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P R E F A C E 
This study on commercial relations between Brazil and the 
United States of America was undertaken within the framework 
of the IPEA-ECLAC Agreement,!/ as part of a Joint research 
program. The institutions share an interest in analyzing 
recent developments in Brazilian exports to the 
industrialized countries and the relative importance of 
import restrictions to these trade flows. The 
Superintendence of IPLAN 2/ and the ECLAC Brasilia Office, 
charged with the execution of the Agreement, defined the 
scope and purpose of a series of studies on Brazil's 
commercial relations with the United States and the European 
Economic Community. 
This study is the first of a series of studies on this 
theme. It focuses on conflict and consensus in the 
commercial relationship between Brazil and the United 
States. The first chapter provides a brief summary of the 
entire study. Chapter II presents a brief description of 
U.S. trade policy and the role of different governmental 
agencies. It also analyses the conflict between free trade 
and protectionism and its impacts on U.S. trade laws. 
Chapter III comments on recent trends in Brazil's trade 
policy, since the inception of the export promotion program 
in particular and explains the main elements, considering 
among other factors its historical background as well as the 
external factors that contributed to changes in the 
orientation of Brazil's trade policy. Chapter IV presents a 
short review of recent trends in bilateral trade between 
Brazil and the United States. The General System of 
Preferences (GSP) program of the United States is also 
examined. Chapter V provides data and background 
information on U.S. import restrictions affecting Brazil 
and estimates their trade coverage. In the final chapter 
(VI), two conflicting conclusions are drawn: Brazil-U.S. 
trade relations are tense because of a combination of 
philosophic and practical differences; yet, at the same 
time, the efforts to resolve trade problems are carried out 
in a more cordial atmosphere than at any time during the 
past decade. The study concludes with recommendations. 
The study was elaborated by the ECLAC Offices in 
Brasilia and Nashington, with the cooperation of Sidney 
Heintraub, Dean Rusk, Professor of the University of Texas 
at Austin, who drafted the final chapter and provided 
comments for the remaining chapters. 
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Apart from the support received from the Coordination 
of Global Planning of IPLAN, the ECLAC Offices in Brasilia 
and Washington received information and comments from trade 
experts in each country at different stages of the execution 
of this study, especially from Mr. Clodoaldo Hugueney 
Filho, Head of the Commercial Policy Division of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brazil, Mr. Tarcisio 
Marciano da Rocha, Head of, and Mr. Adimar Schievelbein, 
Adviser to the Coordination of International Affairs of the 
Ministry of Finance of Brazil. Nonetheless, the information 
and views expressed in this document are the sole 
responsibility of IPEA and ECLAC. 
Notes 
1/ Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Institute for Economic and Social 
Planning (IPEA), related to the Planning Secretary of the 
Presidency of the Republic of Brazil. 
2/ Institute for Planning (IPLAN), body charged with 




The land mass of Brazil (3.3 million square miles) is larger 
than that of the continental United States, but its 
population of 118 million is barely one half, and its per 
capita income only one-fifth that of the United States. 
In many respects the development of Brazil shows 
striking similarities to that of the United States in its 
early growth stage. Beginning with coastal settlements 
along the Atlantic Ocean, both countries strove to open up 
the vast interior; to foster this process, both the United 
States and Brazil decided to move their capital cities away 
from the Eastern seaboard and build new cities incorporating 
modern urban planning techniques and designed specifically 
to serve as capitals. Both countries have ample resource 
bases which facilitated their early agricultural and mineral 
development, followed by industrialization. Both countries 
relied heavily on massive immigration to provide the labour 
force for their growth. 
The Brazilian economy was dependent in the past on 
successive booms of commodity exports starting with sugar, 
which was followed by cotton and then coffee. The drive for 
industrialization may be traced to the 1890s and intensified 
during and following World War II when Brazil was cut off 
from many of its traditional suppliers of manufactured 
goods. During the 1950s and 1960s the process of 
industrialization, which initially had emphasized consumer 
goods, became more complex with the expansion into steel 
mills and the metal-working industries. This led to the 
creation of domestic automobile and aircraft industries, and 
the production of industrial chemicals and pulp and paper 
based on local resources. 
The foundation of this industrialization drive was the 
size and potential growth of the Brazilian market itself. 
This was supplemented by the need to diversify exports and 
the systematic promotion of non-traditional exports. 
Without an industrial base, this diversification of exports 
would not have been possible. Simultaneously, however, new 
non-indu3trial products such as soya, poultry, and orange 
juice, were produced for the export market. More recently, 
in order to overcome the chronic shortage of fuel, a 
sugar-based alcohol for fuel use was developed. 
Brazil's strategy to expand and diversify its exports 
was formulated during the decade of the 1960s. By 1968 
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Brazil was exploring markets for its exports in Africa, 
Asia, and the Middle East, a foresight that paid off when 
the oil price increases of the 1970s consumed ever larger 
amounts of foreign exchange. Despite abundant resources of 
minerals and agricultural products, Brazil has been severely 
hampered in its development by insufficient domestic 
petroleum resources. Thus, the oil crisis which began in 
1973 placed a heavy burden on Brazil, requiring increasing 
foreign-exchange outlays for oil imports, to maintain its 
economic activity. In recent years, oil imports have 
accounted for over 40% of the total value of imports, making 
it imperative to expand exports at a rapid rate to pay for 
imports and to service the growing foreign debt which had 
been accumulated, in part, to finance the oil-induced trade 
deficits. 
Brazilian exports were fueled by an expanding world 
economy in the 1960s and the 1970s, and a domestic policy to 
promote industrial exports was part of the overall 
development plan. Rapid industrialization was financed with 
the help of massive foreign investments and loans which were 
attracted by the potential of the Brazilian market. Foreign 
companies established Brazilian subsidiaries in a wide 
spectrum of industries. In many cases, these subsidiary 
companies became the pioneers of Brazilian manufactured 
exports, particularly within the Latin American region. At 
the same time, policies and instruments to promote exports 
were perfected to enable a wide range of producers to 
participate in this process. 
The 1979-80 increase in oil prices and the subsequent 
recession in the industrialized world provoked a slowdown in 
the rate at which Brazil's exports had been growing. The 
recession brought on calls in industrial countries for 
increasing protection against imports, particularly imports 
of labor intensive products from low-wage countries. 
Brazil suffered the consequences of these protective 
measures at a time when its oil imports and prices were 
still high and interest payments on its foreign debt were 
increasing because of rising interest rates. In the U.S., 
committed officially to a liberal trade policy, the voices 
of protectionism became more powerful. A variety of 
protectionist devices was used. "Voluntary" arrangements 
were worked out to limit imports in order to protect jobs in 
specific industries. Other non-tariff measures were used, 
such as countervailing duties. 
On the other hand, U.S. wholesalers, retailers and 
consumers, and exporters of competitive U.S. products 
expressed their concern at excessive limitations of imports. 
(The 1983 textile agreement with China vividly illustrated 
the conflicting interests at play: the opposing parties 
were the U.S. domestic textile industry on the one hand, 
and consumers and U.S. wheat farmers on the other.) Large 
U.S. corporations exporting sophisticated equipment and 
machinery made known their stake in maintaining open trade 
channels. 
The United States is the largest single merchandise 
exporter to Brazil (excluding petroleum) with $4.1 billion 
in exports in 1980 and $3.5 billion in 1981, representing 
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30% of total Brazilian imports (excluding petroleum). 
The United States is also Brazil's largest export 
market absorbing $4.0 and $5.1 billion in 1982 and 1983, 
respectively, which accounted for 20 and 23% of total 
Brazilian exports. However, in terms of total U.S. 
imports, Brazil ranks tenth among the principal trading 
partners of the U.S. and is surpassed by other developing 
countries such as Mexico, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea. 
Indeed, in relation to overall U.S. imports in 1980 and 
1981 of $240 and $261 billion, respectively, imports from 
Brazil represented barely 1.6 and 1.8%. 
The maintenance of high export growth rates is of 
fundamental importance for the industrial and economic 
development of Brazil and for the financing of its imports 
and foreign debt service. In the sixties and seventies the 
markets of industrialized countries were relatively open for 
Brazilian products. However, the long economic recession in 
these countries and the high growth rates of Brazilian 
exports have provoked increased pressure for restrictions 
against the imports of Brazilian products in spite of its 
still low penetration rates in their markets. 
Brazil has developed a modern and generally efficient 
production apparatus and is now internationally competitive 
in many industrial sectors. This competitiveness is the 
main basis for protectionism in the industrial countries. 
The diminishing competitiveness of many industries in the 
industrial countries makes adjustment to imports 
particularly difficult during an economic recession when 
adjustments to trade penetration are difficult and painful. 
In turn, modern sectors of U.S. industry are exerting 
pressure to open the Brazilian market. A fundamental 
question is thus at stake dealing with the future 
international division of labor. 
Brazil's industrialization process traditionally has 
been largely based on import substitution. This is one of 
the explanatory factors for the existence of export 
disincentives that had to be overcome by the granting of 
subsidies.1/ These subsidies make Brazil's exports 
especially sensitive to import restrictions, principally in 
the United States, where countervailing duties are applied 
more frequently and strictly than in other countries. 
The increase in U.S. protectionism can also be 
explained by the high value of the U.S. dollar which tends 
to favor imports and discourage exports. Furthermore, 
international trade relations have become increasingly 
complicated. Tariffs have been reduced continuously and 
protection has to rely to an ever larger extent on 
non-tariff measures. The economies of industrialized and 
developing countries have become increasingly interrelated. 
The developing countries have for a long time been the most 
dynamic market outlet for many sectors in the industrialized 
countries, principally for capital goods which faced 
sluggish growth in their home markets. The ability of the 
developing countries to service their foreign debt also 
depends to an increasing extent on their export performance. 
The choice between protectionism and open trade in the 
industrialized countries is a complicated one. Exporters, 
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importers and the banking sector generally support the 
maintenance of an open trading system; whereas specific 
economic sectors, trade unions and politicians from areas of 
high unemployment will support protectionist pressures. 
Government agencies involved in the formulation and 
implementations of U.S. trade policy have different 
constituencies and hence varying standpoints. 
Notes 
1/ An important disincentive has traditionally been 
the overvaluation of the exchange rate. 
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Chapter II 
U.S. TRADE POLICY IN RECENT YEARS 
a) Introduction 
In the seventies, the interdependence of the world 
economic system increased significantly. In the United 
States merchandise exports increased from 4.3 to 8.5% of GNP 
between 1970 and 1980. (In the sixties this ratio only 
increased from 4.1 to 4.3.) This growing interdependence was 
accompanied by rapidly changing competitive positions among 
countries due to a series of factors such as large exchange 
rate fluctuations; pronounced differences in the increase 
of production costs, especially unit labor costs; the 
multinationalization of private enterprise, which 
facilitated the internationalization and fragmentation of 
production processes; and the rapid and outward-looking 
growth of the newly industrializing countries. In the 
seventies, there was a further decline in the economic 
hegemony of the United States, as measured by its 
participation in world output and trade.IV 
In this context, trade policy in the United States 
pursued conflicting goals. The growing importance of the 
export sector for the creation of new jobs prompted the U.S. 
Administration to give high priority to its long-term 
commitment to free trade.2/ However, increased imports put 
adjustment pressure on U.S. industry, which aggravated the 
adjustment problem caused by low economic growth and low 
capital formation. Increased protection for U.S. industry 
and labour was thus demanded. These conflicting goals are 
reflected in the two comprehensive trade acts enacted in the 
seventies, the Trade Act of 1974, which authorized the U.S. 
Administration to enter into the Tokyo Round of 
multinational trade negotiations (MTN), and the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979, which incorporated the MTN 
agreements into U.S. trade laws. 
In the early eighties, the stagnation of world trade, 
the sharp increase of unemployment in the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) area, the 
strong appreciation of the U.S. dollar, and the growing 
U.S. deficit in merchandise trade (especially with Japan), 
among other factors, provoked new protectionist-pressures in 
the United States. This pressure was increased because of 
the virtual dismantling of trade adjustment assistance a3 an 
alternative to protection. The early eighties witnessed new 
import relief programs (e.g., for specialty steels), a sharp 
increase in countervailing duty and antidumping actions, and 
special attention in U.S. trade policy to the opening of 
foreign markets for products in which the United States has 
a competitive position: trade in agricultural products, 
high technology products, and services. Because of the 
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importance of remitted profits in the U.S. balance of 
payments, the U.S. maintained its traditional support for 
freedom of capital movements, especially foreign direct 
investment. 
b) The external sector of the U.S. economy in the 
period 1970-1983 
The U.S. trading position in the seventies 
In the period 1970-1980, the external sector of the 
U.S. economy increased significantly: merchandise exports 
increased from 4.3% to 8.5% of GNP. In the same period, 
merchandise imports increased from 4.1 to 9.0% (table II.1). 
Two trends indicate a decline in the relative trading 
position of the United States in the seventies: the 
merchandise trade balance has shown a persistent and 
increasing deficit since 1976 and the U.S. share in world 
merchandise exports declined from 13.6% in 1970 to 10.9% in 
1980 (table II.2).3/ 
Several factors have influenced the competitive 
position of U.S. industry and the growth of the volume of 
U.S. exports, relative to the rest of the world. 
OECD indicators on competitive positions, such as 
relative manufacturing unit labour costs and relative export 
prices in manufacturing, indicate an improvement of the 
competitiveness of U.S. industry in the seventies vis-a-vis 
all its OECD trading partners (table II.3).4/ Relative unit 
labour costs are unit labour costs calculated in a common 
currency; the improvement in the U.S. competitive position 
was due mainly to the depreciation of the dollar. 
The fluctuations in unit labour costs in local 
currency depend on changes in wage costs and productivity. 
In the sixties, unit labour costs in U.S. manufacturing 
increased less than in any of the other seven largest OECD 
countries. In the seventies, the percentage increase was 
higher than in Japan and Germany but lower than in France, 
the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada. Hourly earnings in 
U.S. manufacturing increased less than in other major OECD 
countries, except for Germany. The increase was well below 
that in France, the United Kingdom and Italy. Conversely, 
the deceleration of average productivity growth, a common 
feature in most OECD countries, was particularly sharp in 
the United States.5/ 
The average annual volume increase of U.S. 
merchandise exports in the seventies (6.9%) was higher than 
the (mean) volume increase of all industrial market 
economies (5.8%), although considerably below the growth 
rate of Japan's export volume (8.9%) (table II.2). 
The developing countries, especially the newly 
industrializing countries (NICs), showed high export growth 
rates and accounted for an increasing share of U.S. imports 
of manufactures. Comparative advantages in many industrial 
sectors moved to these countries^because of lower costs for 
labor and raw materials. High growth in output and capital 
formation, together with the transfer to these countries of 
the latest technologies, permitted the NICs to build a 
modern and competitive production apparatus. They became 
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especially competitive in sectors which combine mature 
production techniques with cheap labour and raw materials. 
The multinationalization of private enterprise and the 
international fragmentation of production processes also 
contributed to the export growth of NICs. Their export 
success can also be explained by the outward-looking 
orientation of their economic and trade policies. 
In the seventies, the export volume of the Latin 
American and Asian NICs increased at an annual average 
growth rate of 12.4%. 
The developing countries' share of U.S. imports of 
manufactures increased from 14% in 1970 to 24% in 1980. 
Manufactured imports from developing countries are 
concentrated in relatively few categories such as clothing, 
footwear and consumer electronics (table II.4). 
The current account of the U.S. balance of payments 
The U.S. merchandise trade balance has shown 
persistent and increasing deficits since 1976. The deficit 
reached $69 billion in 1983 (table II.1). 
The balance of international transactions has become 
more pronounced for both surplus and deficit sectors. With 
respect to merchandise trade, the seventies witnessed an 
increasing trade surplus in agricultural products and high 
technology (or R&D-intensive) manufactures. Conversely, the 
deficit in low technology manufactures also increased 
significantly (table II.5). 
Trade in services and return on direct investment 
abroad have shown a substantial surplus and have tended to 
compensate for the deficit in merchandise trade. A high 
proportion of the foreign-exchange earnings of the U.S. 
service industry comes from remitted earnings from foreign 
investment. The surplus in the total service and investment 
account increased from $6.4 billion in 1970 to $36.1 billion 
in 1980 (table II.6). Service earnings by the U.S., 
including direct foreign investment earnings, are estimated 
to have reached about $35 billion in 1980, resulting in a 
surplus in trade of goods and services of more than $7 
billion. 
In 1981, total net investment income showed a surplus 
of $33 billion (table II.6). The direct U.S. investment 
position abroad increased from $90 billion in 1972 to $227 
billion in 1981, attaining an average annual increase of 
about $15 billion.6/ A high proportion of U.S. investment 
abroad can be explained by the increase in the international 
operations of the services industry. Due to its particular 
nature, international transactions in services often require 
the establishment of affiliates abroad. Direct foreign 
investment has great importance for the U.S. economy and 
the current account balance. Earnings from direct 
investment as a percentage of total profits of U.S. 
corporations have grown from 12% in 1970 to 33% in 1980.2/ 
There is also a strong link between U.S. investment abroad 
and U.S. merchandise trade. According to the Department of 
Commerce, about one-third of all U.S. exports in 1977 were 




The oil price increase in 1979-1980 provoked new 
inflationary pressures in the OECD area and a transfer of 
real income to OPEC. Contrary to what had happened after 
the 1973-1974 oil price increase, monetary policy was 
generally non-accommodating and real interest rates rose in 
nearly all countries. This was the case especially in the 
United States where non-accommodating monetary policy was 
combined with an expansionary fiscal policy. U.S. interest 
rates rose to unprecedented levels, especially in late 1981 
and 1982. 
The economic recession lasted much longer than 
expected. The U.S. economy started to recover only in late 
1982. World trade almost stagnated in the 1980-1982 period 
and unemployment rose to high levels in all major OECD 
countries, except for Japan. Total unemployment in the OECD 
area rose to about 34 million persons in 1983, about 9% of 
the total labour force. Youth unemployment rates reached 
17% in 1982. U.S. unemployment was almost 10% in 1982, but 
began to decline in 1983. 
The rise in interest rate differentials in 1980-1981 
provoked a strong appreciation of the dollar,9/ seriously 
affecting the competitiveness of U.S. exports and 
increasing import competition in the U.S. domestic market 
(table II.7). The deterioration of the U.S. merchandise 
trade balance had no apparent impact on the dollar, as 
exchange rates in the eighties have been affected more by 
interest rate differentials and other financial 
considerations. 
In the eighties, the combination of expansionist 
fiscal policy with non-accommodating monetary policy has 
been the main reason for the strength of the dollar. 10/ 
The combination of a faster economic recovery than in 
other OECD countries, the balance-of-payments and debt 
service problems of non-OECD countries, and the strength of 
the dollar have put strong pressure on the U.S. merchandise 
trade balance. This deficit was $69.4 billion ($22 billion 
with Japan) in 1983 and $123.3 billion in 1984 ($36.8 with 
Japan). 
Protectionist demands have increased further, 
especially in the steel industry, and so has the probability 
that these demands will result in protective measures. 
c) U.S. trade policy 
The institutional framework of U.S. foreign trade 
policy 
Many agencies have responsibility for designing and 
implementing U.S. international trade policy. The 
management of trade policy has been subject to 
reorganization in recent years. 
The Office of the Special Representative for Trade 
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Negotiations, created in January 1963 and charged with 
administering trade agreement programs, has been assigned 
increasing powers and responsibilities over the course of 
time. The Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, implemented 
on January 4 1980, changed its name to the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR).11/ It charged the 
Office with responsibility for setting and administering 
overall trade policy. It also provided that the U.S. Trade 
Representative shall be the chief representative of the 
United States for all trade activities of GATT, OECD, UNCTAD 
and other multilateral institutions. 
USTR chairs the cabinet-level interagency Trade Policy 
Committee (TPC). With the advice of this body and its 
subordinate bodies (see chart 1), USTR has primary 
responsibility for developing international trade policy and 
co-ordinating its implementation. 
USTR is responsible for the conduct of unfair trade 
investigations under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 
and for recommending appropriate action to the President. 
The U.S. Department of Commerce was established in 
1903 to "foster, promote and develop the foreign and 
domestic commerce" of the United States. The Department of 
Commerce provides data on a wide range of activities related 
to the economic and technological development of the United 
States' foreign trade. The International Trade 
Administration (ITA) was established on January 2 1980. 
Important units within ITA are the Trade Administration (TA) 
unit responsible for the conduct of subsidy and less than 
fair value investigations; the Trade Development (TD) unit, 
which carries out programs to promote foreign trade and to 
strengthen the international trade and development position 
of the United States; and the International Economic Policy 
(IEP) unit, whose principal immediate goal is the reduction 
of foreign government barriers that impede U.S. 
international trade and development.. IEP plays a major role 
in monitoring and implementing multilateral trade 
agreements. 
The International Trade Commission (ITC) is an 
independent agency that was created in 1916 as the U.S. 
Tariff Commission. In 1974 it obtained its present name. 
ITC conducts investigations on a broad range of topics 
related to international trade and U.S. trade laws. ITC is 
charged with making injury determinations in countervailing 
and antidumping investigations and in investigations under 
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. The ITC advises the 
President about the probable economic effects on domestic 
industry and consumers of U.S. concessions in international 
trade agreements and of the assignment of articles for 
duty-free treatment under the U.S. GSP program. It is also 
charged with the responsibility to analyse whether or not 
imports of agricultural products interfere with support 
programs of the Department of Agriculture. ITC publishes a 
series of summaries on trade and tariff information. 
The Department of Agriculture recommends to the 
President whether he should direct ITC to conduct 
investigations on the interference of agricultural imports 
with support programs (Section 22 of the Agricultural 
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Adjustment Act). 
The Department of Labor administers the Trade 
Adjustment Assistance Program. 
The Secretary of State, the principal foreign policy 
adviser to the President, is responsible for the overall 
direction, co-ordination, and supervision of U.S. foreign 
relations and for the interdepartmental activities of the 
U.S. Government overseas. 
The Secretary of the Treasury has primary 
responsibility for general economic policy and international 
monetary affairs. The Treasury Department participates in 
trade policy decisions to ensure that such decisions include 
a consideration of their impact on the U.S. economy, 
especially on inflation and employment. 
The Customs Service collects the revenue from imports, 
and enforces customs and related laws, and administers the 
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and other customs laws. 
Export promotion and sectoral assistance 
Many federal agencies are charged with granting 
assistance and support to U.S. export sectors. 
The Department of Commerce operates the U.S. and 
Foreign Commercial Service (FCS), which is charged with 
seeking out trade opportunities and providing general 
support to U.S. exporters. The Department of Agriculture 
operates the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), a 
promotional agency for agricultural exports. Both agencies 
have trade experts, marketing specialists and negotiators 
stationed in the United States and abroad. 
The Export-Import Bank (EXIMBANK) provides export 
credits, export credit insurance and export credit 
guarantees. Long-term direct credits to a foreign borrower 
are normally granted for the purchase of U.S. capital 
goods. EXIMBANK is intended to be a self-sustaining agency. 
It is a primary objective of the United States in 
multilateral forums such as OECD and GATT to negotiate the 
elimination of all subsidies in export financing. However, 
"in recent years, high interest rates and the increasing 
tendency of foreign governments to heavily subsidize export 
financing, placed U.S. exporters at a competitive 
disadvantage. In response, EXIMBANK's role expanded to 
provide subsidized interest support for U.S. companies to 
offset the advantages foreign companies obtained from 
subsidized export credits".12/ 
Export credit insurance is also provided by the 
Foreign Credit Insurance Association (FCIA), an association 
of commercial insurance companies formed in 1961 by EXIMBANK 
and the insurance industry. 
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 
insures U.S. investors in developing countries by providing 
political risk insurance against expropriation, 
inconvertibility, war risk and civil strife. OPIC also 
provides, on a limited basi3, direct loans and loan 
guarantees to U.S. investors to support their participation 
in projects in developing countries. 
The Small Business Administration (SBA), an 
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independent federal agency, advises and assists small and 
medium-sized firms. SBA's aid consists of loan guarantees 
(with a current ceiling of $500 000) and direct loans.13/ 
"Small" business is defined broadly. 
The Small Business Investment Corporation (SBIC), 
which works alongside SBA, advises small and medium-sized 
firms on their investment operations. 
The United States has some sectoral support programs. 
Under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, 
construction-differential subsidies (CDS) may be paid to 
American shipbuilders for the construction of certain ships. 
CDS can be defined as the difference in costs between having 
a ship constructed in a foreign shipyard and having the same 
ship constructed in a U.S. shipyard. Due to the cost 
differential, subsidization is necessary to place the 
construction costs of ships built in the United States on a 
parity with foreign construction costs. The program is 
intended to encourage the growth and maintenance of both the 
U.S. merchant marine and the U.S. shipbuilding industry. 
In July 1977, the Administration initiated the 
Footwear Industry Revitalization Program for a period of 
three years and with funds on the order of $56 million.14/ A 
programme of assistance to the steel industry provides for 
loans on the order of $500 million to finance plant 
modernization and conversion operations. 
A controversial issue was the Domestic International 
Sales Corporation (DISC), that allowed the deferral of U.S. 
income tax on a portion of export earnings. 
The EEC has questioned the legitimacy of DISC and in 
1976 a GATT panel found DISC to be inconsistent with the 
rules of GATT.15/ In 1981 the GATT Council adopted a 
qualifier that recognized the legitimacy of territorial 
systems of taxation, exonerating — i n the view of the U.S. 
Government— DISC. The Twenty-Sixth Report of the President 
of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program 
1981-1982, futher observes that: "However, the EC and other 
countries insisted that DISC was not consistent with the 
GATT regulations on export subsidies. Since DISC had become 
a highly contentious issue and threatened to slow progress 
on other important trade problems, the United States 
announced at the October GATT Council meeting that the U.S. 
Government would propose amending the DISC legislation to 
bring it into conformity with GATT; and the Department of 
the Treasury was preparing an analysis of various proposals 
for changing DISC to serve as the basis for a Cabinet 
selection of the eventual proposal to Congress".16/ 
In 1984, the Congress created the Foreign Sales 
Corporation (FSCA) to replace the DISC in granting tax 
incentives to exporters. Under the new regulations export 
sales must be made through a foreign sales corporation 
incorporated outside U.S. customs territory. In the 
opinion of EC authorities, FSCA may be continuing to grant 
export subsidies in violation of the GATT rules. In GATT, 
the representative of the European Communities mentioned 




The liberalization of international trade in services 
and the establishment of internationally agreed upon codes 
has been given priority in U.S. trade policy. 
There are various reasons for this. The United States 
relies increasingly on its highly efficient service industry 
to offset the deficits in its merchandise trade. Due to the 
domestic recession, exports became relatively more important 
for the maintenance of the U.S. service industry growth. 
The export of services also has a significant impact on 
merchandise trade because of follow-up exports, principally 
of capital goods and equipment. The U.S. service industry 
feels it has been facing increasing restrictions on its 
international operations with respect to both exports and 
the establishment of affiliates abroad.18/ 
The Trade Act of 1974 is aimed at reducing barriers to 
international trade, and included the service sector in the 
mandate given to the President to initiate multilateral 
trade negotiations. The Act also extended the President's 
power to retaliate against foreign unfair trade practices 
(Section 301) in the service sector. 
Other manifestations of the growing attention to the 
service sector were the elaboration in 1976 of a 
comprehensive study by an interagency group chaired by the 
Department of Commerce and two studies funded by the Office 
of the USTR.19/ 
The Office of the USTR also prepared, with the support 
of the private sector, a computerized list of rules and 
regulations that affect international service trade as well 
as position papers on particular service industries. 
Several governmental and private sector committees 
were established relating to international service trade, 
including the Services Policy Advisory Group (SPAC), co-
ordinated by the Office of the USTR, a Commerce Department 
Committee and the Service Industry Committee of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce. 
In April 1981, the Reagan Administration launched a 
five point program for the service industry calling for:20/ 
- full use of existing bilateral arrangements with 
other governments to resolve current trade problems 
brought to the government's attention by the private 
sector; 
- inclusion of services in the review of export 
disincentives;21/ 
- domestic and international preparations for 
future multilateral negotiations on services; 
- review of domestic legislative provisions relating 
to the achievement of reciprocity for U.S. service 
industries;22/ 
- review of the adequacy of U.S. statistics on trade 
in services. 
Internationally, the U.S. policy towards services 
aims at (1) establishing a political commitment for 
improving international co-operation on trade in services 
(at first in the OECD and later in the GATT ministerial 
meeting in November, 1982); (2) resisting new barriers and 
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solving current problems; and (3) developing rules for 
trade in services.23/ 
In the GATT ministerial meeting in November 1982, 
contracting parties were invited to conduct, to the extent 
possible, a national examination of their service 
industries. 
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 strengthened the 
place of services in the negotiation and retaliation 
authority of the administration. 
d) The conflict between free trade and protectionism 
Demands for protection have increased since the 
seventies in almost all OECD countries. As tariffs have 
been reduced significantly, these demands have been 
principally of a non-tariff nature. The "new protectionism" 
consists basically of non-tariff restrictions, such as 
quotas, fiscal and financial assistance to domestic 
industries, and attempts to organize international trade on 
the basis of agreements such as "Voluntary" Restraint 
Agreements (VRAs) and Orderly Marketing Agreements (OMAs). 
Countervailing and antidumping actions, although, in 
principle, intended to correct distortions caused by 
"unfair" trade practices, often have been initiated with 
protectionist purposes. 
The macroeconomic costs of protectionism are very 
high. Protectionism affects consumers because of its 
inflationary impact, by reducing real income and by limiting 
the consumer's choices.24/ 
Restricting imports in one industry hurts other 
industries. For example, steel prices above world market 
levels raise the price of automobiles and other steel-using 
industries, which become less competitive on the world 
market. 
Macroeconomic efficiency is affected by allowing less 
productive sectors to retain employment and absorb resources 
that otherwise could be employed in more efficient 
activities. Export sectors are affected because 
protectionism tends to attract retaliation and because 
foreign countries, whose exports are restrained, reduce 
their external purchases, especially if these are developing 
countries whose import capacity is closely related to export 
earnings. 
Attempts to organize international trade on the basis 
of market participation agreements stimulate the formation 
of international cartels, discourage efforts to increase 
productivity and tend to freeze existing patterns of 
production and trade. 
Government assistance to import sensitive sectors can 
be justified, in principle, if it is temporary and permits a 
more harmonious adaptation to changing comparative 
advantages. However, the impact is often to increase 
production capacity without correcting the infficiency of 
beneficiary sectors. Under these circumstances these 
sectors tend to request continuous and increasing 
protection. 
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In spite of the clear macroeconomic costs of 
protectionism and the commitment to free trade of the 
governments of all industrialized countries, protectionist 
demands often result in effective trade restrictions. This 
has been explained by several factors. While the benefits 
of free trade are dispersed among many sectors and persons, 
adjustment costs to imports tend to be concentrated in a few 
sectors, regions and/or occupational groups. It is easier 
to identify industries that will be affected by increased 
imports than to indicate which sectors will benefit from 
free trade. The costs of free trade are felt immediately, 
and by specific groups, and tend to receive more attention 
from politicians than its long term benefits. Although 
imports may not be the main source of damage to particular 
industries, they constitute a factor which can easily be 
identified and it is politically attractive to blame imports 
for the damage. 
The conflict between free trade and protectionism was 
reflected in the trade acts enacted in the seventies. The 
annex gives some background information on the legislative 
history and processes. 
22 
Annex 
The U.S. Trade Agreements Program 
Two comprehensive trade acts were enacted in the 
seventies. The Trade Act of 1974 paved the way for the U.S. 
Administration to enter into the Tokyo Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations (MTN) in February 1975, by authorizing 
the President to negotiate multilateral trade agreements. 
The MTN agreements were authorized and incorporated into 
U.S. law by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. In late 
1984, Congress passed the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. 
The Trade Act of 1974 
The Trade Act of 1974 renewed (for a period of five 
years) the authority of the President to negotiate 
international trade agreements (granted by the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962) and extended that authority to the 
non-tariff area. A main purpose of the Act was to 
contribute to the reduction or elimination of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers in the international trading system. 
Domestic resistance to U.S. concessions in MTN was relaxed 
by improving adjustment assistance programs.2J5/ Other 
provisions were intended to protect U.S. industry and labor 
against foreign competition. 
Section 201 relaxed the criteria for the granting of 
import relief to industries which suffered injury from 
increased imports.26/ Section 301 granted retaliatory powers 
to the President of the United States, by authorizing 
actions against "unjustifiable or unreasonable" import and 
tariff restrictions imposed by foreign countries on U.S. 
goods and services and on U.S. access to supplies. The 
retaliatory powers included actions against dumping, 
subsidies and other "unfair trade practices". 
The countervailing duty provisions were extended to 
include duty-free articles (but only when injury can be 
demonstrated). Time limits were imposed upon the 
determination of the Treasury Department and U.S. producers 
obtained the right to judicial review of negative 
determinations. 
The President was authorized to administer the U.S. 
GSP program which grants duty-free treatment to eligible 
articles imported from beneficiary developing countries. To 
protect U.S. industry and labour, special categories of 
import-sensitive articles were excluded from designation as 
GSP-articles, and competitive need limits were designed (see 
Chapter IV, Section c). Institutional changes were: 
- the change in name from the U.S. Tariff Commission 
to the U.S. International Trade Commission composed 
of six members, each serving one nine-year term, 
with increased advisory duties; 
- the establishment of an overall Advisory Committee 
for Trade Negotiations and general policy advisory 
committees for industry, labor and agriculture; 
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- the establishment of the Office of the Special 
Trade Representative within the Executive Office of 
the President, and the raise of the trade 
negotiator's rank to cabinet level. 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 
The trade agreements negotiated by the United States 
in MTN, under the Trade Act of 1974, were approved and 
implemented by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, which 
authorized a number of changes in U.S. trade laws. 
The Act incorporated into U.S. law the MTN agreements 
on countervailing and antidumping duties, customs valuation, 
government procurement, product standards, civil aircraft, 
agricultural agreements on meat and dairy products as well 
as on liquor duties. 
The Act became effective on June 19 1979. The 
principal provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 are 
as follows: 
- The Act required a demonstration of injury for the 
imposition of countervailing duties (except for dutiable 
imports from non-agreement countries), allowed the 
administering agency (currently the Department of Commerce) 
to self-initiate investigations, set new procedures to 
shorten investigations, and allowed suspension of the 
investigations with undertakings between interested parties. 
(Title I - Countervailing and Antidumping Duties.) 
- The Act simplified the process of assessing duties 
and repealed the American Selling Price (ASP) system of 
valuation (which based duties for some chemicals and rubber 
footwear on the price of comparable domestic products). ASP 
rates of duty were converted into tariffs. (Title II -
Customs Valuations.) 
- The Act gave the President the authority, beginning 
January 1 1981, to waive the application of discriminatory 
government procurement laws such as the Buy American Act for 
purchases covered by the agreement. The Government 
procurement laws used to give domestic bidders on government 
contracts a 6% price preference over foreign bidders, 12% 
for small business or labor surplus areas, and 50% for 
Defense Department procurement. (Title III - Government 
Procurement.) 27/ 
- The Act implemented tariff concessions that exceeded 
the authority granted to the President by the 1974 Trade Act 
and made other technical changes in U.S. tariff schedules. 
It allowed the President to give the least-developed 
countries full tariff reductions (instead of phased 
reductions stretching over eight years) on non-
import-sensitive products. (Title V - Tariff Negotiations.) 
- The Trade Agreements Act authorized the President to 
take action against unreasonable foreign trade practices 
under the current agreements and open consultation with the 
foreign country involved. If the dispute could not be 
resolved through bilateral consultations, then the Trade 
Representative could request proceedings under the 
international dispute settlement procedures of GATT; time 
limits were set for the USTR recommendation to the President 
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(12 months). (Title IK - Enforcement.) 
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 28/ 
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 addresses the 
priority items of the trade policy of the Reagan 
Administration, such as the renewal of the GSP, authority to 
negotiate a free trade area with Israel, and the 
strengthening of services, high technology goods and trade 
related investment in both negotiation and retaliation 
authorities of the President. 
The principal provisions of the Act are: 
- The renewal until July 4 1993 of the U.S. GSP 
program which was due to expire in January of 1985. The 
renewal act includes elements of negotiability by providing 
narrower competitive need limits for specific countries and 
articles considered to be "competitive", but at the same 
time allowing the President to waive, under quantitative 
restrictions, these competitive need limits, considering 
among other factors the access that the United States is 
granted to the home market of the beneficiary country in 
question. (Title V.) 
- The Act provides ample negotiation authority to the 
President and strengthens his retaliatory authority. The 
Act grants authority to the Administration to conclude the 
negotiations for a free trade area with Israel and to 
negotiate tariff agreements with other countries. The Act 
strengthens the place of services, high technology goods and 
trade related investment in both the negotiation and 
retaliatory authority of the Administration. (Title III: 
The International Trade and investment Act.) The Act also 
requires USTR to prepare annual reports on foreign barriers 
to U.S. goods, services and trade related investment. 
- The Act provides changes in the laws which grant 
protection against fair and unfair import competition. Some 
important provisions are: 
i) It modifies the definition of "serious injury" in 
Escape Clause investigation. 
ii) With regard to the antidumping laws, it 
facilitates self-initiation of investigations in cases of 
"persistent" dumping (by providing that the Department of 
Commerce may monitor imports of a product from countries 
where dumping is suspected, provided that the product has 
been found to be dumped by two or more other countries and 
that the Department of Commerce must self-initiate 
investigations if sufficient evidence exists). 
iii) With regard to anti-subsidy investigations, the 
law codifies the concept of "upstream subsidization" 
(subsidies not granted directly to the product under 
investigation, but to one of its principal components), 
already an existing practice of the Department of Commerce 
(but not dealt with in the GATT Subsidy Code or the Tariff 
Act of 1930). 
iv) The Act makes suspension agreements subject to a 
"public interest test". 
v) Concerning injury investigations, the Act requires 
the ITC to "cumulate" the imports from several countries 
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when determining its effects on a U.S. industry. 
Cumulation used to be a matter of individual discretion of 
the Commissioners, but the Act makes it mandatory. With 
regard to small suppliers like Brazil this means that it 
will be easier to reach affirmative injury findings. It may 
also encourage petitioners to include a larger number of 
countries in their complaints. 
- The Act enforces the granting of import relief to 
the steel industry (The Steel Import Stabilization Act). 
Imports will be limited to a 18.5% share of the domestic 
market. In return, the steel industry must devote its net 
cash flow to reinvestment and worker retraining. 
- The Act creates a Trade Remedy Assistance Office, 
located within the ITC, to provide technical assistance to 
small business in preparing and filing petitions and 
applications to obtain relief against fair and unfair import 
competition. 
U.S. import restrictions 
The principal, overt, non-tariff restrictions that can 
be imposed by the U.S. (on imports from non-centrally 
planned economies) are antidumping and countervailing duties 
and a series of quantitative restrictions such as those 
under import relief programs, including OMAs and VRAs, 
restraints under the MFA and quotas for agricultural 
products. Retaliatory actions can be taken under Section 
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 ("unfair trade practices"); 
these actions refer principally to exports of foreign 
countries to third country markets. 
Antidumping and countervailing duties can be imposed 
when dumped or subsidized imports cause material injury to a 
U.S. industry (see next sections). Antidumping and 
countervailing duty actions increased very significantly in 
recent years, especially against steel imports.29/ In 
September 1982, the Department of Commerce was conducting 56 
countervailing duty and 25 antidumping cases. 
Relief to industries affected by increases in imports 
—although neither dumped nor subsidized— may be granted 
under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.30/ ITC is 
charged with determining whether the imports are in such 
increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of injury 
to a domestic industry.31/ ITC may recommend one or more of 
the following measures to the President of the United 
States: (1) imposing or increasing a duty on the imported 
article by as much as 50% of the existing rate; (2) 
proclaiming a tariff-rate quota; (3) imposing or modifying 
a quantitive restriction on the import of the article; (4) 
negotiating an orderly marketing agreement. 
The President has to consider the national economic 
interest and he can reject the ITC recommendation. However 
if he does so. Congress may override the President by a 
simple majority vote and enforce the measures recommended by 
ITC. 
The import relief measures which received much 
attention are the OMAs negotiated with Korea and Taiwan, 
limiting the exports of non-rubber footwear (1977) and 
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colour television receivers and subassemblies (1978).32/ In 
1983 import relief measures were issued against imports of 
specialty steels (Section V.d.). In late 1984, the steel 
industry was granted relief under the Steel Import 
Stabilization Act. 
Imports of textiles and apparel can be restrained 
under bilateral agreements in the framework of the MFA. In 
the United States, textile agreements are authorized by 
Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, as amended. 
The MFA has been effective in restricting U.S. textile and 
apparel imports.33/ 
Under Section 22 of the Agricultural Act of 1933, as 
amended, imports of certain agricultural commodities are 
restricted by quotas or fees to prevent interference with 
price support programs operated by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. Import restrictions are in force on cotton and 
certain cotton products, peanuts, certain dairy products and 
sugar. 
Under Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, the 
President of the U.S. is authorized to negotiate agreements 
with foreign governments limiting exports to the United 
States of agricultural commodities and manufactured products 
as well as textiles. 
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 declares as 
unlawful any unfair method of competition and unfair acts in 
the importation of articles into the United States, the 
effect of which is to injure a domestic industry. Until 
recently. Section 337 had been used almost exclusively 
against the importation of articles allegedly infringing 
upon U.S. patents. As a result of frustration with the 
administration of the antidumping laws, however, American 
industry began to turn to Section 337 for relief in price-
discrimination cases.34/ 
Under Section 301 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1974, 
as amended, the President of the U.S. is "required to take 
all appropiate action, including retaliation, to obtain the 
removal of any act, policy or practice of a foreign 
government which violates an international agreement or is 
unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens 
or restricts U.S. commerce". The Trade and Tariff Act of 
1984 clarifies that services, high technology goods and 
trade-related investment are fully covered by the provisions 
of Section 301. 
Section 301 investigations are administered by USTR 
with the advice of an interagency committee. 
Petitions under Section 301 against GATT member 
countries normally allege that foreign governments provide 
subsidies which are inconsistent with their obligations 
under the GATT subsidy code. Often these subsidies are 
alleged to be granted on exports to third country markets. 
If disputes cannot be solved bilaterally, they can be 
presented to GATT within the framework of the formal dispute 
settlement procedures. 
History of countervailing duty and antidumping- laws 
The Antidumping Act of 1921 was defended with the 
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argument that U.S. industry —principally the chemical 
industry— needed protection against German cartels.35/ U.S. 
antidumping laws were modified several times, but these 
modifications referred to particular problems such as the 
computation of the comparable ex-factory value of 
merchandise subject to investigation in the home market of 
the exporting country and procedural questions. The 
substantive provisions of the original statute have remained 
largely intact.36/ 
In 1954, under the Customs Simplification Act, the 
authority to determine whether or not a U.S. industry was 
injured by dumping was transferred from the Secretary of the 
Treasury to the Tariff Commission. 
The Trade Act of 1974 set time limits, introduced 
procedural modifications, and established the right of U.S. 
industry to judicial review of certain negative 
determinations. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 narrowed 
some time limits and introduced further procedural 
modifications. 
The first countervailing duty statute was established 
as part of the Tariff Act of 1890 to protect sugar producers 
from subsidized imports. The first general countervailing 
duty law was created by the Tariff Act of 1897. The 
Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to impose 
countervailing duties equal to net subsidies granted by 
foreign governments on export of dutiable articles. This 
provision did not apply to duty-free articles which were 
considered as non-competitive with domestic production. The 
coverage of the countervailing duty laws was increased in 
1913 and 1922 and subsidies on production and subsidies 
granted by the private sector also became countervailable. 
Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 authorized the 
Secretary of the Treasury to estimate the net amount of 
subsidies received on articles imported into the U.S. The 
Tariff Act was not amended until the enactment of the Trade 
Act of 1974. All this time, no injury demonstration was 
required and the affirmation of subsidization was the only 
requirement for the imposition of countervailing duties. 
For this reason, U.S. legislation became conflictive with 
GATT provisions when this body was created in 1947. Because 
the U.S. legislation on countervailing duties was enacted 
prior to the creation of GATT, the U.S. was free from the 
obligation to institute an injury investigation, under the 
"grandfather clause". The Trade Act was a compromise 
between the efforts of the Treasury Department to bring 
countervailing duty provisions in line with GATT and 
pressure to guarantee the protection of U.S. industry and 
labour against subsidized imports. The principal points 
introduced by the Trade Act of 1974 are: 
- the extension of the coverage of countervailing duty 
proceedings to duty-free articles, but only if 
injury was demonstrated by ITC; 
- the imposition of time limits upon the subsidy 
investigations carried out by the Treasury 
Department; 
- the establishment of the right to judicial review 
of negative countervailing duty determinations; 
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- the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized 
(subject to a veto of a majority of either the House 
of Representatives or the Senate) to waive the 
imposition of countervailing duties during a four-
year period beginning on January 3 1975 if the 
exporting country had taken adequate steps to reduce 
the subsidies or to eliminate its adverse impact on 
U.S. industry, or if the imposition of 
countervailing duties would hamper the successful 
conclusion of international trade agreements.37/ 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 incorporated the 
principal elements of the GATT subsidy code, agreed to in 
MTN, into U.S. countervailing duty provisions. An 
affirmative injury determination became a precondition for 
the imposition of countervailing duties. However, the U.S. 
limited the right to injury investigations to "countries 
under the agreement".38/ With respect to "agreement 
countries" an injury determination is thus required whether 
or not the merchandise is dutiable. With respect to other 
countries an injury investigation takes place only in the 
case of duty-free merchandise. 
Agencies charged with responsibilities for 
antidumping and countervailing duties 
Effective January 2 1980, the Secretary of Commerce 
established the International Trade Administration (ITA). 
The Trade Administration (TA) unit is charged with the 
administration of antidumping and countervailing duty laws, 
among other responsibilities.39/ Several offices, which 
operate under the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import 
Administration, conduct investigations and implement 
policies: 
- the Office of Investigations carries out 
investigations on subsidies and exports at 
less-than-fair value. The office is divided into 
several divisions according to geographical areas; 
- the Office of Policy has responsibility for the 
development of a coherent and consistent 
interpretation of the applicable laws; 
- the Office of Compliance is responsible for 
computing the correct amount of the duty.40/ 
The International Trade Commission (ITC) is required 
to determine whether an industry in the United States is 
materially injured, threatened with material injury, or the 
establishment of an industry in the United States is 
materially retarded by reason of imports of merchandise for 
which subsidies are (alleged to be) paid 41/ and which enter 
into the United States at less than fair value 
(collectively, material injury). Material injury is defined 
as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial or 
unimportant".42/ 
Dumping and subsidy investigations 
Both dumping and subsidization permit exports at lower 
prices than those prevailing in the domestic market of the 
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exporting country. (At a comparable level, normally the 
ex-factory price is considered.) In the case of subsidies, 
lower export prices are possible because benefits are 
granted on export, normally by the government, which are not 
available for domestic market operations. In the case of 
dumping, a lower export price is the result of the price 
policy of individual firms, which establish different prices 
— a t a comparable level— for different markets. Often 
dumping involves prices which are insufficient to cover the 
long-term production costs. 
U.S. trade legislation does not provide a clear 
definition of subsidies. However, Section 771(5) of the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 provides an illustrative list 
of countervailable export and domestic subsidies.43/ 
Dumping is referred to as sales of foreign merchandise 
at "less than its fair value". Generally this implies that 
the ex-factory value of merchandise exported to the United 
States is lower than the comparable ex-factory price of the 
merchandise at the home market of the exporter. 
The content of inlurv investigations in antidumping 
and countervailing duty cases 
The main issues in injury investigations in 
antidumping and countervailing duty cases are: 
i) The definition of U.S. industry 
U.S. industry is defined as "the domestic producers 
of a like product, or those producers whose collective 
output of the like product constitutes a major proportion of 
the total domestic producers of that product".44/ U.S. 
industry refers to all industries located within the customs 
territory of the U.S., including foreign-owned industries. 
However, industries which are related to importers or 
exporters of the product subject to investigation may be 
excluded from the U.S. industry definition. In certain 
cases, U.S. industry can be divided into two or more 
regional industries. "Like product" is defined as "a 
product which is like, or in the absence of like, most 
similar in characteristics and uses with the article subject 
to investigation". The like product is normally defined as 
the narrowest range of products for which separate data (on 
production, profits, etc.) can be made available. A more 
specific definition of like product, e.g., on the basis of 
characteristics, use or quality, tends to increase the 
probability of an affirmative injury determination, because 
imports are related to a smaller market segment and will 
have a stronger impact on the corresponding U.S. industry. 
ii) Material injury 
The principal factors which ITC must consider in 
making its determination on whether material injury has 
occurred are the volume of imports of the merchandise under 
investigation, their impact on price, and the consequent 
impact of the imports on the domestic industry. 
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- The increase of the volume of imports of the 
merchandise subject to investigation is estimated both in 
absolute terms and in relation to U.S. apparent 
consumption, U.S. production, etc. 
- Low-priced imports are considered to have affected 
domestic prices if they contribute to a decline in U.S. 
market prices (underpricing or underselling) or have impeded 
price increases that could be considered normal, e.g., 
because of an increase in the costs to the domestic industry 
for labour, energy and/or other inputs (price suppression). 
- Maybe the most important question in injury 
determination is whether U.S. industry has lost sales to 
low-priced imports. This part of the investigation normally 
is carried out by verification of lost sales allegations 
with purchasers of the merchandise in question, and special 
attention is paid to determine if the foreign price has been 
a major consideration in substituting low-priced imports for 
U.S. products. 
- The impact of imports on U.S. industry is analysed 
on the basis of an evaluation of all economic factors 
relevant to the state of the industry, especially (1) actual 
and potential decline in output, sales, market share, 
profits, productivity, return on investment, and utilization 
of capacity, (2) factors affecting domestic prices and (3) 
actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, 
inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise 
capital, and investment (Section 771(7)(c)(iii)). 
iii) The threat of material injury 
If no material injury has occurred an affirmative 
injury determination can be issued on the basis of the 
existence of a threat of material injury. 
Until recently, U.S. countervailing duty laws did not 
provide clear guidelines about the factors to be considered 
to determining whether a threat of injury exists. ITC 
normally makes its threat determinations on the basis of 
trend indicators, such as the rate of increase of the 
subsidized exports to the United States, the capacity of the 
exporting country to generate exports, and the likelihood 
that such exports will be directed to the U.S. market. The 
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 includes several new indicators 
which must be analysed when determining the threat of 





1/ U.S. participation in world output declined from 
40.3% in 1955 to 23.7% in 1980 (measured at current prices 
and exchange rates). In the same period the U.S. share of 
world merchandise trade declined from 16.5 to 10.9%. (The 
World Bank World Development Report 1982, table 3.2, p. 22.) 
2/ A recent study concluded that 80% of all new 
manufacturing jobs created in the late 1970s were linked to 
exports. See: Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the President 
of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program 
1981-1982, p. 3. 
3/ Both the merchandise trade balance and the U.S. 
participation in world trade are affected by exchange rate 
fluctuations and by the relative growth of the U.S. economy 
in comparison with its major trading partners. The strong 
deterioration in the merchandise trade balance in 1977 was 
due to both losses in terms of trade as a consequence of the 
depreciation of the dollar and the more rapid increase of 
GDP than in the United States' major trading partners. 
4/ This is reflected in relatively low real energy 
prices in local currency for U.S. industry (nominal energy 
prices divided by the wholesale price index) and relatively 
low taxation, by OECD standards. The legitimacy of the then 
controlled energy prices was disputed by the EEC. 
5/ The following factors are believed to have 
contributed to the secular decline of average productivity 
growth in the United States in the seventies (although all 
the reasons are not known): i) Structural shifts in the 
labour force caused by the arrival of the postwar baby boom 
on the labour market and the rise in female participation 
rates, which led to some slowdown in aggregate productivity 
performance, ii) Increased government regulations 
concerning industrial safety, health and environmental 
protection as well as government regulation of specific 
industries, iii) The reduction of research and development 
expenditures as well as an apparent shift away from basic 
research, iv) Slower rates of private investment led to a 
decline in the growth of the capital/labour ratio. An 
Increasing proportion of new investment went to pollution 
abatement and re-equipment to deal with the increased prices 
of energy, v) Sectoral changes, such as the decreased 
importance of the farm sector, are no longer contributing 
positively to productivity growth as they did in the first 
twenty years of the postwar period. See: OECD Economic 
Survey, United States, November 1979, pp. 23 and 24. 
6/ Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the President of the 
United States on the Trade Agreements Program, 1981-82. 
(table A-12a. p. 155). U.S. direct net foreign 
investment has traditionally shown annual deficits. However 
in 1981 and 1982 foreign direct investment in the United 
States exceeded U.S. direct investment abroad by more than 
$10 billion per year. For the financing of their domestic 
market operations, U.S. companies in 1982 relied heavily on 
funds raised in the Eurodollar and Eurobond markets by their 
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foreign affiliates. (OECD Economic Outlook 33, page 67.) 
7/ Ibid., p. 40. 
8/ Ibid., p. 20. 
9/ Interest rate differentials eased in 1982, which 
had some effect on the dollar, but other factors contributed 
to a rebound of the dollar in 1983 and early 1984: 
- the prospect that federal budget deficits would 
remain high for several years in combination with the 
strength of economic recovery fueled fears of a tightening 
of monetary policy and a new rise in interest rates; 
- the international debt problem and political 
uncertainty seem to have resulted in substantial capital 
flight to the United States, especially from Latin America; 
- confidence in the U.S. economy grew, fueled by 
lower oil prices, persistently good inflation results and 
rising stock prices on Wall Street. (OECD Economic Outlook 
33. July 1983, p. 69. ) 
10/ A very important factor is the Federal budget 
deficit. Deficits are high in almost all OECD countries, 
but most of them have followed more restrictive fiscal 
policies than the U.S. For this reason budget deficits in 
most countries are of a cyclical nature, which means that if 
economic activity returns to its trend level, increased 
fiscal revenues and decreased social security payments will 
bring the budget back into equilibrium. Under the current 
tax legislation the U.S. deficit, on the contrary, has a 
significant structural element and is expected to remain 
high for many years. (See: OECD, OECD Economic Outlook 33, 
chapter on fiscal and monetary policies.) 
11/ A cabinet-level official with the rank of 
ambassador, who is directly responsible to the President and 
the Congress of the United States. 
12/ Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the President of the 
United States on the Trade Agreements Programme 1981-1982, 
p. 50. 
13/ The OECD Economic Survey, United States (November 
1979), mentions "very low interest rates" for SBA loans 
(p. 76). 
14/ In September 1978, $12 million was granted to 13 
manufacturers in loans at preferential rates or with 
subsidies. Fifty-four firms received technical assistance. 
OECD, Ibid., p. 77. 
15/ Gary Clyde Hufbauer observed that: "The DISC, 
declared an export subsidy by GATT, has been defended by the 
United States under the dubious argument that its total 
effect does not exceed the degree of stimulus to exports 
presented by other (for example, European) countries overall 
tax practices. This argument invites country harmonization 
to the lowest common denominator of trading practice and 
ignores the fact that the exchange rate — a t least in 
principle— provides overall balance. At any time Canada 
and Europe could impose countervailing duties against the 
DISC, but so far they have preferred to hold the issue in 
abeyance for leverage against a strong U.S. stand on their 
own subsidies. DISC is the American Achilles heel in the 
debate on subsidies". Gary Clyde Hufbauer, "Subsidy Issues 
af£er the Tokyo Round", Cline, ed.. Trade Policy in the 
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19803. This analysis is expanded in: Gary Clyde Hufbauer 
and Joanna Shelton Erb, Subsidies in International Trade 
(Washington, Institute for International Economics, 1983). 
16/ Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the President of the 
United States on the Trade Agreements Programme 1981-1982, 
p. 75. 
17/ GATT. Minutes of Meeting on July 11 1984. 
Geneva, 1984. (C/M/180.) 
18/ There is a close link between U.S. demands for 
trade liberalization in services and the foreign direct 
investment issue. 
19/ U.S. Service Industries in World Markets: 
Current Problems and Future. Washington D. C. 1976. "The 
International Operations of U.S. Service Industries: 
Current Data Collection and Analyses", Economic Consulting 
Services, Inc., Washington, June 1981. See also: Evelyn 
Parrish Lederer, Walther Lederer and Robert L. Sammons, 
Proposals for International Services Newsletter, Volume 1, 
Issue 4, January-June 1981. 
20/ International Services Newsletter, Volume 1, Issue 
4, January-June 1981. 
21/ Such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the 
tax system for U.S. citizens working abroad. 
22/ This review would include the consideration of 
whether retaliation is a useful instrument for the 
negotiation of the reduction or elimination of barriers 
affecting international trade in services. 
23/ William E. Brock, "A Simple Plan for Negotiating 
on Trade in Services" (article for the November number of 
the World Economy, the quarterly journal of the Trade Policy 
Research Centre, London). 
24/ In an article published in the Washington Post in 
October 1983, Professor Michael C. Munger of the University 
of Washington observed that: "voluntary export restraints 
on coffee cost the consumers more than $700 million in 1980. 
Other such restrictions imposed similar costs: beef and 
pork $1.4 billion, steel $1.7 billion, and footwear $1.6 
billion. Moreover, since 1980, the U.S. has extended 
voluntary export restraints increasing the price of cars, 
television receivers, textiles, batteries, zinc, dairy 
products, etc.". 
25/ For instance, the criteria for workers displaced 
by imports to qualify for adjustment programs were eased (by 
requiring that imports "contribute importantly" rather than 
be the "major cause" of unemployment). 
26/ For an industry to become eligible for import 
relief it was required that increased imports were a 
substantial cause of serious injury rather than a major 
cause as in the previous law. 
27/ Excluded from the waiver provision were several 
U.S. agencies, including the Departments of Transportation 
and Energy, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Army 
Corps of Engineers. Also excluded were purchases under 
$190 000, State and local government purchases, current 
preferences for small and minority businesses, strategic 
goods, and purchases for farm support or human feeding 
programs such as the U.S. school lunch program. 
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28/ This section is based largely on: Steve Lande and 
Craig Vangrasstek. Assessment of the Trade and Tariff 
Act of 1984, Washington D.C., Manchester Associates 
Ltd.,1984. 
29/ With respect to steel imports the Trigger Price 
Mechanism (TPM) was designed as an alternative to individual 
antidumping investigation. The TPM has been suspended since 
January 1982 (Section V.b). 
30/ For imports from communist countries relief can be 
granted under Section 406. 
31/ Important differences exist between import relief 
programs and antidumping and countervailing duty actions. 
Section 201 does not concern itself with dumping or subsidy 
practices. For import relief programs the national economic 
interest must be considered, while for the imposition of 
antidumping or countervailing duties only injury to a 
particular industry must be demonstrated. The imposition of 
antidumping and countervailing duties is mandatory and to 
the full extent of dumping or subsidization, once injury is 
demonstrated. For import relief the President can reject 
the ITC determination (although the Congress can override 
such rejection by a simple majority vote). Finally, the 
injury requirement of a Section 201 action imposes a tougher 
standard than in the countervailing duty law. The increased 
imports must be a substantial cause, that is, an important 
cause of the injury which is no less than any other single 
cause, while the injurious effect for purposes of the 
countervailing duty law needs only to be more than 
inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant. 
32/ The measures were terminated at their first 
expiration date (1981 and 1982 respectively). Effective 
relief to domestic industry was frustrated by the surge of 
new suppliers and upgrading of restraint articles. 
33/ There are fewer square-yard-equivalents of textile 
and apparel imports into the United States today than in 
1971. The quotas of dominant suppliers were allowed only 
low average annual growth rates in the 1981 renewal of the 
MFA. In the new bilateral agreement with Hong Kong, the 
U.S. allowed annual increases of only 0.5% (two thirds of 
the items) or 2% (other items). (Martin Wolf, "Managed 
Trade in Practice: The Implications of the Textile 
Arrangements", Cline, ed., Trade Policy in the 1980s.) 
34/ Bryan Greyson, Taxing Unfair Trade Practices, 
p. 257. 
35/ Expert testimony indicated that American prices 
were the highest in the world and that foreign competitors 
had no reason to dump. The Antidumping Law was enacted as 
part of a protectionist program that also included 
protectionist tariffs. The political momentum facilitated 
actions against German industry as Germany had been the 
enemy in war. Bryan Greyson, Taxing Unfair Trade Practices, 
page 8. 
36/ Ibid., p. 9. 
37/ The waiver authority was fundamental for the 
acceptance of the EEC to negotiate an international subsidy 
code in the framework of the MTN. 
38/ "Countries under the agreement" include (1) 
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countries which have signed the agreement; (2) those which 
have assumed the obligations of the agreement, but cannot 
sign because they have no diplomatic relations with the 
United States; and (3) those with which the United States 
has an unconditional most-favored-nation agreement 
obligation that runs specifically to countervailing duties. 
39/ An important reason for shifting responsibility 
for subsidy and antidumping investigations from the Treasury 
Department to the Department of Commerce was that Treasury 
was perceived as being "soft" on foreigners owing to an 
excessive concern with international policy. Douglas R. 
Nelson, "The Political Structure of the New Protectionism". 
World Bank Staff Working Paper, No. 471, p. 21. 
40/ The U.S. Customs Service is charged with the 
implementation of the decisions by the Commerce Department 
regarding the amount of antidumping or countervailing duties 
that must be assessed. 
41/ In all cases involving Brazil there was an 
established industry in the U.S., and for this reason the 
question of retardation has not been a relevant issue. 
42/ Section 771(7) of the Trade Agreements Act of 
1979. 
43/ The GATT subsidy code also includes an 
illustrative list of export subsidies. 
44/ Section 771(4)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930. 
45/ See: Lande, Steve and Craig Vangrasstek, 
Assessment of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. Executive 




UNITED STATES: INDICATORS OF FOREIGN TRADE 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Billions of U.S. dollars 
Kerch, trade balance 2.60 -2.27 -6.42 0.91 -5.37 9.08 -9.49 -31.10 -33.98 -27.56 -25.53 -28.05 -36.39 -60.55 
Exports FOB 42.47 43.31 49.38 71.41 98.31 107.12 117.74 120.81 142.05 184.47 224.24 237.03 211.21 200.21 
Iiports FOB 39.87 45.58 55.80 70.50 103.68 98.04 124.23 151.91 176.03 212.03 249.77 265.08 247.60 260.76 
Iiports CIF 42.43 48.34 58.86 73.58 108.00 103.39 132.50 160.41 186.05 222.23 256.98 273.35 254.88 269.88 
Crude petroleui 1.28 1.70 2.38 4.24 15.34 19.75 27.46 35.87 34.26 49.02 64.63 64.32 47.45 39.51 
Other 41.15 46.64 56.48 69.34 92.66 83.64 105.04 124.54 151.79 173.21 192.35 209.03 207.43 230.37 
Iransfers, net 2.12 3.68 3.51 8.84 12.94 12.65 18.06 20.78 23.22 31.81 32.54 39.28 32.89 27.89 
Current balance 2.33 -1.43 -5.80 7.14 4.86 18.28 4.38 -14.49 -15.49 -0.95 0.48 4.64 -11.20 -40.84 
As a percentage of GNP 
4. Exports (la) 4.3 4.1 4.2 1.5 7.0 6.9 6.9 6.3 6.6 7.6 8.0 8.0 6.9 6.0 
Iiports (lb) 4.1 4.3 4.8 5.4 7.3 6.3 7.2 7.9 8.1 8.8 9.5 9.0 8.1 7.9 
5. Current balance (3) 0.2 -0.1 -0.5 0.5 0.3 1.2 0.3 -0.8 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.4 -1.2 
Indexes (1980 = 100) 
6. Voluie of exports 50.8 50.2 55.0 67.9 74.0 72.4 74.9 75.2 84.2 93.7 iOO.O 96.9 86.6 80.8 
Voluie of iiports 64.2 69.8 79.2 84.1 80.3 72.0 88.0 97.5 107.4 107.6 100.0 102.5 97.4 107.2 
7. Unit value of exports 38.3 39.5 40.7 47.5 60.3 67.4 69.9 72.4 77.4 88.1 100.0 109.2 110.4 112.1 
Unit value of iiports 25.7 27.0 29.0 34.2 51.3 55.5 57.2 62.0 66.9 79.9 100.0 105.5 103.8 99.8 
Tens of trade 149.0 146.3 140.3 138.9 117.5 121.4 122.2 116.8 115.7 110.3 100.0 103.5 106.4 112.3 
8. GNP 982.4 1 063.4 1 171.1 1 306.6 1 413.2 1 549.2 1 718.0 1 918.3 2 163.9 2 417.8 2 631.7 2 954.1 3 073.0 3 310.5 
Source: ECLAC on the basis of: IMF International Financial Statistics, except for current balance 1970-1976 (data provided by 0ECD). 
table II.2 
UNITED STATES, OTHER MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 
SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Average annual growth rates in 1970-1980 (lì Percentage of GDP (1980) Basic indicators (1980) Share of 
tin. 1 A uoria 
Merchandise exports Production Gross Export of Gross Gross GDP Population GNP •erchandise 
doiestic goods and doiestic doiestic (•illions (•illions) per exports 
1960-70 1970-80 GUP •anufact. investment non-factor savings investient of •id-year capita 
services dollars) (dollars) 1970 1980 
Industrial aarket 
econo»ies j/ 8.5 5.8 3.2 3.2 1.6 20 22 23 7 372.6 714.4 10 320 69.0 60.5 
Largest seven a/ 10.0 6.7 3.3 3.2 1.9 22 23 23 6 268.4 595.6 10 525 51.8 45.6 
United States 6.0 6.9 3.0 2.9 1.6 10 17 18 2 587.1 227.7 11 360 13.6 10.9 
Japan 17.2 8.9 5.0 6.4 3.2 14 31 32 1 040.0 116.8 9 890 6.2 6.5 
Germany 10.1 5.8 2.6 2.1 1.6 28 25 25 819.1 60.9 13 590 10.9 9.7 
Prance 8.2 6.8 3.5 3.6 1.9 22 21 23 651.9 53.5 11 730 5.7 5.6 
United Kingdoi 4.8 7.5 1.9 0.1 0.0 28 19 16 522.9 55.9 7 920 6.1 5.8 
Italy 13.6 6.7 3.0 3.8 0.5 25 22 25 394.0 56.9 6 480 4.2 3.9 
Canada 10.0 4.4 3.9 3.6 4.2 29 24 22 253.4 23.9 10 130 5.1 3.2 
Middle-incoae 
econoiies a/ 5.4 3.9 5.6 6.4 7.8 25 25 20 1 593.2 1 138.0 1 400 19.5 19.5 
Latin American and 
Asian NICs j/ 10.4 12.4 7.2 8.9 B.8 ,. . , , , 624.4 260.7 2 395 3.5 6.3 
Brazil 5.1 7.5 8.4 10.3 9.7 9 20 22 237.9 118.7 2 050 0.9 1.3 
Mexico 2.8 13.4 5.2 5.9 7.4 14 26 28 166.7 69.8 2 090 0.4 1.0 
Argentina 3.4 9.3 2.2 1.0 2.9 ,. .. 130.9 27.7 2 390 0.6 0.5 
Korea, Rep. of 34.1 23.0 9.5 16.6 13.4 37 23 31 58.2 38.2 1 520 0.3 1.1 
Hong Kong 12.7 9.4 9.3 9.3 12.7 111 24 29 20.2 5.1 4 240 0.8 1.1 
Singapore 4.2 12.0 8.5 9.6 6.7 .. 30 43 10.5 1.2 4130 0.5 1.2 
Source: Uorld Bank, World Developient Report 1982, and UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and Developient Statistics, 
j/ Mean. 
TABLE II.3 
HAJOR OECD COUNTRIES: COMPETITIVE POSITIONS 
Average annual growth rates 
|n(jex Qf aanufacturing unit Index of export prices of 
Hourly earnings Unit labour costs labour costs (1970=100) aanufactures (1970=100) 
in »anufacuring in aanufacturing 
In i0C3i in a coiBon In local In a coaaon 
1962 1972 1962 1971 currency currency currency currency 
to to to to 
1971 1981 1971 1982 1980 1983 1980 1983 1980 1983 1980 1983 
United States 4.8 8.5 1.8 7.5 180 214 66 82 233 281 85 111 
Japan 13.2 11.8 3.2 5.6 208 266 82 95 233 260 81 79 
Geraany 8.3 7.2 3.6 5.2 174 194 136 122 169 177 101 99 
Erance 9.0 14.8 3.0 10.4 240 341 100 99 231 324 100 93 
United Kingdoi 8.1 15.9 4.3 15.9 170 184 118 108 160 185 108 101 
Italy 10.2 22.6 5.5 16.0 381 602 94 99 408 631 100 99 
Canada 6.5 11.2 2.0 8.4 398 476 114 124 366 420 125 106 
Source: OECD. Economic Outlook. Paris, No. 33, July 1983. 
•t» N> M I E II.4 
UNITED STATES, 1981: INPOITS FiOM SELECTED C0UNT1IES BY SITC-COMMODIT» 8I0UPS 
(U.S.* B i l l i o n s ) 
Developed Centrally Developing Major <non-€ECD) newly industrializing countries Relative iiport share <I) 
Site- World aarket planned coimtries 
code economies economies 
Total Brazil Mexico Argentina Hong Kong Korea Sinsapore Other Asian Developing Major Brazil 
countries NICs 
All conodities 273 352.2 148 404.5 3 764.9 121 179.8 42 136.9 4 851.6 14 013.3 1 214.5 5 757.2 5 474.1 2 194.9 8 631.3 44.3 15.4 1.8 
0 Food and live aniials 16 517.6 5 564.9 306.9 10 645.8 4 331.5 2 123.8 1 315.9 447.6 69.0 105.8 48.8 220.6 64.5 26.2 12.9 
1 Beverages and tobacco 3 418.2 2 690.3 45.1 2 690.3 279.0 92.5 126.9 6.3 1.4 50.4 0.7 0.8 78.7 8.2 2.7 
2 Crude katerials, excl. fuels 12 207.7 7 932.6 414.4 3 860.6 885.3 304.4 394.7 75.3 16.5 10.7 59.3 24.4 31.6 7.3 2.5 
3 Minerals, fuels, etc. 84 316.8 16 022.0 595.9 67 698.8 7 664.4 301.3 7 006.5 212.9 II.5 131.9 0.3 80.3 9.1 0.4 
4 Aniaal and veget. oils and fats 526.6 90.8 2.3 433.5 57.1 48.2 2.0 5.3 0.5 0.9 0.2 82.3 10.8 9.2 
5-B Industrial products 149 176.6 110 662.1 2 367.4 34 139.8 27 970.9 1 858.5 4 751.6 397.6 5 512.2 5 241.4 1 863.7 8 345.9 22.9 18.8 1.2 
(Industrial prod, excl 67 and 68) 129 950.6 95 437.3 2 015.9 30 490.0 26 489.8 1 444.5 4 412.5 357.5 5 490.1 4 677.1 1 849.9 8 258.2 23.5 20.4 1.1 
5 Cheaicals, related prod. NES 9 740.5 8 486.1 287.9 966.5 694.7 160.7 247.6 122.6 7.2 44.1 4.7 107.8 9.9 7.1 1.6 « Basic aanufactures 39 535.4 29 780.8 860.0 8 894.6 5 061.9 685.1 787.6 204.1 439.4 1 490.5 60.0 1 395.2 22.5 12.8 1.7 
85 Textile yarn, fabrics, etc. 3 071.9 1 425.6 299.3 1 347.0 689.4 95.3 71.8 1.3 161.9 169.6 20.0 169.5 43.8 22.4 3.1 
67 Iron and steel 12 146.8 10 609.2 213.7 1 323.9 1 086.3 380.0 44.1 35.2 540.7 2.9 83.4 10.9 8.9 3.1 
871 Pi9 iron, etc. 912.9 613.8 6.5 292.6 125.7 105.3 19.5 0.9 33.1 13.S 11.5 
672 Iron, steel priaary foras 398.1 382.8 0.1 13.2 10.9 4.8 6.1 3.3 2.8 1.2 
Other 10 837.8 9 612.6 207.1 1 018.1 949.7 269.9 24.6 34.3 534.6 2.9 83.4 9.4 8.8 2.5 
674 Univ. plates, sheet 3 119.1 2 703.3 140.2 275.6 267.2 135.6 0.4 128,9 2.3 8.8 8.6 4.3 
678 Pipes and tubes 5 197.3 4 490.3 58.3 648.7 608.0 95.1 20.8 23.4 387.6 2.8 78.3 12.5 11.7 1.8 
68 Non-ferrous aetals 7 079.2 4 615.6 137.8 2 325.9 394.8 34.0 295.0 4.9 22.1 23.6 10.9 4.3 32.9 5.6 0.5 
667.3 Precious, seai-precious stones 410.0 129.8 0.5 279.7 97.5 45.7 0.9 48.1 0.3 1.4 1.1 68.2 23.8 11.1 
Other 16 B27.5 13 000.6 208.7 3 618.1 2 793.9 130.1 375.8 162.7 207.3 756.3 24.8 1 136.9 21.5 16.6 0.8 
7 Machines, transport equipaent 72 469.8 60 547.3 306.9 11 615.7 9 555.3 540.9 2 565.1 38.0 1 308.4 1 083.6 1 492.1 2 527.2 16.0 13.2 0.7 
713 Internal coabus. piston engines 2 341.1 2 095.6 3.3 242.2 240.1 125.7 101.3 3.2 0.7 0.6 2.8 5.8 10.3 10.3 5.4 
761 Television receivers BI6.3 312.2 504.1 503.4 1.0 194.3 29.4 278.7 61.8 61.7 
762.1 Motor vehicle radio receivers 650.3 472.3 177.9 177.8 62.2 11.8 8.3 58.3 26.4 10.8 27.4 27.3 9.6 
763 Sound recorders, phonograph 2 140.3 1 989.3 0.2 250.8 248.7 9.3 21.1 24.4 57.9 43.6 92.4 11.7 11.6 0.4 
764 Telecoi eqpt, pts, acc NES 4 096.0 2 302.1 0.7 1 793.2 1 707.3 0.4 768.8 0.2 47.2 125.3 256.1 509.3 43.8 41.7 0.0 
776.4 Electronic aicrocircuits 3 040.6 514.7 2 625.8 1 028.9 13.6 64.0 52.4 203.8 588.9 106.2 86.4 33.8 0.4 
778.3 Autoiotive electr. equipment 289.2 235.8 53.3 46.8 27.3 2.7 0.1 9.4 0.« 2.5 4.4 18.4 16.2 9.4 
784 Motor vehicle parts 4 419.8 4 016.6 36.3 366.9 347.1 109.5 206.0 0.5 0.7 5.6 2.4 22.4 8.3 7 S 2.5 
792 Aircraft, etc. 2 827.5 2 685.7 1.5 140.2 129.8 55.6 48.7 1.5 0.3 22.3 1.4 5.0 4.6 2.0 
Other 51 848.7 46 023.0 264.8 5 461.3 5 125.4 137.3 1 340.7 32.5 1 164.0 437.4 517.7 I 495.8 10.5 9.9 0.3 
S Misc. aanufactured goods 27 430.9 11 847.8 912.7 14 670.4 12 658.6 471.8 1 151.4 32.9 3 757.1 2 623.0 3 6.9 4 315.5 53.9 46.1 1.7 
84 Clothing and accessories 8 118.0 862.6 558.9 6 696.5 5 359.3 19.7 247.0 10.9 2 027.3 1 412.3 161.6 1 480.5 82.5 66.« 0.2 
851 Footwear 3 214.6 1 005.5 112.1 2 097.0 2 000.1 394.3 66.0 0.8 74.0 573.0 8.2 883.8 65.2 62.2 12.3 
885 Hatches and clocks 1 307.1 738.2 3.3 565.6 525.4 0.5 23.9 334.5 37.8 37.0 91.7 43.3 40.2- 0.0 
894 Toys, sporting goods, etc 2 292.2 701.0 10.7 1 580.5 1 473.7 4.7 50.0 585.5 207.6 23.5 602.4 69.0 64.3 0.2 
Other 12 499.0 8 540.5 227.7 3 730.8 3 300.1 52.6 764.5 21.2 735.8 392.3 76.6 1 257.1 29.8 26.4 0.4 
9 Goods not classified by kind 7 188.7 5 441.8 32.9 1 711.0 948.7 122.9 415.7 69.5 157.6 53.4 90.5 39.1 23.8 13.2 1.7 
Source: United nations, Coaaodity Trade Statistics, 1981, United States of Aierica-Puerto lieo, Statistical Papers Series D Vol. XXXI, Ho. 1-8. 
Table II.5 




Agriculture 1.6 24.3 
Crude aaterials and fuels, except petroleua 2.4 14.6 
High technology aanufactures 11.7 52.4 
Services, included investment earnings 3.0 36.1 
Deficit sectors 
Petroleua 2.3 75.8 
Low technology aanufactures 8.3 34.8 
Consuaer goods 4.7 18.3 
Autoaotive products 2.3 11.2 
Source: U.S. Department of Coaaerce, Overseas Business Report, National Science Foundation. 
In: Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Irade Agree»ents 
Prograaae. Washington, Noveaber 1982. 
Table 11.6 
UNITED STATES: CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE 
<$ billions) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Current account balance 
Herchandise trade balance 
Balance of trade in services 
and total net investaent incoae 
Total net investaent incoae 
Direct investaent earnings 
Balance other transactions 
Other services trade balance 
Other 
4.384 -14.110 -14.075 
-9.306 -30.873 -33.759 
18.129 19.852 24.013 
15.975 17.962 21.400 
15.889 16.839 21.247 
0.086 1.123 0.153 
2.154 1.890 2.613 
-4.439 -3.089 -4.329 
1.414 1.520 4.471 
•27.346 -25.338 -27.889 
35.300 36.112 40.506 
33.463 29.910 33.037 
31.973 27.680 24.065 
1.490 2.230 8.972 
1.837 6.202 7.469 
-7.450 -9.254 -8.146 
Source: Iwenty-sixth Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreeaents 
Prograaae 1981-1982. Table 2, page 9. 
ai Principally fees and royalties ($6.6 billion surplus in 1981). 
y Includes services like travel, fares and other transportation, banking, construction and engineering, 
c/ Includes U.S. ailitary agencies sales, direct defense expenditures, and unilateral transfers such as 
foreign aid, U.S. Governaent pensions, and other official and private transfers and reaittances. 
Table 11.7 
SEAL EXCHANGE SAIE INDEXES OF SELECTED U.S. TRADING PAKTNERS H 
(Against the dollar) 





Japan Canada France teriany Italy U.K. tonico Korea Singapore 
1971 61.6 67.0 125.0 89.3 120.4 130.2 124.3 129.3 103.2 116.2 _ 
1972 71.3 66.9 111.0 87.0 108.2 120.2 116.2 123.4 103.7 118.6 -
1973 68,5 64.0 91.5 84.3 89.0 100.8 106.0 125.1 95.7 119.7 -
1974 71.7 66.7 91.5 84.6 91.0 105.3 102.7 131.0 95.4 105.0 97.1 
1975 74.8 69.8 100.8 88.1 95.7 106.5 105.9 125.7 96.3 110.2 106.8 
1976 74.6 71.7 102.2 86.6 106.0 111.9 88.3 140.3 103.5 104.7 111.2 
1977 75.1 72.4 97.0 92.5 110.2 107.3 112.9 129.4 114.8 102.6 112.3 
1978 74.3 72.9 83.9 97.6 104.2 98.6 107.7 115.9 107.4 98.8 110.6 
1979-1 76.6 74.2 84.9 94.8 100.8 92.4 105.1 113.6 102.6 98.0 100.5 
1979-11 79.7 77.4 91.5 93.7 104.5 96.7 105.4 110.3 102.8 95.3 99.3 
1979-111 BO.2 77.7 91.4 96.3 101.9 95.2 101.4 100.3 102.4 90.8 98.1 
1979-IV 85.6 85.1 99.6 98.8 101.0 95.7 100.6 105.1 102.8 92.0 94.6 
1980-1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1980-11 94.4 95.0 94.4 102.1 103.4 102.5 102.4 97.3 98.3 96.5 101.1 
1980-III 85.1 86.7 90.7 100.3 102.7 102.0 101.2 93.6 94.0 97.9 98.8 
1980-IV 78.5 82.3 89.4 101.4 108.8 110.6 107.1 94.1 93.9 100.9 98.0 
1981-1 77.2 80.9 91.1 103.4 122.5 122.6 117.9 98.3 92.7 101.8 99.5 
1981-11 78.3 82.7 99.5 104.8 134.9 134.5 131.1 109.0 92.4 101.3 104.5 
1981-III 81.0 84.0 104.5 104.7 139.8 142.1 136.9 121.4 91.3 100.5 108.0 
1981—IV 83.3 85.4 102.4 102.5 134.3 130.2 130.6 118.6 89.9 101.9 107.5 
1982-1 82.8 84.2 106.7 103.3 139.7 134.8 134.4 118.7 108.3 104.1 110.6 
1982-11 79.5 80.8 110.8 103.9 142.0 134.7 137.1 120.8 127.1 105.9 112.1 
1982—III 80.0 79.4 117.5 104.5 155.6 140.7 141.7 124.5 151.0 108.5 115.6 
1982-IV 84.9 83.4 118.8 103.3 157.8 142.2 142.1 129.5 144.7 109.3 118.1 
1983-1 96.1 98.2 109.5 101.9 149.5 136.7 135.9 137.0 155.1 109.7 115.1 
1983-11 106.8 112.6 11.4 100.7 156.0 140.6 141.2 132.4 143.1 113.0 117.6 
1983-III 101.8 110.9 114.7 101.0 161.8 150.0 144.4 136.8 141.4 116.8 119.8 
1983-IV 98.5 111.3 11.9 101.5 161.0 151.7 149.0 139.2 140.1 118.8 120.3 
1984-1 98.4 111.7 110.9 01.8 159.4 152.6 148.7 141.1 - 119.2 120.2 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
Noiinal exchange rate adjusted for relative prices of lanufactures. 
y Wholesale prices. 




BRAZIL'S TRADE POLICY 
a) Recent trends 
Import substitution has played an important role in 
Brazil's industrialization process ever since its early 
phases. Industrial growth has always faced an important 
foreign exchange restraint. However, with the exception of 
the period 1962-67 and the current recession, high 
industrial growth was achieved because the foreign exchange 
restraint was alleviated by a net inflow of capital, at 
first principally through direct investment (particularly 
from 1956 to 1961) and since the mid-sixties principally 
through foreign loans. An increasing proportion of these 
loans was provided by private banks at variable interest 
rates. Although the Brazilian economy started to obtain a 
more open character in the mid-sixties, when trade policy 
reforms and favourable external conditions facilitated an 
impressive export growth, in the seventies the country felt 
obliged in the face of external shocks to reinforce 
balance-of-payments restrictions and to intensify the 
orientation toward import substitution. The obligation to 
service its high foreign debt and the rigid structure of its 
imports has made the Brazilian economy heavily dependent on 
its external sector, in spite of the small size of the 
latter. Due to sharp rises in oil prices and interest 
rates, the sum of crude oil imports and foreign debt service 
has exceeded Brazil's export earnings since 1979 (table I). 
The balance-of-payments disequilibrium has had great impact 
on Brazil's trade policy, a main characteristic of which 
became the existence of strong export incentives 
simultaneously with severe import restrictions. In 1984 
export subsidies were reduced significantly. During 1985 
most of them will be eliminated completely. 
Until the mid-sixties, industrialization through 
import substitution was carried out mainly by multiple 
exchange rates, high tariff protection and a severe 
application of the "Law of National Similars". This 
protectionist policy implied an antiexport bias, which was 
reinforced by the absence of exemption from payment of 
indirect taxes on exports, which were often not granted in 
order to keep down domestic food prices. 
The protection granted to domestic industry permitted 
high economic growth rates during the phases of "easy" 
import substitution. However the process became more 
complicated in later phases when intermediate products and 
capital goods had to be substituted. The still small 
domestic market for these goods could not be enlarged 
sufficiently by exports to achieve economies of scale and 
there was idle capacity in several sectors. The slow growth 
of export earnings complicated the industrialization process 
by increasing restraints on the balance of payments. 
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After the stabilization policy of 1964-1967, high 
economic growth was achieved in the period 1968-1973. At 
the same time, the Brazilian economy acquired a more open 
character, partly due to trade policy reforms. On the 
import side, protection for domestic industry was reduced by 
lowering import duties and by a less severe application of 
the "Law of National Similars". Exchange rate markets were 
unified, but exchange controls were not eliminated. On the 
export side, the tax system was improved with the 
elimination of the discrimination against exports by 
granting exemptions from payment of indirect taxes on 
exported goods and introducing a "draw-back" system. 
Genuine export subsidies were introduced, such as the 
exemption from the corporate profit tax on exports and 
fiscal credits (the IPI and ICM credit premiums, see below). 
Preferential financing of working capital for the production 
of exportable goods was increased. These export subsidies 
were intended to compensate for the antiexport bias which 
still existed due to an overvaluation of national currency 
and the high protection for domestic industry. Although the 
national currency continued to be overvalued, the 
exchange —rate policy obtained a more neutral character by 
the introduction of a crawling-peg system that was aimed at 
maintaining a stable real value of the exchange rate. 
In 1974, the Brazilian economy suffered a strong 
external shock, mainly from the oil crisis. The import bill 
doubled due to the sharp increase in oil prices and 
significant increases in both volume and prices of other 
imports. As a result, the merchandise balance of trade, 
which had been slightly positive in 1973, showed a large 
deficit of $4.7 billion in 1974. 
The economic authorities tried to correct the 
balance-of-payments crisis by import controls and export 
promotion. The current-account deficit was financed by 
resorting to foreign debt and drawing down international 
reserves. There was no major devaluation of the cruzeiro or 
the application of severe demand restraint policies, which 
most probably would have led to an economic recession. This 
policy orientation was facilitated by the easy availability 
of new loans in the international money markets at low or 
negative real interest rates. 
Some important trade policy measures were taken. Many 
import tariffs were increased, mainly on products considered 
to be superfluous; quantitive restrictions were imposed, 
principally on external purchases by the public sector; and 
the "Law of National Similars" was more severely applied. A 
compulsory cash deposit on imports was introduced with a 
maturity of one year, without any accruing of interest or 
monetary correction. The import substitution policy was 
also intensified, especially for intermediate inputs (such 
as pulp and paper, non-ferrous metals, fertilizers, 
petrochemicals and steel) and capital goods. On the export 
side, funds designated for export finance were increased and 
the BEFIEX programme (see below) that had been created in 
1972 and put into operation in 1973 became much more 
important. 
The effects of these selective import controls were 
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uneven on different economic sectors. A large number of 
special policies were employed to provide fiscal incentives 
to certain imports, thus permitting the authorities to 
influence the composition of external purchases. This 
policy was facilitated by the high direct participation of 
the public sector in total imports. Import controls mainly 
affected industrial products and more specifically capital 
goods. 
While imports diminished slowly in relation to GDP, 
the export share remained relatively unchanged. However, 
manufactured products increased their share in total 
exports. Since an antiexport bias was inherent in the 
import controls, export subsidies had to be maintained or 
increased. The combined effect of large subsidies granted 
to manufactured exports and the increasing participation of 
these products in total exports led to a significant rise in 
subsidies as a proportion of exports. Although the 
immediate goals --a high growth rate and a rapid 
diversification of exports-- were accomplished, it became 
clear that the export subsidies had many disadvantages, 
namely, their high fiscal costs and a lack of rationality. 
For instance, the fiscal credits per sector were granted in 
relation to IPI and ICM rates, which in turn were 
established according to special criteria that did not take 
into consideration the domestic costs of foreign exchange 
earnings. Export subsidies were not granted on the basis of 
economic criteria such as domestic resource costs. The high 
level of export subsidies also provoked adverse reactions in 
importing countries, principally the United States, which in 
some cases applied countervailing duties to imports of 
Brazilian products (mainly footwear at this time). 
The evolution of the real rate of exchange, weighted 
by exports of manufactures to Brazil's major trading 
partners, improved the international competitiveness of 
manufactured products in the seventies, due to the 
depreciation of the U.S. dollar against other convertible 
currencies (table II). However, the need for significant 
import controls simultaneously with ample export subsidies, 
despite which there was a deficit in trade in goods in the 
period 1979-1980, indicated that there was still an 
overvaluation of the national currency. 
Brazil made a commitment during the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (MTN) to gradually eliminate its principal 
export subsidy, the fiscal credit. In an attempt to 
liberalize the economy, in January 1979, Brazil began a 
program to phase out the fiscal credit gradually through 
June 1983, in combination with faster real exchange rate 
adjustments. The policy package of December 1979 included a 
30% increase in the cruzeiro value of the U.S. dollar, the 
total abolition of fiscal credits and the elimination of the 
prior cash deposit required for imports. 
During 1980, Brazil's trade policy went through 
various modifications. It was decided at the beginning of 
the year that the increase in the cruzeiro's value of the 
U.S. dollar during the year would be only 40%. The main 
reason for this decision was to stimulate external borrowing 
by maintaining the cost of loans in foreign currencies below 
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the cost of domestic loans. Since domestic interest rates 
were controlled and the monetary correction factor, which is 
the legal basis for debt adjustments, was pre-established 
for the entire year, the cost of external loans could be 
kept below that of domestic loans only if the exchange rate 
variations were also controlled. Pre-establishment of the 
total exchange rate variation was also aimed at reducing 
inflationary expectations. 
This exchange rate policy meant a considerable loss of 
export profitability during 1980. By the first quarter of 
1981 the real exchange rate adjusted for external inflation 
had almost completely lost the effect of the devaluation of 
December 1979. The abolition of fiscal credits thus added 
to the net loss of competitiveness for exports of 
manufactured products. To compensate for this loss, more 
emphasis was put on preferential working capital finance. 
The Brazilian economy suffered another external shock 
in 1979-1980 from the new increase in oil prices. Contrary 
to what had happened after the first oil shock, the 
industrialized countries pursued deflationary policies this 
time. Interest rates also increased. The simultaneous 
stagnation of world trade and the sharp increase in interest 
rates put heavy pressure on the foreign debt service of 
Brazil (and other developing countries). 
As a consequence of the balance-of-payments 
difficulties, import controls were further reinforced in 
1980, principally by the application of the Financial 
Operations Tax (I0F) to import-related exchange rate 
operations, which meant a 15% surcharge on imports. In 
spite of fortified import controls and good growth of export 
earnings, the large deficit in the merchandise trade balance 
experienced in 1979 was practically maintained during 1980. 
The deficit on current account reached 12.9 billion dollars 
and international reserves dropped to a level equal to the 
value of only three months of imports. This unfavorable 
development can be explained by a deterioration of the terms 
of trade 1/ mainly due to a 50% increase in prices of 
imported oil in 1980, and —principally— by the rise in 
interest rates in international money markets. The 
balance-of-payments difficulties can also be partially 
explained by the high economic growth rate in 1980 and by 
the stockpiling of imported products. The latter was 
encouraged by the combined effect of the exchange rate 
policy, the controls on domestic interest rates and the fear 
of tighter import controls in the future. 
The unfavorable situation of the external sector at 
the end of 1980 led to new reforms in economic policy. 
These reforms marked the beginning of a period of a more 
austere economic policy and a pronounced reduction of 
economic growth. The principal policy measure was the 
liberalization of interest rates, which in combination with 
a tight monetary policy and heavy borrowing by the public 
sector, experienced a substantial increase. This sharp rise 
in interest rates made it possible to increase the rhythm of 
the cruzeiro's devaluation without discouraging external 
borrowing whose cost remained below that of domestic loans. 
During 1981 the cruzeiro was devalued according to domestic 
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inflation, without adjustments to external inflation. This 
was believed to be sufficient to gradually recover the 
profitability of exports lost in 1980. However, because 
many convertible currencies devalued strongly against the 
dollar, the effects of the cruzeiro's adjustment were partly 
or fully annulled. 
Exports of manufactured products stagnated in the 
first quarter of 1981 and fiscal subsidies were reintroduced 
in April. This policy measure was considered necessary to 
compensate for the negative effects on exports of the 
exchange rate policy in 1980, the devaluation of almost all 
convertible currencies against the dollar, the economic 
recession in the industrialized countries, and the 
devaluation of the Argentine peso. The reintroduction of 
fiscal incentives provoked protectionist pressures in the 
United States and, to a lesser degree, in the EEC. In order 
to avoid increases in outstanding U.S. countervailing duty 
orders, export taxes were charged on sales of certain 
products shipped to the United States. 
Import restrictions were increased once again. The 
I0F surcharge was increased from 15 to 25%. The major 
importers (enterprises whose annual imports exceed a value 
of 100 000 dollars) were obliged to present annual import 
programmes to CACEX. In principle, the import values 
authorized for 1981 were not to exceed the value of imports 
realized by the same enterprise in the previous year. The 
volume of authorized imports was reduced implicitly as a 
result of price increases. 
In 1982, the Brazilian economy continued to suffer 
from a series of external difficulties, which had a strong 
impact on its balance of payments. The most striking fact 
in the first semester of 1982 was the significant absolute 
fall in export earnings which at year end reached 13.4%. 
From 1967 through 1981, export earnings had grown at an 
average annual rate of more than 20%. As a result, the 
surplus in the balance of trade in goods in 1982 was only 
775 million dollars, far below the initial 3 billion dollar 
target. 
As in previous years, Brazilian exports were hampered 
by the economic recession and the consequent strengthening 
of protectionist pressures in the developed market 
economies, high interest rates, the continuous high value of 
the dollar compared to other convertible currencies and, 
mainly due to these factors, the low levels of commodity 
prices. However, the decrease in Brazil's exports in 1982 
was due mainly to the balance-of-payments difficulties of 
other developing countries, principally in Latin America and 
Africa, and to diminished purchases of Brazilian products by 
the socialist countries. These countries had been the most 
dynamic markets for Brazil's exports in prior years. The 
same external problems facing Brazil were facing other 
developing countries and they were obliged to take measures 
restricting their imports, with dramatic effects on Brazil's 
exports. 
The highly unfavorable development of exports in 1982 
once again led to a further tightening of import controls in 
June, and again in September when there was a drastic 
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reduction in the inflow of foreign loans, which caused a 
severe drop in Brazil's international reserves. The maximum 
value of allowable imports by the public sector was reduced 
significantly (from $3.6 billion in 1981 to $3 billion in 
1982 and $2 billion in 1983) and the CACEX import programs 
for major importing firms were made much more restrictive. 
(Currently, all private and public importers are subject to 
the CACEX import programs.) The number of products for which 
no import permits can be obtained was increased 
substantially and the requirements to obtain external 
financing for imports were reinforced. 
In November 1982, the Governments of Brazil and the 
United States agreed to the maintenance of the export credit 
premium for eligible products through April 30 1985 at an 
overall rate of 11% of the adjusted FOB value. As mentioned 
above, when Brazil signed the GATT subsidy code agreed to in 
the MTN it committed itself to phase out the export credit 
premium by June 1983. Since the U.S. approved the 
modification of Brazil's original commitment, it will 
continue to consider Brazil as a "country under the 
agreement" and will thus require an injury demonstration for 
the application of countervailing duties on subsidized 
imports of dutiable articles from Brazil. 
A large increase in the deficit on current account, 
principally due to an increase of more than $2 billion in 
net interest payments, together with a sharp reduction in 
new external financing in the second half of the year, 
provoked a record balance-of-payments deficit (loss of net 
international reserves, balance-of-payments concept) of $8.9 
billion in 1982. This deficit could be financed only by a 
significant loss of international liquidity, IMF 
compensatory f inancing and bridge loans provided by 
commercial banks, the U.S. Treasury and the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). 
It became clear that the amount of international loans 
that Brazil could obtain in the international money markets 
in the coming years would be significantly below its 
historical levels and that the traditional mechanisms for 
obtaining external resources would be insufficient to cover 
Brazil's gross borrowing needs. 
At the end of 1982, the economic authorities designed 
an economic adjustment program, in order to face the 
balance-of-payments problems and to make structural 
adjustments aimed at reducing the role of external savings 
and increasing the efficiency of the economy through changes 
in relative prices. 
Major objectives of the adjustment program were to 
achieve a significant surplus in foreign merchandise trade 
and a real devaluation of the cruzeiro. 
In order to guarantee the acquisition of the necessary 
external financing, in late 1982 Brazil started negotiations 
with the IMF on special credit facilities, and presented a 
plan to commercial banks aimed at refinancing the 
outstanding debt and obtaining new loans. The negotiations 
included almost all foreign loans that Brazil planned to 
acquire in a certain period (normally one year) and were 
supported —and at the same time conditioned— by the 
52 
fulfillment of the economic adjustment programme agreed to 
with the IMF. 
In February 1983, the IMF approved a loan of 4 488.75 
Special Drawing Rights, within the Extended Fund Facility, 
over a period of three years and subject to an economic 
adjustment program.2/ Brazil also obtained compensatory and 
buffer stock financing. 
The first plan for commercial banks was presented in 
December 1982 and referred to Brazil's external financing 
needs for 1983. In September 1983, Brazil started 
negotiations on a new loan package, in order to obtain 
additional resources for 1983 and to guarantee the financing 
of the balance of payments in 1984. The plans presented to 
commercial banks included new loans (Brazil requested $4.4 
billion in December 1982 and $6.5 billion in September 
1983), the conversion of amortizations into new long-term 
loans ($4.5 billion in 1983 and $5.4 billion in 1984) and 
the maintenance of trade-related short-term credits and 
short-term bank lines. 
In November 1983, Brazil negotiated the rescheduling 
of its foreign debt eligible for negotiations in the "Paris 
Club" (direct government loans and credits guaranteed or 
insured by creditor governments and its institutions). The 
main result was a rescheduling of 85% of the principal and 
interest due from August 1 1983 through December 31 1984 
over nine years with a grace period of five years. 
(Eligible debt has been estimated between $2.4 and 3.8 
billion.) 
The continued high value of the U.S. dollar against 
other convertible currencies, the devaluation of the 
currencies of Brazil's major trading partners in Latin 
America, and the necessity to attain a large surplus in the 
balance of trade in goods in order to keep the financing of 
the deficit on current account under control provoked a new 
maxidevaluation (23%) of the cruzeiro in February 1983. The 
principal export incentives for manufactured products and 
import restrictions were maintained. However, the dollar 
amounts of preferential working capital finance for 
exportable products were reduced to compensate for the 
effects of the devaluation (the amounts in local currency 
remaining unchanged), export taxes were charged on some 
primary and agro-based industrial products and the IOF 
surcharge on imports of a series of articles was reduced to 
15%. 
Brazil's agreement with the IMF, according to the 
"letters of intent", will have no significant short-term 
effects on Brazil's trade policy. However, Brazil will 
reduce foreign exchange restrictions in accordance with the 
possibilities permitted by the balance-of-payments 
situation. In the long run, Brazil intends to continue the 
crawling-peg exchange rate system, maintaining at least the 
real value of the cruzeiro against the dollar, eliminate 
exchange restrictions (towards the end of the 3-year 
agreement with the IMF), and base protection for domestic 
industry on tariffs rather than on quantitative 
restrictions. 
In January 1984, the amount of available working 
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capital finance for export production (under former Central 
Bank resolution 674) as a proportion of adjusted FOB value 
of exports was reduced significantly and eliminated 
completely for some sectors. The subsidy element was 
virtually eliminated in January 1984, as loans were to be 
fully adjusted by the monetary correction factor (ORTN) and 
bear a real interest rate of 3%. (Central Bank resolutions 
882 and 883.) Resolution 950 obliged the banks authorized to 
operate the program to finance working capital for export 
production exclusively out of their own resources; with 
regard to interest payments, a small percentage will be 
borne by FINEX (10% of interest costs for operations for 
which certificates were issued after August 1 1984). 
The external sector of the Brazilian economy showed 
impressive results in 1983 and 1984. The surplus in 
merchandise trade exceeded the 6 billion dollar target in 
1983 and the deficit on current account was reduced from 
$14.8 billion in 1982 to $6.1 billion in 1983 and $550 
million in 1984. In 1984 the trade surplus ($13 billion) 
again exceeded the ($9.1 billion) target. In 1984, Brazil 
met the external sector's performance criteria agreed to 
with the IMF with a considerable margin. 
b) Main elements of Brazil's export promotion program 
Fiscal incentives for exports consist mainly of 
exemptions from payment of value added and indirect taxes on 
exports and exemption or reduction of duties on imports of 
raw materials, intermediate products and capital goods, used 
fully or partly in export activities. 
The exemption from indirect taxes on exports and the 
exemption from or restitution of taxes and duties on inputs 
that are physically incorporated into the exported products 
—normally under the "draw back" system— avoids having 
domestic taxes affect export prices, this is considered 
internationally as a normal and acceptable practice. 
Additional compensations that involve a transfer of 
public resources to the export sector — o n export 
performance— at lower than market prices and that thus 
permit price discrimination (at a comparable level, e.g., 
"ex factory") according to the destination of sales 
(domestic or external markets) are normally considered as 
genuine export subsidies. 
In Brazil, normal restriction or exemption of domestic 
taxes is granted as follows: 
i) Exemption from the Industrial Product Tax and the 
Circulation of Merchandise Tax 
Both the Industrial Product Tax (Imposto sobre 
Produtos Industrializados, IPI) and the Circulation of 
Merchandise Tax (Imposto sobre Circulacao de Mercadorias, 
ICM) are value-added taxes. Exemption from IPI (a federal 
tax) is granted to exports of all sectors, whereas exemption 
from ICM (a State tax) normally is granted only on exports 
of manufactured products. However, exemption from ICM can 
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be granted on export of primary products by special 
agreement. Tax exemptions are normally granted directly to 
producers of exportable products. However, similar 
incentives are available to trading companies and pools of 
exporting firms through suspension of tax payments. 
ii) Suspension of IPI and ICM for products deposited 
in "Entreposto Aduaneiro" 
This involves suspension of tax payments on products 
deposited in customs warehouses for eventual export. 
iii) Drawback 
The Brazilian drawback system was created in 1966 but 
has been operating only since 1969. Three different 
procedures exist: 
- Suspension of duties and related taxes 3/ on imports 
to be incorporated into export products with a higher unit 
value. This is the most commonly used procedure in Brazil, 
on the basis of agreements between exporting firms and 
CACEX. 
- Exemption of duties and related taxes on imports to 
replenish stocks of imported raw materials incorporated into 
(previously) exported products. Previous clearance from 
CACEX is required. 
- Restitution of duties and related taxes involves 
reimbursement on export of previously paid taxes on imported 
inputs. This procedure is scarcely used in Brazil. 
iv) Exemption from the Financial Operations Tax 
Financial operations related to exports are exempted 
from payment of the Financial Operations Tax (Imposto sobre 
Operacoes Financeiras, IOF). These exemptions are granted 
to export finance, export credit insurance and exchange rate 
operations related to exports. 
One of the most important incentives that can be 
considered as export subsidies are the tax credits. The IPI 
(and ICM) export tax credits ("cre%'dito premio fiscal") 
have existed since 1969. Under the old programme, the 
exporter received on export a credit that exceeded the 
indirect taxes that otherwise would have been borne by the 
exported product and its components. This additional credit 
could be used for payment of other federal and State taxes 
or transferred to other companies. In special cases it 
could also be traded in for cash. 
When Brazil subscribed to the GATT Subsidy Code, it 
committed itself to eliminate these tax credits gradually, 
according to a timetable that established June 30 1983 as 
the final expiration date. However, in December 1979, this 
programme was abolished completely 4/ in combination with 
the maxidevaluation of the cruzeiro. 
As mentioned before, the favorable effects on 
international competitiveness of exports of manufactured 
products of the December 1979 devaluation were lost within 
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one year as a result of the 1980 exchange rate policy in 
combination with the appreciation of the U.S. dollar. 
These factors led to the re-introduction of the export 
credit premium on April 1 1931. As the programme was 
reinstituted in combination with a timetable for its gradual 
elimination through June 1983, roughly equal to Brazil's 
original MTN commitment, the Government of the United Staces 
did not oppose the reintroduction and continued to consider 
Brazil as a "country under the Agreement". 
After some modification, the timetable remained as 
follows: 15% through March 30 1982; 14, 12.5 and 11% in 
the second, third and fourth quarters of 1982 respectively, 
and 3% during the first quarter of 1983. However, in 
November 1982, Brazil negotiated with the United States the 
maintenance of the export tax premium —at the prevailing 
rate of 11%-- until April 30 1985. In September 1984, the 
Minister of Finance decided to reduce the export tax premium 
according to the following rates: 9% in November 1984; 7% 
in December 1984; 5% in January 1985; 4% in February 1985; 
3% in March 1985; and 2% in April 1985. 
The new export credit premium is different from the 
former IPI export tax credit as it is granted to all 
beneficiary sectors at a uniform rate and deposited in cash 
for the exporter. The deposit is made through the bank 
involved in the export transaction generally 30 days after 
the realization of the exchange contract or shipment of the 
exported articles. (Under special circumstances the delay 
can be up to 120 days.) 
The basis for calculation is the adjusted FOB invoice 
value of exports, after several deductions. These 
adjustments include: any agent commissions, rebates or 
refunds resulting from quality, deficiencies or damage during 
transit, contractual penalties, and the value of imported 
inputs. In order to receive the maximum export credit 
premium, the exported product must consist of a minimum of 
75% value added in Brazil. If this minimum limit is not 
met, there is a specific calculation to reduce the FOB 
invoice price when calculating the base upon which the IPI 
export credit premium is paid. 
The export credit is added to the profits of the 
beneficiary firms and therefore subject to corporate profit 
taxation. For this reason plus the adjustments that have to 
be made to the FOB export value and the delay in its 
payments, the real value 'of the incentives for the exporters 
(as well as its actual costs to the federal budget) are 
considerably below its nominal value. 
An important incentive is pre-shipment finance granted 
mainly under the Special Programme for Export Finance 
(former Central Bank resolutions 643 and 674, since January 
1984, resolutions 882 and 883), which provides working 
capital for the production of exportable manufactured 
products, at subsidized interest rates and using 
preferential Central Bank rediscounting. In recent years 
the annual interest rate had been 40%, to be paid biannualy, 
the effective rate being 44%. In June 1983 the interest 
rate was increased to 60% annually (Central Bank resolution 
832, June 9 1983) and in January 1984 it was increased to 3% 
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+ 100% of the variation of the monetary correction factor 
(ORTN) (Central Bank resolutions 882 and 883). The sectors 
and products for which this type of finance can be provided 
and the amounts they may receive (as a percentage of FOB 
value) are indicated by the National Monetary Council (NMC). 
The loans may have a duration of up to one year, apart from 
the time needed for export production. For the calculation 
of the adjusted FOB invoice value, which is the basis for 
the computation of eligible finance, several items must be 
deducted from the export value, such as agent commissions, 
contractual penalties, refunds or return of goods, exports 
denominated in cruzeiros, imported inputs over 20% of the 
export value, and a deduction for the company's trade 
deficit as a percentage of the value of its exports. Under 
resolution 674, eligible products and/or sectors were 
allowed to receive 12, 20 or 40% of the adjusted FOB value 
of exports in the previous year.5/ In January 1984, these 
amounts were reduced and for some sectors eliminated (e.g., 
frozen concentrated orange juice). In August 1984, Central 
Bank resolution 950 obliged banks authorized to operate the 
programme to provide working capital finance for export 
production completely out of their own resources and 
established that interest rates for export financing should 
be equal to the normal rates of each bank less a percentage 
borne by FINEX (15% for operations for which documents were 
issued between January 1 and July 31 1984; and 10% for 
operations for which certificates were issued after August 1 
1984) . 
Another important instrument, available for all export 
products, is the Export Financing Against Foreign Exchange 
Contracts (AAC), which involves advances in national 
currency for up to 90 days (for an amount of up to 100% of 
the export value) against foreign exchange contracts and 
receivables, at non-subsidized interest rates that depend on 
each bank. 
The Banco do Brasil can provide finance out of its own 
resources to support the production of manufactured and 
semi-manufactured goods with short production cycles. The 
firm that receives finance must commit itself to export 
goods up to a certain amount during its term, which at 
present is one year. 
For profit tax computations, the taxable income of 
firms can be reduced by the percentage of its total sales 
accounted for by export sales. As a consequence, profits 
made on export sales are not subject to the corporate profit 
tax of around 35%. This programme has existed since 1971 
and according to the legislation it will expire at the end 
of 1985. 
Since 1971, exemption from IPI and ICM taxes on 
imports of raw materials and intermediate and capital 
products can be granted to exporters in proportion to the 
increase of their exports. This scheme has had little 
importance in practice and according to the legislation it 
will expire at the end of 1985. 
In some cases, exporters can obtain exemption from 
payment of duties and value added taxes on imported plant 
and equipment, in relation to export performance. The duty 
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free imports of capital goods for export production is 
considered a subsidy as imported products are not physically 
incorporated into exported products and thus give an extra 
benefit to the exporting firm in relation to its sales in 
the domestic market. In some cases a firm can be granted 
—based on its export performance-- the benefit of 
accelerated depreciation of plant and equipment manufactured 
in Brazil. 
The BEFIEX (Special Program of Fiscal Incentives to 
Exports) program, which has been operating since 1972, aims 
principally to promote exports of manufactured products by 
granting fiscal incentives to imports, facilitating the 
growth and modernization of enterprises and/or the 
diversification of production lines, thus contributing to a 
modern and internationally competitive production apparatus. 
Multinational companies were induced to operate at economic 
scales, attaining specialization of production across 
countries. By paying special attention to these factors, 
BEFIEX plays an important role in Brazil's industrial 
development policy. 
In order to receive the benefits of the program, 
enterprises (individually or in pools) must present 
long-term export programs, normally for ten-year periods, 
and reach a minimum domestic value-added content of exports 
(and of total production). At this enterprise level the 
total value of imports receiving fiscal incentives, 
including those realized under the "draw back" mechanism 
and/or other promotion schemes, should not exceed 50% of the 
FOB value of exports. In cases where transport and/or 
insurance is provided by national companies, the FOB values 
of exports can be increased by the corresponding value. 
Incentives, negotiated at the enterprise level with 
BEFIEX, can be the following: 
i) A 70 to 80% duty and tax reduction on imports of 
equipment and machinery. These tax reductions can be 
authorized even when a "national similar" exists. A waiver 
can be granted if there is a "national similar", but imports 
are subject to previous approval by the Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce in the case of machinery, equipment and 
components, and by the Council of Customs Policy (Conselho 
de Politica Aduaneira, CPA) in the case of imports of 
intermediate products. 
ii) In special cases the President of Brazil can grant 
a greater tax reduction if the project is considered of 
special national importance. 
iii) A 50% duty and tax reduction on imports of raw 
materials, components and intermediate product imports, up 
to a total import value of one third of the average net FOB 
value of exports. In special cases, considered to be of 
national interest, complete exemption from duties and taxes 
can be granted. 
iv) Maintenance of fiscal export incentives during the 
entire period of validity of the export programs, even if 
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changes occur in the legislation on incentives. This point 
has proved to be especially important in recent years when 
the fiscal credits were first abolished (1979) and then 
reintroduced in combination with a timetable for its gradual 
elimination (1981). These changes have not affected the 
fiscal credits granted to enterprises which joined the 
BEFIEX program before March 30 1982. 
v) Exemption from payment of corporate profit tax on 
exports and from taxes on remittance of profits. 
Preoperational and preindustrial costs can be carried 
forward for tax computations for a term of up to ten years. 
In 1976, a similar program was established (CIEX, 
Comissao de Incentivos as Exportacoes) which aimed to grant 
incentives to smaller firms. Benefits are more limited: 
beneficiary firms are allowed reductions of up to 90% in 
taxes on imported capital goods. The export commitments are 
easier to achieve (positive balance in foreign exchange 
receipts and payments and viability of the export program). 
The CIEX program is quite small compared to BEFIEX. 
Postshipment finance is provided by the Fund for 
Export Credit Finance (FINEX), administered by the Bank of 
Brazil-CACEX. Its resources come from the Central Bank of 
Brazil. The maturity of the loans is between 6 months and 8 
years according to the nature and value of the exportable 
goods and services. 
According to the Equalization of Interest Rates 
system,6/ commercial banks are authorized to borrow abroad, 
at interest rates prevailing on the international financial 
markets, increased by spread and commission, to finance 
Brazilian exports at internationally competitive interest 
rates. The difference between the cost of foreign loans and 
the interest rate charged to the importer of Brazilian 
products is covered by FINEX. Financial institutions 
authorized to operate under these conditions are private 
commercial banks, branches of Brazilian banks operating 
abroad and foreign financial institutions guaranteed by the 
Central Bank of Brazil. 
With regard to Buyer's Credit, export credits supplied 
directly to the importer of Brazilian products using FINEX 
funds are scarce and used only in the case of big projects 
in which several Brazilian firms participate. 
Notes 
¿/Brazil's terms of trade deteriorated throughout the 
period 1978-1982. The terms of trade for merchandise 
suffered an accumulated fall of 46% in the years 1978 
through 1982, as compared to 1977. See ECLAC, Estudio 
Economico de America Latina, Brasil (E/CEPAL/L.286/Add.12). 
2/ For the quantitative evaluation of the economic 
adjustment program, performance criteria were agreed upon 
with the IMF on net foreign reserves of the monetary 
authorities, the public sector borrowing requirements, net 
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domestic assets of the monetary authorities and net 
disbursement of external debt. Monthly targets were also 
established on monetary aggregates and on the borrowing 
requirements of the federal. State and municipal 
governments. Departures from these monthly targets do not 
automatically lead to the suspension of new IMF 
disbursements, but oblige the authorities to hold 
consultations with the IMF. 
3/ IPI, ICM, The Harbour Improvement Tax (Taxa de 
Melhoramento de Portos) and the Merchant Marine Renovation 
Tax (Imposto para a renovacao da Marinha Mercante, IRMM). 
4/ Except for tax credits granted to specific firms 
under the BEFIEX program. These credits could not be 
modified for legal reasons as they had been granted under 
the condition that they would remain in force during the 
entire period of validity of the firm's export commitment. 
5/This percentage was equal, e.g., to 40% for footwear 
and 20% for frozen concentrated orange juice and most steel 
products. 
6/ Central Bank resolution 509 authorizes obtaining 
external resources for use for postshipment finance. 
However, resolution 637 authorizes the anticipated entry of 
all available foreign currency also for use for preshipment 
finance through Foreign Exchange Contracts (ACC). 
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Table III.l 
BRAZIL: BALANCE OF PAYHENIS AND FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
(» aillions) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
1. Merchandise trade balance -252 -61 -4 748 -3 549 -2 385 -100 -1 159 -2 717 -2 823 1 184 778 6 470 
Exports of goods 3 941 6 093 7 814 8 493 9 961 11 922 12 473 15 244 20 132 23 275 20 175 21 899 
¡•ports of goods 4 193 6 154 12 562 12 042 12 346 12 022 13 632 17 961 22 955 22 091 19 397 15 429 
Crude oil 344 606 2 558 3 099 3 354 3 602 4 064 6 264 9 372 10 604 9 566 7 822 
Other 3 849 5 548 10 004 8 943 8 992 8 420 9 568 11 697 13 583 11 487 9 831 7 607 
2. Net interest payments -413 -581 -730 -1 496 -1 811 -2 103 -2 699 -4 108 -6 310 -9 162 -11 353 -9 555 
3a . Balance on current account -1 713 -2 174 -7 560 -6 995 -6 551 -5 115 -7 039 -10 482 -12 848 -11 760 -16 279 
3b . Excluded reinvested profits . . . ... . . . ... . . . . . . ... -10 993 -14 755 -6 171 
4. Amortization -1 271 -1 676 -1 929 -2 185 -3 017 -4 133 -5 274 -6 553 -6 677 -7 642 -8 098 -7 591 a/ 
5. Debt service (2+4) -1 684 -2 257 -2 659 -3 681 -4 828 -6 236 -7 973 -10 661 -12 987 -16 804 -19 451 -17 146 ~ 
6. Gross borrouing needs (3b*4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 635 22 853 16 101 
7. International liquidity (at end of period) 4 183 6 416 5 269 4 041 6 544 7 256 11 895 9 689 6 913 7 507 3 994 4 S 3 
8. External debt, registered 9 521 12 572 17 166 21 171 25 985 32 037 43 511 49 904 53 848 61 411 70 198 80 843 
External debt, registered and non-registered . . . . . . . . . ... . . . ... ... . . . . . . 71 878 83 205 91 162 
9. Index nuabers (1970=100) 
Teras of trade in goods FOB/CIF 97.7 106.9 90.9 85.4 92.8 100.8 87.6 79.9 67.4 56.1 54.0 53.9 
Purchasing pouer of exports of goods 122.6 163.2 142.3 145.1 160.4 185.8 181.5 188.4 200.9 211.9 188.4 217.0 
10. Debt indicators: 
Debt service/exports of goods (1) 42.8 37.0 34.0 43.3 48.5 52.3 63.9 69.9 64.5 72.2 96.4 78.3 
Net interest payaents/exports of goods (2) 10.S 9.5 9.3 17.6 18.2 17.6 21.6 26.9 31.3 39.4 56.3 43.6 
Aaortization/exports of goods (Z) 32.3 27.4 24.7 25.7 30.3 34.7 42.3 43.0 33.2 32.9 40.1 34.7 
Registered external debt/exports of goods 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.5 3.3 2.7 2.6 3.5 3.7 
11. Other indicators: 
Imports of crude oil/exports of goods (Z) 8.7 9.9 32.7 36.5 33.7 30.2 32.6 41.1 46.6 45.6 48.7 35.7 
(Debt service * oil iaports)/exp. of goods (Z) 51.5 46.9 66.8 79.8 82.1 82.5 96.5 111.0 111.1 117.8 145.1 113.0 
Source: 1972-1981: ECLAC on the basis of the INF and the Central Bank of Brazil. 
1982-1983: Central Bank of Brazil. Brazil Economic Prograa; Internal and external adjustment. Hay 1984. 
a/ Included aaortizations converted into neu loans, to an aaount of $4.6 billion. (Project 2.) 
Table III.2 
BRAZIL: TRADE WEIGHTED REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEX a/ 
(1980 = 100) 
Hajor trading United 
Period partners _b/ States EEC c/ Japan LAAI d/ 
1971 63.7 75.3 60.0 56.4 54.9 
1972 65.3 75.3 65.0 63.6 54.7 
1973 69.2 71.7 69.3 73.3 65.2 
1974 72.7 75.3 70.5 77.0 70.1 
1975 72.5 78.9 73.7 73.2 63.8 
1976 72.9 80.3 7Ö.0 73.7 «6.5 
1977 73.5 81.1 73.9 78.4 64.3 
1978 77.0 81.7 80.3 91.2 67.5 
1979 87.2 88.1 89.6 89.9 83.6 
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1981 87.8 93.4 79.0 88.0 89.5 
1982 77.3 91.6 68.3 75.7 70.5 
1979-1 81.7 83.1 85.2 91.7 75.5 
1979-11 84.4 86.7 86.6 88.7 78.8 
1979-III 87.4 87.1 90.1 89.3 84.7 
1979-IV 95.3 95.3 97.5 89.7 93.5 
1980-1 111.3 112.0 113.8 104.9 108.9 
1980-11 105.4 106.4 106.7 105.6 103.4 
1980-III 98.0 97.1 99.1 100.3 97.9 
1980-IV 92.6 92.2 88.9 96.6 95.6 
1981-1 88.1 90.6 80.3 93.2 91.6 
1981-11 85.2 92.7 74.2 87.2 86.8 
1981-III 85.3 94.1 70.2 84.3 88.7 
1981-IV 89.0 95.7 76.2 87.6 92.7 
1982-1 84.7 94.3 73.3 82.8 84.5 
1982-11 79.2 90.5 69.5 76.5 76.1 
19B2-III 73.3 89.0 65.6 71.0 64.2 
1982-IV 76.8 93.4 67.6 73.7 67.8 
1983-1 91.0 110.0 80.9 94.1 79.7 
1983-11 105.7 126.2 91.8 106.1 96.5 
1983-III 104.8 123.7 85.4 101.5 101.5 
1983-IV 105.1 124.6 84.6 104.3 102.0 
a/ For the calculation of the real exchange rate index, the 
noiinal exchange rate was divided by relative price 
indexes for industrial products. 
J>/ Obtained fro» a basket of the »ain 17 buyers of Brazilian 
»anufactures in the developed aarket economies and Latin 
Aaerica, weighted by " i average share of exports of 
•anufactures to each country in the period 1977-1981. The 
basket includes Canada, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, the 
United States and the countries lentioned under c/ and d/. 
c/ The basket includes Belgiui, Luxeabourg, France, Geraany, 
Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdoa. 
A/ Latin Aaerican Association for Integration. Ihe basket includes 
Argentina, Chile, Hexico, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
Chapter IV 
BRAZIL-UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 
a) Introduction 
Trade in goods is only one of the major components of 
international economic relations. Transfers of capital, 
mainly through loans and direct foreign investment, and its 
counterparts —interests and profits— constitute other 
major elements of international payments. These variables 
have a great impact on foreign trade. 
The position of U.S. direct investment and 
reinvestments registered in Brazil amounted to $6.9 billion 
by June 1983. This was by far the largest single country 
share of total foreign direct investment in Brazil (32%) and 
even exceeded the position of all EEC countries together.!/ 
By 1981, Brazil was the sixth largest recipient of U.S. 
direct investment abroad, ranking first among the developing 
countries. 
Brazil has received a large share of foreign lending 
by U.S. banks, and Brazilian debt represents a significant 
share of the bank capital of many of them. 
For these reasons, William G. Tyler observed that: 
"Clearly, any changes in Brazil's ability or 
willingness to service its debt, or rumors to that effect, 
are bound not only to reverberate through the U.S. banking 
community but to send tremors through the international 
financial system as well. Through trade, direct foreign 
investment, and bank lending, the United States has 
gradually involved itself in a mutually interdependent 
economic relationship with Brazil. U.S. interests serve as 
both hostage and inducement in that relationship, with ample 
areas for conflict and consensus. The continuation of such 
relations on a healthy basis is economically important to 
both countries."2/3/ 
Brazil's long-term trade policy has been intended to 
support infant industries by granting them protection in the 
domestic market and to support exporters of manufactures by 
granting them incentives to overcome the antiexport bias 
inherent in Brazil's import substituting industrialization. 
In the short run, trade policy measures are intended to 
correct the balance-of-payments disequilibrium. 
Important elements of these policies --especially the 
long-term elements-- have been a cause of conflict in 
Brazil-U.S. trade relations. The subsidy/countervailing 
duty question has been a perennial point on the agenda of 
bilateral consultations and requires daily attention by 
trade officials of both governments. The U.S. has put 
pressure on Brazil's protection policy for infant 
industries, principally with regard to Brazil's computer 
industry. U.S. firms have complained about domestic 
content and export performance requirements in Brazil. 
In recent years, the U.S. has more vigorously pursued 
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the application of the principles of graduation and 
reciprocity in international trade relations. The nub of 
the graduation issue is that the more advanced developing 
countries should gradually be phased out of their special 
and differential treatment in the international trading 
system (e.g., with respect to tariff preferences in the 
market of the industrialized countries) and be phased in 
with respect to obligations under the trade rules of GATT 
(e.g., with respect to export subsidies granted to 
industrial products). 
In new trade bills in the United States, the issue of 
reciprocity in foreign trade received a more aggressive 
approach designed to open foreign markets, often reinforced 
with the threat of retaliation.4/ The word "reciprocity" has 
thus taken on a trade-restrictive rather than a trade-
liberalizing tone. 
In the short run, trade policy measures in Brazil have 
served principally balance-of-payments purposes in response 
to a series of external shocks, especially the rise of 
interest rates in the international money markets, which led 
to serious debt-service problems. Under these 
circumstances, the demands for graduation and trade 
liberalization are extremely difficult for Brazil to 
fulfill. 
The reaction of the U.S. Government to Brazil's 
balance-of-payments and debt-service problems has been 
positive in several instances. At the end of 1982, the U.S. 
Treausury provided bridge loans which represented an 
important contribution to the financing of Brazil's balance-
of-payments deficit. In November 1982, the U.S. Government 
agreed to the maintenance of Brazil's fiscal export credit 
through April 1985. The U.S. Government has also showed 
cooperation regarding suspension agreements in 
countervailing duty cases. In September, 1983, EXIMBANK 
approved a special facility to provide Brazil with up to 
$1.5 billion in financial insurance and guarantees for a 
variety of trade transactions. This facility became 
available in 1984. However, at the London economic summit 
and in letters interchanged between the Presidents of the 
two countries, the Government of the United States showed 
little willingness to accept political solutions of the debt 
problem. 
The reason for the conflict/cooperation in Brazil-U.S. 
trade relations will be further elaborated in Chapter VI. 
This chapter provides a short review of the main issues. 
i) Export subsidies 
Developing countries defend export subsidies on the 
ground of their need to compensate for internal and external 
discouragements to exports, such as the overvaluation of the 
exchange rate, the high cost of domestic inputs due to 
protection of infant industries and import controls for 
balance-of-payments reasons, as well as tariff escalation 
and trade restrictions in importing countries. These 
disincentives are particularly relevant in the Latin 
American countries, which have based their industrialization 
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processes to a large extent on the substitution of imports. 
Carlos Di%'az-Alejandro has pointed out that export 
subsidies "resulted from the process of moving from inward 
to outward-looking policies in the 1960s and early 1970s, a 
process encouraged by the World Bank and bilateral aid 
agencies".5/ 
The United States considers subsidies to be generally 
undesirable distortions of international competition and 
trade. The U.S. viewpoint is elaborated in Chapter VI. 
For a long time, U.S. trade legislation did not require 
--in the case of dutiable imports-- the demonstration of 
injury (a traditional provision of GATT) for the imposition 
of countervailing duties.6/ 
In MTN, the U.S. agreed to apply countervailing 
duties against subsidized imports of dutiable articles only 
when injury to the domestic industry of those articles can 
be demonstrated. The U.S. limited the benefits of the 
injury investigations --as well as the possibility of 
suspending investigations through undertakings between 
interested parties-- to "countries under the agreement" 
(countries which have assumed the obligations --or 
substantially equivalent obligations-- of the MTN agreement 
on subsidies and countervailing measures). 
In the framework of the MTN subsidy code, Brazil 
committed itself to phase out its principal export subsidy: 
the export credit premium. According to the original 
commitment, this incentive would be gradually eliminated by 
June 1983. However, as stated in Chapter III, in light of 
Brazil's balance-of-payments problems, in November 1982, the 
U.S. agreed with the maintenance of the premium (at a rate 
of 11% of the FOB invoice value) until April 30 1985. 
ii) Graduation 
The GATT international trade rules recognize the need 
for developing countries to adopt trade policies different 
from those of the industrialized countries. Developing 
countries are exempted from the outright prohibition on 
granting export subsidies to non-primary products, may 
benefit from tariff concessions on a non-reciprocal basis, 
and enjoy soft conditions for the imposition of quantitative 
import restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes.2/ 
However, in the late seventies, the major 
industrialized countries started to insist that the 
relatively advanced developing countries should more fully 
assume GATT obligations. In MTN, the industrialized 
countries tried to link departures from basic GATT 
principles in favour of developing countries, such as MFN 
treatment and reciprocity, with the graduation principle, by 
means of the "enabling clause".8/ The U.S. position on 
graduation is as follows: 
"Developing and developed countries have a common 
interest in maintaining an open international trading system 
based on agreed rules and constraints on national action. 
While under the existing trading system developing countries 
are accorded certain forms of preferential treatment, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to justify such treatment as 
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the individual country's development level moves closer to 
that of an industrial country. The continuation of 
preferential treatment to all developing countries, 
regardless of their state of development and international 
competitiveness, would have adverse consequences for both 
developing and developed countries. By formalizing a 
two-tier trading system, it would undermine current efforts 
to strengthen international discipline over national trade 
policies and to foster the kind of open markets in which all 
countries, especially those of the developing world, have a 
major stake".9/ 
The graduation principle has had significant effects 
on Brazil-United States commercial relations. In 1979, at 
the insistence of the U.S., Brazil committed itself to phase 
out its most important export subsidy: the fiscal export 
credit. The U.S. requested this commitment in order to 
consider Erazil as a "country under the Agreement" in 
countervailing duty cases.10/ 
The United States has graduated Brazil with respect to 
some articles from duty-free treatment under its GSP program 
(see Section C). 
iii) Reciprocity 11/ 
The traditional concept of reciprocity means that 
trading partners should offer equivalent concessions in 
multilateral negotiations on trade liberalization, 
considering all products together. In recent years the U.S. 
has approached reciprocity as a principle of equivalent 
market access, in some cases for limited ranges of goods. 
On the basis of the principle of reciprocity, the U.S. 
often demands trade liberalization with the threat of 
retaliation against countries that offer the U.S. unequal 
access (as compared to the U.S.) to their markets, 
especially countries which have large bilateral trade 
surpluses with the U.S. This policy is focused on sectors 
where the U.S. is competitive, such as telecommunications 
and high technology. A major objective of this new 
reciprocity movement is to open foreign markets in services 
and trade-related foreign investment, two areas that have 
been largely outside the trading rules of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
Reciprocity has not been demanded from developing 
countries in multilateral trade negotiations. Tariffs play 
an important role in the development process, on the basis 
of the infant industry argument and in some cases for 
government revenues. Developing countries obtained the 
benefits of tariff concessions from the industrialized 
countries on a non-reciprocal basis, under the MFN clause. 
Developing countries are sensitive to reciprocity 
demands under the new concept because of the high protection 
granted to infant industries. However, "the principle of 
non-reciprocity for less developed countries is well 
established" 12/ as developing countries will normally 
dedicate the maximum of foreign currency at their disposal 
to the acquisition of imported products needed for their 
economic development and for the fulfillment of the basic 
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needs of their population. 
This argument is futher elaborated by Cline as 
follows:13/ 
"Brazil and Mexico are countries that probably would 
be high on the list of targets for application of 
reciprocity pressure. Both have high protection and both 
actively affect the pattern of international trade through 
local content and export requirements in their agreements 
with multinational corporations. 
The cases of Mexico, Brazil, and other developing 
countries are complicated, however. Their "reciprocity" 
tends to be automatic at the aggregate level, because their 
need for foreign exchange is so great that they tend to 
spend whatever amounts of it they can earn. Their tariff 
and quota protection and investment requirements distort the 
composition of imports, but the level of their imports is 
essentially determined by their export earnings (and capital 
inflows). To force compositional changes in their 
industrial structure would benefit some U.S. exporters but 
hurt others because, if Brazil (for example) imported more 
automobiles, it would have less foreign exchange left to 
import wide-bodied aircraft. 
Moreover, Brazil, Mexico, and some other newly 
industrialized countries (NICs) can legitimately point to 
the infant industry argument to justify some of their 
protection, considering that their domestic markets are 
large enough for potential economies of scale and that they 
have an increasingly sophisticated base of skilled labor. 
Over the longer run, better rules of the game will have to 
be worked out for trade with the newly industrialized 
countries. However, this is not an auspicious time to 
impose additional pressure on exports from Mexico and 
Brazil, considering their high external debt (much of it 
held by American banks) and their severe balance-of-payments 
problems." 
The new concept of reciprocity was incorporated to 
some extent in the extension of the U.S. GSP programmes 
beyond the initial expiration date of January 3 1985. (This 
issue is treated in Section C.) 
iv) Other trade conflict 
Brazil has restrained exports of hides and skins in 
order to foster domestic production of leather articles, 
guaranteeing the availability of raw materials at low 
prices. The U.S. has alleged that this practice 
constitutes a distortion of free competition, as it permits 
Brazilian producers of leather articles to obtain raw 
materials at lower than world market prices, whereas U.S. 
producers have to pay a higher price. 
In March 1980, the U.S. and Brazil negotiated an 
interim agreement under which Brazil agreed that it would 
replace the embargo of exports of hides and skins by a 36% 
export tax. A new one-year agreement providing for the 
reduction of the export tax to 18% was negotiated and went 
into effect on October 1 1980. This rate was reduced to 14% 
as of February 1 1982 and to 9% as of December 30 1982. 
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(Central Bank resolution 725 of January 20 1982.) 
U.S. producers of apples and pears have complained 
about problems in exporting to Brazil. 
b) Bilateral trade between Brazil and the United 
States 
Bilateral Brazil-U.S. trade reflects the general 
patterns of foreign trade of these two countries. The main 
U.S. exports to Brazil are agricultural products 14/ 
(principally wheat), technologically more advanced 
industrial products, and services (table IV.1). Brazilian 
exports to the United States are mainly tropical products 
(principally coffee, cane sugar and cocoa) and industrial 
products which are labor intensive (footwear, textiles) 
and/or produced by mature production techniques (steel 
products) (table IV.2). An important proportion of 
Brazilian exports to the United States consists of 
agro-industrial products based on the availability of cheap 
inputs, either from domestic production (e.g., frozen 
concentrated orange juice) or from use of the drawback 
system (e.g., corned beef).15/ 
Within these general patterns, important changes in 
the structure of bilateral trade are underway. Import-
substituting industrialization in Brazil contributed to a 
decline in the share of industrial products in imports from 
the United States (table IV.1). 
Brazil's remarkable export diversification, achieved 
principally in the seventies, is reflected in Brazil's 
exports to the United States. The share of coffee in beans, 
raw sugar and cocoa decreased from 50% in 1971 to 15% in 
1983. The share of industrial products (excluding food; 
defined throughout this chapter as those products included 
in Chapters 28 through 99 of the Brussels nomenclature of 
the Customs Co-operation Council) increased from 18% in 1971 
to 44% in 1982 and 54% in 1983 16/ (table IV.2). 
The composition of Brazil's exports of industrial 
products to the U.S. market also became more diversified. 
The share of footwear, textiles and apparel in the exports 
of non-agro-based industrial products to the United States 
decreased from 40% in 1975 to 27% in both 1982 and 1983. In 
the same period the share of another category of import 
sensitive products, steel, increased sharply (from 7 to 15% 
in 1982 and 17.6% in 1983).17/ The share of other articles 
in the exports of industrial products (excluding food) 
increased from 53% in 1975, to 58% in 1982, and to 55% in 
1983. 
Tariff preferences under the U.S. GSP program and the 
important role of subsidiaries of transnational corporations 
contributed to the export success in these sectors. A 
sample of the 400 major exporting firms to the U.S. 
indicates that in these sectors subsidiaries of U.S. firms 
contribute significantly to Brazil's exports to the United 
States, especially in parts and components for the 
automobile and electronic industries (e.g., radio receivers 
for cars, exported by Philco, which belongs to Ford). Table 
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IV.6 shows that subsidiaries of U.S. firms accounted for 
almost 18% of the value of manufactures exported to the 
United States by the 400 largest exporting firms in 1981. 
If textiles and apparel, footwear, and iron and steel are 
excluded, this ratio rises to 32%. The major exporting 
firms and their ownership (according to equity capital) are 
shown in table IV.7. 
The United States is the largest single country market 
for Brazilian export products, absorbing 20% of total 
exports in 1982 and 23% in 1983 (tables IV.3 and IV.4). In 
the seventies, exports to the United States showed high 
growth rates (17.9% annually on the average), although less 
spectacular than total Brazilian exports (22.1%). Since the 
early seventies, the nominal value of exports to the United 
States decreased only in the recession years 1975 and 1982. 
Exports to the U.S. market increased 26% in 1983 and 64% in 
the first quarter of 1984 (in comparison with the first 
quarter of 1983). Exports to the United States accounted 
for 60% of Brazil's total export growth in 1983. 
The participation of the U.S. in Brazilian imports 
decreased in the seventies because a greater proportion of 
Brazil's import bill was absorbed by increased oil prices, 
because of the continuation of Brazil's import-substituting 
industrialization, which principally affected products 
imported from industrialized countries, and because of a 
more than proportional increase in trade with the Latin 
American Association for Integration (ALADI). The U.S. 
share of non-oil imports decreased from 35.3% in 1970 to 
31.7% in 1983 (table IV.4). 
In the period 1969 through 1980, Brazil-U.S. 
bilateral trade (FOB-FOB) showed a deficit for Brazil, 
attaining a record 1.7 billion dollars in 1975 (according to 
Brazilian trade figures --table IV.4). In the eighties, 
Brazil's balance of trade with the U.S. turned into a 
surplus, due to both increased exports and reduced imports. 
The surplus in merchandise trade that Brazil has planned to 
attain (6.5 and 9 billion dollars in 1983 and 1984 
respectively) has to be achieved principally by a growing 
trade surplus with the industrialized countries. Brazil's 
trade deficit with OPEC (6.1 billion dollars in 1982, 
excluding Ecuador and Venezuela) has to be partially 
financed by a trade surplus with the rest of the world. A 
surplus in trade in goods is also needed to compensate for 
the deficit in Brazil's international services trade and, 
principally, to make a contribution to the servicing of 
foreign debt. 
In 1983 Brazil attained a surplus of $2.7 billion in 
its merchandise trade with the United States, equal to 41% 
of its total merchandise trade surplus and to 25% of the 
$10.6 billion surplus with non-OPEC countries. (The largest 
bilateral trade surplus of Brazil was with the EEC; $3.8 
billion.) The increased surplus with the United States 
accounted for 26% of the $5.6 billion increase of Brazil's 
merchandise trade surplus from 1982 to 1983, while the $2 
billion decrease in Brazil's deficit with OPEC (excluding 
Venezuela and Ecuador) explained 36% of the improvement of 
Brazil's trade balance. 
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The increased trade surplus with the United States in 
1983 and 1984 is the combined result of the overall increase 
in the U.S. trade deficit and Brazil's economic adjustment 
program. This has been a common factor in Latin America. 
According to data compiled by ECLAC, Latin American and 
Caribbean countries registered a record $31.2 billion trade 
surplus in 1983 with the rest of the world. As U.S. import 
(customs value) and export (FAS) statistics has registered a 
U.S. trade deficit of 14.7 billion dollars with all other 
OAS countries, it can be concluded that almost one half of 
Latin America's trade surplus in 1983 resulted from 
transactions with the United States. From 1982 to 1983 the 
U.S. trade deficit with all other OAS countries increased 
$11.4 billion (as a result of a 10% increase in imports and 
a 24% fall in exports), accounting for 44% of the total 
increase in the U.S. trade deficit. The U.S. bilateral 
trade deficit with Brazil increased from 866 million dollars 
in 1982 to 2.4 billion dollars in 1983 (4% of the total U.S. 
trade deficit). 
Trade with Brazil represents only a small proportion 
of total U.S. foreign trade. Imports from Brazil represent 
less than 2% of total U.S. imports. More than one third of 
Brazilian articles imported into the U.S. are food products 
(principally coffee, cocoa, sugar and frozen concentrated 
orange juice (table IV.5). 
Brazil is the main foreign supplier to the U.S. of a 
series of agricultural and agro-industrial products (e.g., 
coffee in beans, instant coffee, sugar, cocoa butter, frozen 
concentrated orange juice, cashews, and castor oil). In 
these products, Brazil competes with a wide range of third 
country suppliers, principally Colombia (coffee), the 
Dominican Republic (sugar), the Ivory Coast (cocoa), India 
(cashews and castor oil), Mexico (shrimps and lobsters), 
Argentina (corned beef) and Ecuador (unsweetened chocolate). 
The share of Brazilian manufactures in total U.S. 
imports is generally low. A GATT sample of U.S. imports 
from Brazil in 1980 indicates that for industrial products 
the EEC, Canada and Japan are Brazil's major third country 
competitors in the U.S. market. In the case of 311 out of 
475 manufactured products imported into the U.S. from 
Brazil and representing 1.1 billion dollars of trade (out of 
a total of 1.5 billion of U.S. imports of manufactures from 
Brazil), the principal third country supplier was the EEC, 
Canada or Japan (table IV.8). Competition with the NICs in 
the U.S. market is also significant. In the case of the 
East Asian NICs, this competition is concentrated in steel 
products, footwear, textiles and semiprecious stones. 
Mexico is a significant competitor in parts for the 
automobile industry. 
Brazil's exports to the U.S. show a different degree 
of specialization from those of other NICs. For many of 
these countries, especially Mexico and Singapore, "off 
shore" production, or the elaboration of U.S. imports, is 
an important source of trade with the U.S. This can be 
demonstrated by the value of U.S. imports under TSUS items 
807.00 and 806.30. U.S. duties on imports under these 
items apply only to value added abroad but not to the U.S. 
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imports used in foreign production. In 1982, U.S. imports 
of these items from Brazil amounted to only 125.2 million 
dollars, of which 18.4 million dollars was duty free (table 
IV.7.a). 
For Brazil, vertical specialization —through the 
international division of the production process— is 
achieved mainly by exports of automotive and electronic 
parts. As mentioned before, subsidiaries of U.S. and other 
foreign-owned firms account for an important share of these 
exports, as do private Brazilian firms.18/ 
A good indicator of the relative importance of imports 
for the U.S. economy is the market penetration rate of 
imports at a product specific level. This indicator 
normally relates imports (from all sources or from a 
particular country) to U.S. apparent consumption (defined 
as producers' shipments plus imports less exports) by 
preference expressed in quantitative terms. Some U.S. 
market penetration rates of Brazilian articles can be 
obtained from ITC investigations (see Chapter V, table V.5). 
c) The GSP program of the United States 
The GSP program of the United States has played a 
significant role in the growth and diversification of 
Brazilian exports to that country, especially in the early 
years of its operation. From 1976 to 1979, duty-free 
imports of Brazilian GSP articles into the United States 
increased at an annual rate of 36.4%. Brazil is the number 
five supplier of GSP duty-free articles imported into the 
United States, after Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Mexico. 
However, Brazil's share in duty-free GSP imports was only 
6.1% in 1981. 
The U.S. GSP program currently grants duty free 
treatment to some 3 000 tariff items,19/ mainly manufactures 
and semi-manufactures. The Trade Act of 1974 excluded a 
series of import sensitive items from duty-free treatment, 
including some important export products of Brazil such as 
textile and apparel articles subject to textile 
arrangements, footwear, and import-sensitive steel articles. 
As can be seen in table IV.3, textiles, footwear and steel 
products represented 47% of Brazil's exports of industrial 
products —excluding food— (16% of total exports) to the 
U.S. in 1975, immediately before the initiation of the U.S. 
GSP program. 
In order to "reserve the benefits of the program for 
less competitive producers" and also to grant "some measure 
of protection for U.S. producers of like or directly 
competitive products",20/ the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 
504) contained a competitive need formula. According to 
this formula a country is automatically excluded from the 
benefits of duty-free treatment for a particular product if 
imports of that product from that country in the previous 
calendar year exceeded either a certain dollar value 
(adjusted annually according to the growth in the U.S. 
GNP) 21/ or 50% of total U.S. imports of the product. The 
Trade Act was amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 
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introducing a de minimis provision, which gives the 
President the discretion to waive the 50% competitive need 
rule in cases where U.S. imports of an article were less 
than a certain dollar value (to be adjusted annually to 
reflect the growth in the U.S. GNP).22/ A country may be 
redesignated for GSP benefits in an excluded item if its 
imports fall below the competitive need limits in a 
subsequent year. 
Table IV.11 summarizes the 44 GSP articles for which 
Brazil has been excluded from duty-free treatment in one or 
more years since the initiation of the GSP program. 
Brazilian exports of GSP eligible articles have been 
severely affected by the competitive need limits. In 1981, 
40% of the value of U.S. imports of GSP articles from 
Brazil were excluded from duty-free treatment for this 
reason. In 1982 this share decreased to 20%, principally 
because of a sharp decline in sugar imports. Imports of 
other articles excluded from GSP duty-free treatment also 
declined in 1982. 
Since 1980 the United States has applied the 
graduation principle to the GSP program, excluding 
relatively more advanced developing countries from its 
benefits for particular products on the basis of 
discretionary authority of the President. This policy was 
introduced mainly as a result of an evaluation of the first 
five years operation of the GSP program 23./ that showed an 
uneven distribution of the benefits of the system among 
beneficiary developing countries, and is intended to give 
the least developed countries a better chance to obtain a 
larger share of the benefits of the GSP program. The same 
study pointed out, however, that the little use that least 
developed countries made of the U.S. GSP program can be 
explained by their lack of exportable surplus and not only 
to competition from the more advanced developing countries. 
It must also be noted that GSP duty-free imports from Brazil 
are small in relation to total imports from Brazil and that 
it is doubtful that the type of products with respect to 
which Brazil has been graduated can be supplied by least 
developed countries. 
The graduation principle is made effective principally 
by denying individual countries, which become eligible for 
redesignation for duty-free treatment for particular items 
on the basis of the trade in that item in the previous 
calendar year (when trade in this item falls below the 
competitive need limits), the benefits of the GSP program 
for that product. Countries can also be graduated in 
response to petitions filed by U.S. producers and labour 
unions. Since 1981, seven of the more advanced developing 
countries have been graduated from GSP eligibility with 
respect to individual products (table IV.12). 
Brazil has been graduated in one or more years on six 
products (table IV.11) affecting a relatively small value of 
trade. With respect to three of these products, Brazil had 
previously been excluded from duty-free treatment because 
U.S. imports from Brazil exceeded the competitive need 
limits. With respect to some products, after being 
graduated, Brazil was excluded from GSP eligibility again on 
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the basis of the competitive need formula in subsequent 
years. In 1983, Brazil was excluded for the first time on 
request of petitioners. The articles with respect to which 
Brazil was graduated in 1984 represented 46 million dollars 
of trade in 1983 (U.S. imports). 
The tariff preferences that Brazil enjoys under the 
GSP program are, on the average, small. Ad valorem 
equivalents of import duties for non-GSP beneficiary 
countries for GSP-articles imported duty-free from Brazil 
are presented in table V.4 (Chapter V).24/ For some 
individual items, tariff preferences are more significant. 
As can be seen in the table, an erosion of tariff 
preferences will occur as a result of the MTN tariff 
reductions. However, the benefits that Brazil will obtain 
from the general tariff reductions are probably more 
significant than the disadvantage of the erosion of tariff 
preferences under the GSP program. 
GSP can be an important instrument for the 
diversification of Brazilian exports to the U.S., away from 
import-sensitive articles. The effect of the different 
types of GSP exclusions on Brazil's exports are difficult to 
evaluate. However, in 1982, exports of all excluded GSP 
articles suffered considerable declines. 
Some remarks should be made on the future of the U.S. 
GSP program under legislation extending the program for 
eight and a half years beyond January 3 1985. This is 
designed to gradually reduce benefits to the NICs and 
improve them for the least developed countries. The new 
program includes certain elements of reciprocity (although 
not explicitly, otherwise it would not be eligible for a 
GATT waiver) by contemplating that advanced developing 
countries also would be asked to commit themselves to take 
certain steps to liberalize their imports in return for GSP. 
The new program establishes, on a country specific 
basis, narrower competitive need limits for products 
considered to be "competitive", roughly equal to half of the 
competitive need limit applicable to other articles: $25 
million (in 1985, to be increased annually to reflect growth 
in U.S. GNP) or 25% of U.S. imports. The Act directs the 
President to conduct a general review of GSP eligible 
articles in order to identify those articles in which 
specific beneficiary countries have reached "a sufficient 
degree of competitiveness" in relation to other beneficiary 
countries. One of the considerations which the USTR will 
make when identifying "competitive" articles is the 
willingness of beneficiary countries to liberalize their 
imports. At the same time the President has the authority, 
under certain quantitative restrictions, to waive the 
competitive need limits, considering, among other factors, 
the access that beneficiary countries grant to their markets 
and basic resources. 
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Notes 
1/ The U.S. direct investment and reinvestment 
position in Brazil has exceeded that of the EEC since 1982. 
In recent years their respective positions (in $ billions) 
were as follows: 
United States EEC 
December 1978 3.8 4.5 
December 1979 4.4 5.3 
December 1980 5.1 5.8 
December 1981 5.8 5.9 
December 1982 6.6 6.5 
June 1983 6.9 6.6 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Monthly Bulletin. 
Vol. 20, No. 4. April 1984. 
2/ William G. Tyler, "Changing perspectives of 
Brazil's international economic relations". In: Howard J. 
Wiarda and Janine T. Perfit, eds. Changing Dynamics of the 
Brazilian Economy. Washington, D.C. The Center for 
Hemispheric Studies (February 1983) p.3 (Occasional Papers 
Series No.5). 
3/ According to a study by Data Resource, Inc. and 
published in Business Week, a default on Brazil's foreign 
debt would cost the U.S. economy $24.7 billion in GDP, $14 
billion in export earnings and 399 thousand jobs; the 
deficit on the federal budget would increase $8.4 billion 
and interest rates on federal funds would raise by 0.6 
percentage points. Cited by Mr. Laerte Setubal Filho, 
President of the Brazilian Exporters Association, in his 
opening speech before the seminar "How to increase the 
Brazil - U.S. trade". Rio de Janeiro, March 28 1984. 
4/ William Cline, "Reciprocity a new approach to World 
Trade Policy", Institute for International Economics, Policy 
Analysis in International Economics, No. 2 (September 1982), 
Washington, D.C. 
5/ Cited in C. Fred Bergsten and William R. Cline, 
"Trade Policy in the 1980s", p.31. 
6/ The Tokyo Round subsidies code essentially 
represented a bargain whereby the United States accepted the 
general GATT practice of applying countervailing duties only 
when injury exists (a requirement previously absent under 
U.S. "grandfather clause" rights) in exchange for European 
acceptance of the principle that subsidies, ostensibly for 
domestic purposes, are also subject to countervailing if 
they cause trade injury. (Gary Clyde Hafbauer, "Subsidy 
Issues after the Tokyo Round", Trade Policy in the 1980s), 
Cline, ed. 
7/ In the IMF, many developing countries have not 
accepted Article VIII status. They maintained Article XIV 
status and therefore are exempted from the prohibition of 
imposing restrictions on payments and transfers for current 
international transactions, unless authorized by the Fund, 
and to engage in discriminatory currency arrangements or 
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multiple currency practices. See: The "Graduation" Issue 
in Trade Policy Toward LDCs, World Bank Staff Working Paper, 
No. 334. 
8/ The enabling clause, among other matters permits 
industrialized countries to grant tariff preferences to 
developing countries under the GSP programs, without the 
necessary extension of a waiver of their MFN obligations. 
9/ Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of 
Representatives, "Report to the Congress on the first Five 
Year's Operation of the U.S. Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP)". Page 23. U.S. Government Printing 
Office (WMCP 96-58, April 21 1980, 187 pp.). 
10/ In 1982 the U.S. Government claimed that Brazil 
signed contracts under the BEFIEX program granting the 
export credit premium despite a commitment to phase out this 
subsidy and requested Brazil to take corrective measures. 
Firms which joined BEFIEX after March 30 1982 will not 
receive the export credit premium during the entire period 
of validity of their export programs, but only until the 
expiration date of this export incentive. 
11/ This section is based to a large extent on: 
William R. Cline, "Reciprocity. A new approach to world 
trade policy". Institute for International Economics, Policy 
Analysis in International Economics, Number 2 (September 
1982). 
12/ William R. Cline, et al., Trade negotiations in 
the Tokyo Round; A Quantitative Assessment, Washington, 
D.C., The Brookings Institution (1978) 314 pp. 
13/ William R. Cline, "Reciprocity. A new approach 
to world trade policy", p. 15. 
14/ Both Brazil and the United States are important1 
exporters of agricultural products. Trade in agricultural 
products between the two countries is determined to a large 
extent by climatic factors. Brazil exports tropical 
products to the United States and imports wheat, to 
compensate for insufficient domestic production. Trade in 
other agricultural and agro-industrial products led to 
conflict between the two countries, either because of 
competition with producers in the U.S. home market (meat, 
sugar, frozen concentrated orange juice, instant coffee) or 
competition in third country markets (soybean, 
poultry-section 301 investigations by the Office of the 
USTR, see Chapter V). In some cases the two countries have 
common interests and are allies, for instance, with regard 
to the Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC. 
15/ The drawback system is also important for footwear 
exports. 
16/ The diversification of exports in favour of 
manufactures was accompanied by a spectacular growth of 
Brazil's exports to other developing countries. These 
exports consist principally of manufactures. The U.S. 
market has been extremely important for the diversification 
of Brazil's exports. The share of industrial products in 
the exports to the U.S. is much higher than is the case 
with Brazilian exports to other industrialized countries. 
17/ As a result, imports of footwear, textiles and 
apparel, and steel products, all of which are generally 
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import-sensitive items, still accounted for 47% of Brazil's 
export of industrial products (excluding agro-industrial 
products) to the U.S. in 1982. 
18/ This kind of vertical specialization is important 
for Hong Kong and Taiwan. See: Bela Balassa, Industrial 
Prospects and Policies in the Developed Countries, World 
Bank Staff Working Paper No. 453, Washington (April 1981). 
Balassa observes that: Parts, components, and accessories 
figure prominently in U.S. imports originating in Hong 
Kong, Korea, and Taiwan, each of which ships several times 
more manufactured goods to the United States than do Mexico 
and Malaysia, which surpass them in terms of U.S. imports 
under tariff items 807.00 and 806.30. There is also a 
reverse flow of parts, components and accessories from the 
developed countries for assembly in the developing 
countries. For example, Taiwanese firms import 
technologically sophisticated as well as capital-intensive 
parts, components, and accessories from the United States 
and Japan for assembly in Taiwan. This is the converse of 
the pattern observed in the developed countries that 
purchase simple, labor intensive parts, components, and 
accessories from the developing countries (pp. 17 and 18). 
19/ Increased from 2 800 articles at the beginning of 
its operation in 1976. 
20/ Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Report to Congress on the first Five 
Years' Operation of the U.S. Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP), U.S. Government Printing Office (WMCP 
96-58, April 21 1980, 187 pp.). 
21/ The dollar value for 1982 imports was 53.3 million 
dollars (increased from 25 million dollars for 1976 
imports). 
22/ The dollar value was 1 266 622 dollars for imports 
in 1982 (increased from 1 million dollars for 1979 imports). 
23/ Report to the Congress. 
24/ These are nominal rates. The effective tariff 
rates are probably higher due to the escalation of U.S. 
rates in line with value added. 
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Table III.2 
BRAZILIAN IMPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES 
FOB US* lillion Percentage breakdown 






Other agricultural products 
Mineral products 
Coal 
Other lineral products 







309.0 505.6 637.5 837.7 557.1 
261.3 234.0 320.5 629.0 460.9 
1.0 194.7 224.5 143.0 
46.7 76.9 92.5 65.7 96.2 
216.3 217.9 279.0 218.2 302.1 
117.8 161.0 186.2 
Industrial products 843.3 : 
Cheiical products 187.5 
Plastic and rubber 
•aterials 
Boilers, apparatuses and 
aechanical instruients 
Hacbines and electrical 
apparatuses 62.8 
Transport equipment 36.1 
Optical, photografic, cineiat. 
•easurins, checking, precision, 
•edical instruients and parts 35.1 
Other ind. products 253.8 
201.5 
98.5 56.9 92.8 218.2 100.6 
549.5 2 492.8 3 161.0 2 424.2 1 977.9 
653.0 862.6 1103.7 666.1 538.8 
38.4 84.7 38.7 159.6 132.6 114.9 
229.6 661.0 528.7 600.5 653.2 533.3 
214.4 277.8 294.3 311.0 254.7 
435.8 153.1 421.9 246.1 101.8 
110.6 152.4 153.8 134.4 127.9 





















































1.8 2.3 6.3 3.5 
77.5 77.5 69.7 69.7 
26.8 27.1 19.1 19.0 
1.2 3.9 3.8 4.0 





Source: ECLAC on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Finance of Brazil. 
Table IV.2 
BRAZILIAN EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES a/ 
FOB US* «illions 
1971 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 
721.1 1 287.8 3 439.9 4 040.2 3 980.3 4 989.7 Total 
Agricultural and agro-
dustrial products 551.0 
Raw sugar 65.2 
Cocoa 37.0 
Coffee in bean 259.3 
Infant coffee 26.0 
Orange juice (FCOJ) 11.9 
Other agr. products 151.6 
Mineral products 40.2 
Industrial products 129.9 
Footwear 26.6 
Textiles 20.6 
Steel products 12.4 
Boilers, apparatuses and 
•echanical instruments 8.4 
Machines, electrical 
apparatuses 1.7 
Transport equipient 10.3 
Cheiical products 12.5 
Other ind. products 37.4 
619.0 1 894.1 1 628.8 1 557.5 1 607.8 
52.9 397.0 331.1 41.7 89.6 
116.6 215.8 184.8 124.1 163.7 
198.2 620.8 310.8 459.2 485.7 
38.0 139.1 95.7 97.9 103.6 
9.3 66.8 268.4 328.2 281.9 
204.0 454.6 438.0 506.4 483.3 
217.3 170.2 429.9 690.8 687.5 
451.4 1 375.7 1 981.5 1 732.0 2 694.4 
133.2 257.6 389.3 379.2 581.6 
48.6 93.9 120.1 87.9 147.5 
30.2 236.9 397.0 263.6 472.9 
29.7 151.9 229.7 253.4 421.6 
70.5 124.3 171.5 164.4 224.2 
17.6 167.6 191.6 126.1 142.0 
29.1 65.3 155.6 113.2 172.6 
92.5 278.2 326.7 344.2 532.0 
Percentage breakdown 
1971 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
76.4 48.1 55.1 40.3 39.1 32.2 
9.0 4.1 11.5 8.2 1.0 1.8 
5.1 9.1 6.3 4.6 3.1 3.3 
36.0 15.4 18.0 7.7 11.5 9.7 
3.6 3.0 4.0 2.4 2.5 2.1 
1.7 0.7 1.9 6.6 8.2 5.6 
21.0 15.8 13.2 10.8 12.7 9.7 
5.6 16.9 4.9 10.6 17.4 13.8 
18.0 35.1 40.0 49.0 43.5 54.0 
3.7 10.3 7.5 9.6 9.5 11.7 
2.9 3.8 2.7 3.0 2.2 3.0 
1.7 2.3 6.9 9.8 6.6 9.5 
1.2 2.3 4.4 5.7 6.4 8.4 
0.2 5.5 3.6 4.2 4.1 4.5 
1.4 1.4 4.9 4.7 3.2 2.8 
1.7 2.3 1.9 3.9 2.8 3.5 
5.2 7.2 8.1 8.1 8.6 10.7 
Source: ECLAC on the basis of data provided by CACEX. 
a/ Excluded Puerto Rico. 
Table N.3 
BRAZIL: EXPORIS SHIPPED TO THE UNITED STATES AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL EXPORTS a/ 
(Percentages) 
1971 1975 1980 
Total 
Agricultural and agro-







dustrial products 31.4 13.1 20.0 16.7 19.1 18.0 
Rau sugar 64.8 6.9 53.0 57.2 16.1 26.9 
Cocoa 40.7 39.9 40.2 41.0 40.4 29.4 
Coffee in bean 33.6 23.2 25.0 20.5 24.7 23.2 
Instant coffee 52.3 47.8 48.8 40.2 39.1 42.0 
Orange juice (ECOJ) 33.1 11.3 19.7 40.7 57.2 46.4 
Other agr. products 27.1 8.0 14.2 11.3 10.8 9.5 
Mineral products 12.4 13.0 5.2 13.2 19.6 23.6 
Industrial products 15.7 19.9 18.6 19.3 20.4 27.6 
Footwear 90.2 79.2 63.2 66.5 72.4 81.6 
Textiles 8.9 9.1 10.3 12.5 11.7 13.9 
Steel products 23.1 15.9 24.1 34.7 23.8 27.5 
Boilers, apparatuses and 
mechanical instruments 10.9 7.3 1 1 . 0 14.8 21.2 38.1 
Machines, electrical 
apparatuses 6.0 43.6 26.9 30.6 40.5 50.0 
Transport equipment 37.9 5.5 11.1 9.2 7.3 9.8 
Chemical products 25.3 19.3 13.1 19.5 16.3 19.1 
Other ind. products 11.3 27.7 22.7 12.5 16.5 22.6 
Source: ECLAC on the basis of data provided by CACEX. 
a/ Excluded Puerto Rico. 
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Table IV.11 
BRAZIL: INDICATORS OF TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES 
Percentage of total foreign trade Annual growth rates Bilateral 
¡»ports trade 
Exports balance 
Total Excluded Exports Iaports 
crude oil 
1964 33.2 26.2 39.4 -10.7 -6.7 99.4 
1965 32.6 17.7 34.3 9.7 -24.9 238.6 
1966 33.4 30.0 44.5 11.8 85.7 58.5 
196 7 33.1 .30.9 38.4 -5.8 -2.4 37.2 
1968 33.3 32.6 35.7 14.5 20.0 14.3 
1969 26.4 26.5 33.2 -2.7 0.1 -3.5 
1970 24.7 30.1 35.3 10.9 34.3 -147.7 
1971 26.2 32.9 31.9 12.4 15.9 -194.9 
1972 23.3 30.4 42.0 22.5 26.9 -280.6 
1973 18.1 29.3 32.6 20.5 50.1 -696.0 
1974 21.9 38.7 30.5 54.8 69.3 -1341.5 
1975 15.4 35.2 32.5 -23.0 0.2 -1748.9 
1976 18.2 28.0 31.8 37.8 -8.0 -996.3 
1977 17.7 19.8 28.5 16.6 -15.4 -252.7 
1978 22.7 22.8 30.0 33.5 20.3 -19.6 
1979 19.3 21.3 27.4 2.5 12.1 -298.7 
1980 17.4 20.4 30.2 19.3 26.6 -591.4 
1981 17.7 15.0 30.5 17.1 -14.6 607.8 
1982 20.0 14.2 28.9 -1.9 -18.3 1173.0 
1983 23.1 15.6 31.7 25.5 -15.8 2654.3 
1984 1st quarter 30.4 14.3 29.5 64.1.b/ -18.0J)/ 1253.3 
Source: ECLAC on the basis of data provided by CACEX and the Ministry of Finance of 
Brazil, 
j/ Included Puerto Rico, 
b/ As coipared to 1st quarter of 1983. 
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Table IU.S 
U.S. HADE WITH BRAZIL ACCORDING TO U.S. TRADE STATISTICS 
Hillions of dollars Percentage breakdown 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1979 1980 1981 1982 
U.S. Exports to Brazil (FAS) 
Total 3 407.5 < 306.3 3 752.9 3 380.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Food and live aniials 452.4 652.6 673.8 458.9 13.3 15.2 18.0 13.6 
Beverages and tobacco 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Crude aaterials 150.1 145.2 122.8 142.8 4.4 3.4 3.3 4.2 
Hineral fuels and lubricants 224.9 229.7 182.9 273.9 6.6 5.3 4.9 8.1 
Oils and fats 49.4 11.6 0.2 5.3 1.4 0.3 0.0 0.2 
Cheaicals 950.3 1 162.5 719.7 594.2 27.9 27.0 19.2 17.6 
Manufactured goods by chief laterial 211.4 312.3 191.4 185.8 6.2 7.3 5.1 5.5 Machinery and transport equipment 1 146.7 1 568.6 1 637.9 1 499.8 33.7 36.4 43.6 44.4 
Miscellaneous lanufactures 186.9 191.7 187.7 186.6 5.5 4.5 5.0 5.5 
Other 35.0 31.6 35.9 32.4 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 
U.S Iaports froa Brazil (Custoas value) 
Total 3 118.8 3 714.6 4 474.5 4 285.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 
44.2 
100.0 Food and live aniials 1 516.7 1 989.2 1 978.0 1 451.8 48.6 53.6 33.9 Coffee 596.9 1 053.8 850.1 670.4 19.1 28.4 19.0 15.6 Cocoa 312.4 197.4 194.3 133.4 10.0 5.3 4.3 3.1 Sugar 264.0 442.7 410.0 98.3 8.5 11.9 9.2 2.3 
Vegetables, fruits 165.7 122.1 315.8 355.6 5.3 3.3 7.1 8.3 Beverages and tobacco 53.9 67.1 84.4 154.0 1.7 1.8 1.9 3.6 Crude aaterials 222.7 213.9 247.5 158.3 7.1 5.8 5.5 3.7 
Mineral fuels and lubricants 14.1 43.1 287.4 658.6 0.5 1.2 6.4 15.4 Oils and fats 43.1 50.9 42.4 28.8 1.4 1.4 0.9 0.7 Cheaicals 57.3 123.4 148.4 111.5 1.8 3.3 3.3 2.6 Manufactured goods by chief laterial 452.5 452.9 621.4 621.9 14.5 12.2 13.9 14.5 Machinery and transport equipaent 412.1 390.1 508.4 554.5 13.2 10.5 11.4 12.9 Miscellaneous aanufactures 309.0 308.1 439.9 433.8 9.9 8.3 9.8 10.1 Other 37.4 75.9 116.7 112.1 1.2 2.0 2.6 2.6 
Source: FT 1SS Annuals. 
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Table IV.10 
BRAZIL, 1381: 400 LARGEST EXPORTERS TO THE UNITED STATES: BREAKDOWN ACCORDING TO OHNERSHIP AND PRINCIPAL EXPORT PRODUCT 
Nuaber of fins FOB-value of exports to the U.S. (US t aillions) Partici-
Sector — pation of 
(principal export product) Brazilian Foreign Not Brasili«) Foreign Not subsidiaries 
Total — iden- Total iden- of US firas 
State private U.S. Other tified State Private U.S. Other tified in value(Z) 
Total 400 15 211 39 53 82 3 654.0 956.4 1 633.3 392.3 432.1 239.9 10.7 
Agricult. and agro-ind. products 143 2 79 10 11 41 1 560.7 370.3 896.6 93.2 84.3 116.3 6.0 
Sugar 1 1 331.1 331.1 
Cocoa 26 14 2 10 179.8 131.2 21.9 26.8 
Coffee in bean 28 19 2 1 6 285.6 248.7 15.3 5.2 16.5 5.4 
Soluble, instant coffee 10 7 1 2 92.5 79.9 6.2 6.4 6.7 
Frozen concentr. orange juice 6 5 1 274.7 246.1 28.6 10.4 
Other 72 1 34 6 8 23 397.0 39.2 190.7 43.1 57.2 66.6 10.9 
Mineral products, fuels 13 3 5 1 3 1 419.2 376.5 13.7 3.0 21.5 4.5 0.7 
Manufactures 244 10 127 28 39 40 1 674.2 209.5 723.0 296.2 326.3 119.1 17.7 
Textiles and apparel 21 12 8 1 86.7 54.0 29.3 3.4 
Footwear 75 58 17 328.1 266.9 61.2 
Iron and steel 34 6 19 1 7 I 378.2 116.4 187.8 8.8 63.7 1.5 2.3 
Boilers, apparatuses and aec. instr. 25 7 10 6 2 201.2 64.5 43.2 85.5 8.0 21.5 
Machines, electrical apparatuses 7 4 3 173.5 164.0 9.5 94.5 
Transport equipment 17 2 6 5 3 1 176.9 70.3 23.8 21.7 59.4 1.8 12.3 
Other 65 2 25 8 12 18 329.6 22.8 126.1 58.5 79.0 43.3 17.7 
Source: ECLAC on the basis of data provided by: 
CACEX. 
Que* e Quea na Econotia Brasileira, Ano XXXII, n. 35A, August 1983, 514 pp. 
Jean Bernet, Guia Interinvest; O Brasil e o Capital Internacional. 5. ed. Rio de Janeiro, INTERINVEST, C 1983. 964 pp. 
Table IV.11 
BRAZIL, 1981; PRINCIPAL EXPORTERS TO IHE UNITED STATES 
Exporting fin Ownership (lore than 50Z of equity capital) Principal producrexported~to"the~uTs" 
Inst, de Acucar e do Alcool 
Petrobras 
PhiIco Radio e Televisao 
Citrosuco Paulista 
Sucocitrico Cutrale 
Cia Sider. Paulista, COSIPA 
Eibraer 
Inter-Continental Cafe 
Volkswagen do Brasil 
Mercedes Benz do Brazil 
Persico Pizzaaiglio 




Cia Vale do Rio Doce 
Frutesp 
Tristao Cia Cot. Exterior 
Cia Bras. Metal Hineracao 
Unicafe Cia Coa. Exterior 
Hajor exporters to the United States (all firas) 
Brazilian State enterprise 
Brazilian State enterprise 
Subsidiary of foreign fira (U.S.) 
Brazilian private fira 
Brazilian private fira 
Brazilian State enterprise 
Brazilian State enterprise 
Brazilian private trading coapany 
Subsidiary of foreign fira (West Geraany) 
Subsidiary of foreign fira (West Geraany) 
Brazilian private fira 
Brazilian State enterprise 
Brazilian State trading coapany 
Subsidiary of foreign fira (U.S.) 
Brazilian private fira 
Brazilian state enterprise 
Brazilian private fira 
Brazilian private trading coapany 
Brazilian private fira 
Brazilian private trading coapany 
Brazilian subsidiaries of U.S. coipanies 
Sugar 
Petroleua derivates 
Radio receivers for cars 
Frozen concentrated orange juice 
Frozen concentrated orange juice 
Carbon steel plate 
Coatuter aircraft 
Coffee in bean 
Internal coabustion engines 
Trucks, CKD 
Steel pipes and tubes 
lincalcined bauxite 
Ethilic alcohol 
Organic cheaicals (epoxides) 
Industrialized beef 
Iron ore and concentrates 
Frozen concentrated orange juice 
Coffee in bean 
Iron ore and concentrates 
Coffee in bean 




Ligget Myers Cigarros 
Ford Motor Corp.j Dearborn (Mich.) 
Dow Cheaical Co., Midland (hich.) 
Cargill Inc., Minneapolis (Minn.) 
Burroughs Corp., Detroit (Mich.) 
Ligget Myers, recently acquired by 
Grand Metropolitan (United Kingdoi) 
Radio receivers for cars 
Organic cheaicals (epoxides) 
Frozen concentrated orange juice 
Electronic aicrocircuits 
Tobacco, unaanufactured 
Ford Brasil Ford Motor Corp., Dearborn (Mich.) Internal coabustion engines 
General Motors do Brasil General Motors Corp., Detroit (Hich.) Hetalworking aachinery 
Leon Israel Agricola Donaldson, Lufkin t Jenrette, New York Coffee in bean 
Reynolds Iabacos Reynolds Industries Inc., Uinston-Salea (N.C.) Tobacco, unaanufactured 
USIPA Philipp Brothers, subsidiary of Pig iron 
Engelhard Minerals I Cheaicals Corporation, N.Y. 
RCA Eletronica RCA Corporation, New York Electronic guns 
Texas Instr. Eletr. do Brasil Texas Instruaents Inc., Dallas (Tex.) Electronic aicrocircuits 
Beeton Dickinson Becton, Dickinson 1 Co., Paraaus (N.J.) Medical instruaents (artif. kidneys) 
Coca Cola Coca Cola Co., New York Soluble, instant coffee 
Aaazonas Coapensadas Latinadas Georgia Pacific Corporation, Portland Oregon laainated wood products 
Hetalquiaica da Bahia Xerox Corp.,Staaford (Conn.) Cheaical products for use in photogr. 
Gecoaol Uestway Trading Corp., Englewood Cliffs (N.J. Cane sugar aolasses 
Caterpillar Brasil Caterpillar Tractor, Peoria (Hi.) Track-laying tractors 
HcFadden "Valaac "Industries,"" Heaphis (Term;)" Coffee in bearr 
TRW do Brasil TRV Inc., Cleveland (Ohio) Internal coabustion engines, parts 
Borg Warner do Brasil Borg-Harner Corporation, Chicago (III.) Hotor vehicle parts 
Anderson Clayton Anderson, Clayton t Co., Houston (Tex.) Coffee in bean 
Araada Futos Thorpe and Ricks Inc. Tobacco, unaanufactured 
Kodak Brasil Eastaan Kodak, Rochester (N.Y.) Gray and residuals containing aetal 
Soc. Bras. Benefic. de Cha Nabisco Brands Co. Tea 
Singer Brasil Singer Co., N.Y. Sewing aachines 
Hughes Tool do Brasil Hughes Tools Co., Houston (lex.) Accessories for aetalworking aachinery 
Equipaaentos Clark Clark Equipaent Co., Buchanan (Hich.) Hotor vehicle parts 
Hewlett-Packard do Brasil Hewlett Packard, Palo Alto (Cai.) Pocket calculators 
Xerox do Brasil Xerox Corporation, Staaford (Conn.) Copying aachines 
Reaington Sparry Rand Corp., N.Y. Portable typewriters 
Monroe Auto Pecas Tenneco Inc., Houston (Tex.) Motor vehicle parts 
NCR do Brasil NCR Corporation, Dayton (Ohio) Machines for classification of coins 
Du Pont do Brasil Du Pont de Neaours, Vilaington (Del.) Aaide function coapounds 
Lawton Madeiras Aaazonia Plywood 
Bendix do Brasil Bendix Corporation, Southfield (Mich.) Vacuua puaps 
Torrington Brasil Ingersoll Rand Corporation, Voodclifflake (N.J.) Textile aachinery 
IBM Brasil IBM Corp., Araonk (N.Y.) Data processing equipaent, parts 
Source: CACEX. 
Quei e Quea na Econoaia Brasileira, Ano XXXII, n 35A, August 1983, 514 pp. 
BERNET, Jean. Guia Interinvest; 0 Brasil e o Capital Internacional, INTERINVEST, C 1983. 964 pp. 
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Table IV.11 
U.S. IMPORTS EOS COHSUMPIION 1 K B ISUS ITEHS 807.00 MID 806.30 
(In «illions of U.S. dollars) 
¡979 iÜÖ Iii! ¡Ü2 
Total Duly tree Dutiable Total Duty free Dutiable Total Duty tree Dutiable total Duty tree Dutiable 
ISU5 ite» 807.00 
Grand total II 559.3 3 091.0 8 «8.3 13 762.3 3 584.1 10 178.2 15 924.3 42 70.4 11 653.9 17 917.1 4 461.1 13 456.0 
Developed 
countries 6 365.1 527.9 5 837.2 7 529.7 491.7 7 037.9 8 731.5 689.9 8 041.7 10 121.9 610.6 9 511.3 
Other 
countries 5 194.2 2 563.1 2 631.1 6 232.6 3 092.4 3 140.3 7 12 . 8 3 580.5 3 612.3 7 795.2 3 850.5 3 944.7 
Mexico 2 001.7 1 005.1 996.6 2 276.3 1 141.1 1 134.8 2 655.9 1399.3 1256.6 2804.8 1429.8 1375.0 
Malaysia 603.5 369.9 233.6 795.3 465.2 330.1 900.5 542.8 357.7 1096.2 661.5 434.8 
Singapore 547.0 278.0 269.0 760.4 402.2 358.2 843.1 393.3 449.8 836.2 363.7 472.5 
Philippines 264.2 159.3 104.9 409.9 251.2 15B.7 523.3 326.4 196.6 660.2 407.5 252.7 
Taiwan 395.9 88.6 307.3 473.7 107.1 366.6 536.6 110.3 426.3 543.0 101.1 441.8 
Hong Kong 326.6 102.8 223.7 407.8 113.7 294.2 517.8 126.0 391.9 508.3 102.6 405.7 
South Korea 322.3 173.6 148.7 311.2 166.5 144.6 301.8 174.2 127.6 375.3 218.3 157.0 
Haiti 133.7 94.5 39.2 153.8 105.3 48.5 171.3 117.1 54.2 179.9 125.7 54.3 
Doiinican Republic 87.7 59.6 28.0 97.5 66.1 31.5 119.7 78.6 41.1 131.0 88.2 42.8 
Brazil 138.0 15.2 122.8 110.8 15.5 95.2 142.1 20.4 121.7 123.1 18.4 104.8 
Thailand 47.6 34.9 12.6 82.4 67.3 15.2 106.5 79.9 26.7 107.3 73.4 33.9 
TSUS ite* 806.30 
Grand total 407.7 234.8 172.8 254.2 170.7 83.6 256.5 176.2 80.3 358.4 242.2 116.2 
Developed 
countries 287.4 158.7 128.7 144.9 99.2 45.8 169.5 118.3 51.2 292.9 198.6 94.3 
Other 
countries 120.2 76.1 44.1 109.3 71.5 37.8 87.0 57.9 29.1 65.4 43.6 21.8 
Mexico 63.4 44.3 19.1 65.1 44.9 20.3 53.8 38.4 15.4 32.7 24.3 8.4 
Malaysia 31.6 18.4 13.1 24.7 15.3 9.5 15.7 9.7 6.0 15.7 8.8 6.9 
Singapore 12.6 7.1 5.5 12.9 7.2 5.7 15.1 8.1 7.0 9.0 4.5 4.6 
Philippines 2.3 1.5 0.8 3.0 2.2 0.7 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.2 0.8 
Taiwan 5.6 1.9 3.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.6 1.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
Hong Kong 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.4 0.6 
South Korea 2.0 1.3 0.7 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.2 
Haiti .. .. .. 
Doiinican Republic .. .. .. .. 
Brasil 1.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Thailand • • • • • • 
Source: ITC, figures coipiled froi official statistics of the U.S. Department of Conerce. 
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Table IV.11 
UNITED STATES, 1980: THIRD COUNTRY SUPPLIERS OF MANUFACTURES IMPORTED FROM BRAZIL 
(a) 
Third country 
Country under (a) is the principal 
third country supplier of articles 
iiported into the U.S. froi Brazil 
Country under (a) is one of the 
principal five supplier countries 
(including Brazil) of articles 
iiported into the U.S. froi Brazil 
Nuiber of articles 
iiported froi 
Value of U.S. 
iiport froi 
Nuiber of articles 
iiported froi 
Value of U.S. 
iiports froi 
Brazil Brazil (US« 
li 11 ions) 
Brazil Brazil (US' 
•illions) 
World 473 1 547.5 
EEC 169 596.3 389 1 158.4 
Canada 60 311.2 279 704.9 
Japan 82 210.3 258 907.0 
Mexico 14 61.6 108 314.0 
Argentina 3 3.2 22 82.8 
Hong Kong 17 36.7 89 88.9 
Korea 8 55.2 71 425.4 
Singapore 1 0.5 27 101.0 
Other Asian nations 31 12.5 142 380.6 
Other countries 88 260.0 _ -




UNITED STATES: IMPORTS FROH BRAZIL ACCORDING TO TARIFF TREATMENT 
(US* millions) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Total trade 1 721.4 2 230.7 2 788.8 3 078.8 3 686.0 4 332.6 4 174.4 
HFN 1 432.2 1 722.8 2 106.7 
Dutiable 378.8 414.7 651.6 
Duty free 1 053.4 1 308.1 1 455.1 
GSP 289.1 507.9 682.1 947.4 969.7 1 102.5 828.8 
Duty free 214.7 343.8 468.9 545.5 438.0 514.6 563.9 
Dutiable 74.4 164.1 214.1 401.9 531.7 587.9 264.9 
Coapetitive need 36.5 131.8 166.3 354.1 486.2 445.7 168.8 
Graduation n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 79.0 20.4 
Adainistrative reason a/ 37.9 32.3 47.8 47.8 45.5 73.2 75.7 
Source: 1976-1979 Coaaittee on Hays and Means, U.S. House of Representatives; 
Report to the Congress on the First Five Years Operation of the US Generalized Systea of 
Preferences (GSP). 
1980-1983 ECLAC on the basis of various publications, 
a/ Such as failure to claia GSP, iaproper docuaentation, or failure tö aeet 35X value added requireaent. 
Table IV.11 
UNITED STATES: GSP ARTICLES HUH RESPECT TO UHICH BRAZIL IMS EXCLUDED EBON DUTY FREE TREATMENT IN ONE OR MORE YEARS 
DUE TO THE APPLICATION OE THE COMPETITIVE NEED FORMULA (X) OR GRADUATION (G) 
Excluded in: 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Iiports froi Brazil 
TSUS Description Due to (» thousands) 
Iiport value in: 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 
10745 Beef or veal X X - 90 
10748 Corned beef X X X X X 59 945 38 838 
13035 Corn or aaize X - -
14785 Guavas X X X X 318 353 
15254 Guava paste and pulp X X X X 512 1059 
15308 Guava jelly, jai, etc. X - -
15520 Sugar, sirup, etc. X X X X X X X X X X 387 810 88 857 
15640 Cocoa unsweetened X X X 9 923 6 554 
15645 Cocoa sweetened X - -
17601 Castor oil, valued not 
over 20 cts. per pound X X - -
17602 Castor oil, valued 
over 20 cts. per pound X X - -
17615 Castor oil, valued 
over 20 cts. per pound X X X X - 573 
18620 Fur cut X X 13 7 
24010 Plywood, Spanish cedar face X 
24012 Plywood, Parana pine face X 
209 754 
X X 92 121 
24520 Hardboard, n/face finished X X 6 G X G 17 959 13 784 
24530 Hardboard, face finished X 3 733 888 
30444 Raiie fibers X X 96 62 
30448 Sesal and henequen X 14 36 
30830 Silk yarn X X 78 329 
40212 Phtalic anhydride X 979 147 
42098 Sodiui chroiate and dichrosate X - -
42574 Citric acid X - 50 
42586 Oxalic acid X X 160 653 
42830 Butylene and propylene glycol X 6 313 1 455 
42834 Ethylene glycol X 3 052 2 979 
42838 Ethyl acetate X X 556 1 437 
42886 Propylene oxide X 16 080 4 144 
43724 Cuprous oxide X - -
43751 Gluconic acid X - -
43764 JtenUmd X X X X X X 10 879 2 909 
45244 Orange oil X 1 256 767 
46070 Safrol X - -
46565 Coconut, pall-Kernel and pali oil X - -
52051 Precious stones X 7 29 
60636 Ferrosilicon G G 2 923 2 490 
60637 Ferrosilicon S G 18 684 7 886 
60644 Ferrosilicon aanganese G G 13 681 4 496 
62240 Tin pipe tubes X X 136 -
65414 Articles of aluiinui X 
66042 Piston-type compression engines X X G G 6 G 9 807 6 656 
66048 Piston-type engines X X 17 225 U l 051 
69232 Motor vehicle body parts X G X G X 52 002 39 330 
69650 Floating ducks and parts X X - -
70320 Headwear fur X - -
73027 Rifles, val. over «10 not over «25 X X - -
73029 Rifles, val. over »25 
73039 Shotguns, val. over »5 not over »10 X 
X X X X 204 23 
- -
73041 Shotguns, val. over »10 not over <25 X X X X X - -
73077 Shotgun rifle coibination parts X -
79120 Patent leather cut X X -
Nuiber of articles 10 10 15 15 17 11 7 10 12 12 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of: 
1976-1979 CoMittee an «ays and Means, U.S. House of Representatives. Report to the Congress on the First 
Five Years' Operation of the Generalized Syste» of Preferences (GSP). 
1980- Data provided by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. 
J/ Itei nuiber changed to 13032+13037. 
b/ Itei was withdrawn froi GSP when tariff was reduced to zero. 
£/ It» nuiber changed to 17615. 
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Table IV.12 
UNITED STATES: COUNTRIES GRADUATED FROM DUTY FREE TREATMENT ON CERTAIN GSP ARTICLES AND PREVIOUS YEAR'S TRADE 
(US$ aillions) 
1982 1983 1984 
Redesig- Redesig- Redesig-
Total n a t e Petition Iotal n a t e Petition Total n a t e Petition 
denied denied denied 
Total 651.1 597.2 53.9 900.1 805.4 94.7 1 208.5 1 025.9 182.6 
Brazil 27.8 27.8 - 60.9 46.0 14.9 46.0 46.0 -
Hong Kong 257.8 257.8 - 294.9 294.9 - 283.8 265.4 18.4 
Israel 3.0 2.6 0.4 4.3 4.3 - 4.4 4.4 -
Korean RP 90.8 87.3 3.5 125.3 91.3 34.0 213.5 181.6 31.9 
Mexico 84.4 84.4 - 80.6 53.6 27.0 134.0 134.0 -
Singapore 23.1 - 23.1 20.4 20.4 - 106.0 106.0 -
Taiwan 164.2 137.3 26.9 313.7 294.9 18.8 420.8 288.5 132.3 
Source: Office of the USIR. 
Chapter V 
U.S. IMPORT RESTRICTIONS FACING BRAZIL 
This chapter presents data and background information on 
U.S. import restrictions affecting Brazil (Sections a 
through g). In section h, imports from Brazil which are 
affected by measures under U.S. trade laws or practices 
--including export taxes in Brazil in the framework of 
suspension agreements— are related to total exports from 
Brazil to the United States. 
a) Tariff Protection 
One of the main characteristics of international trade in 
the post-war period is the continuous reduction of tariffs 
in the industrialized countries, the benefits of which have 
been extended to developing countries under the MFN clause. 
These reductions were achieved first product by product and, 
afterwards, through across-the-board tariff reductions in 
successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations (the 
most recent being the Dillon, Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds). 
As a result, tariffs charged on imports into 
industrialized countries tend to be low and are being 
reduced even more in accordance with the tariff cuts agreed 
upon in the Tokyo Round, which will be fully implemented by 
January 1 1987. 
With regard to tariffs facing developing countries, 
two remarks are commonly made: first, duties on products of 
current export interest to developing countries remain 
relatively high, whereas tariffs on products of greatest 
interest to industrial countries, which were cut more 
sharply in the Tokyo Round, generally are low; and second, 
exports of manufactures by developing countries suffer high 
effective duty rates due to the existence of tariff 
escalation in industrialized countries. 
There is no detailed analysis on effective tariffs 
affecting articles imported into the United States from 
Brazil. This section refers only to nominal tariffs. The 
analysis is based on U.S. import statistics for 1982 and on 
a GATT sample of U.S. imports from Brazil in 1980. 
In 1982, 52.4% of U.S. imports from Brazil were 
dutiable, 34.1% were free on an MFN basis, and 13.5% were 
duty free under GSP. On the dutiable imports, the average 
(mean) duty (in 1981) was 8.2%. 
The standard deviation of import duties is high. 
According to a recent OAS publication,!/ in 1982 out of 669 
tariff items imported from Brazil, and excluded from GSP 
treatment, 127 suffered tariffs of over 15%, 51 of over 25%, 
and 18 of over 35%. However, present and/or potential trade 
in these items is not always significant. 
MTN tariff concessions will have a modest effect on 
products of present export interest to Brazil. The average 
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(mean) duty on dutiable imports will decline from 8.2% in 
1981 to 7.5% in 1987. The trade weighted average duty on 
dutiable imports will fall from 13.1% in 1980 to 12.3% in 
1987 (according to 1980 trade figures; table V.l). U.S. 
trade legislation excluded products subject to import relief 
programs from the MTN tariff negotiations. For example, 
footwear was excluded because orderly market agreements 
(OMA's) with Korea and Taiwan were in force. A series of 
steel products were also not negotiable. With regard to 
textiles, some tariff reductions were negotiated, but a 
"snapback" clause was established at the MTN which permits 
tariffs for textiles and apparel to revert to pre-MTN levels 
if there are import surges. Although U.S. tariff 
reductions — a s is the case of tariff reductions granted by 
other industrialized countries-- will have only a small 
impact on products of immediate export interest to Brazil, 
in the long run they may be more significant as they benefit 
potential exports. 
The main characteristics of U.S. tariff protection 
facing Brazil are summarized in table V.l. The figures 
presented there are calculated on the basis of a GATT sample 
of 549 major tariff lines (on the 5 digit aggregation level 
of the TSUS) representing 3.6 billion dollars of U.S. 
imports from Brazil in 1980. 
It is interesting to note that in the case of U.S. 
imports from Brazil, the trade weighted average tariff on 
dutiable articles in 1980 was higher than the simple 
arithmetic average. If nominal duties have a significant 
effect on the structure of imports, that is, if imports in 
tariff lines with low duties tend to be higher than those in 
tariff lines suffering high duties (in the extreme case 
duties can be so high as to be prohibitive), the trade 
weighted average duty will be lower than the simple 
arithmetic average. The fact that this could not be 
verified in the case of U.S. imports from Brazil in 1980 
indicates that trade is important in some tariff lines 
affected by higher tariffs, which is an indication of the 
high competitiveness of some major export articles of 
Brazil. This is typically the case of sugar and frozen 
concentrated orange juice.2/ 
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Articles- imported from Brazil with nominal tariffs oi 
15% or more and which represented no less than one million 









Import duty ad 
valorem equivalent (%) 
Pre-MTN Post-MTN 1980 
15520 Sugar, syrups 
and molasses 409 986 17. 7 17. 7 17. 7 
16535 Citrus fruit 
juices 65 070 51. 9 51. 9 51. 9 
17032 Cigarette leaf 5 571 16. 8 16. 8 16. 8 
17060 Scrap tobacco 23 703 19. 4 19. 4 19. 4 
33815 Woven fabrics of 
man-made fibers 5 393 18. 6 15. 0 18. 6 
38206 Cotton wearing 
apparel, knit, 
for women and 
girls 6 714 21. 0 14. 4 21. 0 
42530 Monosodius 
glutamate 3 446 16. 0 12. 0 15. 5 
53224 Ceramic floor 
and wall tiles 2 299 22. 5 19. 0 22. 5 
Source: GATT, 1980 sample of U.S. imports from Brazil. 
It can be concluded that tariffs charged on imports 
from Brazil are generally low. However, a small number of 
products of great export interest to Brazil, principally 
sugar, orange juice and tobacco, face high import duties. 
Some textiles and apparel categories also suffer from 
relatively high tariffs. 
Some recent developments regarding U.S. tariffs have 
caused concern in Brazil. In late 1981, tariffs on sugar 
imports were increased (see section g). In 1983, the U.S. 
Customs Service changed the tariff classification of certain 
tobacco used for cigarettes, resulting in a sharp increase 
in the import tariff.3/ 
Of great concern in Brazil is the U.S. policy 
regarding alcohol fuels. In October 1983, a bill (HR 4105) 
was presented in the House of Representatives to amend the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The bill proposed, among 
other things, an increase in the tariff on alcohol imported 
for fuel use (TSUS item 901.50) from 50 to 90 cents per 
gallon. The tariff increase was approved in 1984. As the 
tariff increase refers to an item that was bound under GATT, 
Brazil is entitled to compensation in the form of 
concessions on other items. Negotiations are underway 
between the two countries. The United States has offered 
tariff concessions on corned beef (a GSP article for which 
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Brazil has been excluded from duty-free treatment for 
competitive need reasons). 
b) Countervailing duties 
Countervailing duties have been applied to Brazilian 
products since 1974 (footwear, table V.2). Since then 
Brazil's exports to the United States have been especially 
sensitive to countervailing duty petitions because of the 
combined effects of the significant reliance on subsidies 
for export promotion and the concentration of exports in 
articles for which import penetration into the United States 
from all sources is high. The number of products subject to 
countervailing duty proceedings increased sharply In 1981, 
due to the long economic recession in the United States, the 
high value of the dollar and the re-introduction of fiscal 
subsidies in Brazil. An additional factor is the difficult 
situation of the U.S. steel industry and the role of the 
U.S. market as an outlet for steel makers in many developed 
and developing countries which possess overcapacity in 
relation to their domestic markets. Antidumping and 
countervailing duty investigations on steel products 
exploded in recent years affecting many countries. In 
November, 1981, the Department of Commerce self-initiated 
antidumping and countervailing duty investigations 
(including carbon steel plate from Brazil) in response to 
significant imports of steel products at prices below those 
established by the Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM). On 
January 11 1982, domestic producers filed 132 antidumping 
and countervailing duty petitions covering carbon steel 
products from seven EEC countries. South Africa, Romania, 
Spain and Brazil. The U.S. Administration suspended the 
TPM that had been established as a substitute for individual 
unfair trade investigation on the basis of petitions by U.S. 
steel producers. The suspension of the TPM contributed to a 
further increase of unfair trade investigations. In 
September 1982, the Department of Commerce was investigating 
56 countervailing duty and 25 antidumping cases.4/ 
Around September 1982, some 16 articles exported by 
Brazil to the United States suffered either countervailing 
duty proceedings in the U.S. or offsetting export taxes in 
Brazil, representing more than one fourth of the value of 
Brazilian exports to the United States, and about 40% of the 
exports of manufactured articles (1981 trade; throughout 
this chapter the definition of industrial and manufactured 
articles corresponds to the rather broad CACEX 
classification). In mid-1984, Brazilian exports to the U.S. 
market affected by either countervailing duties or 
offsetting export taxes amounted to 1.2 billion dollars, 
equal to 25% of total exports and 35% of exports of 
manufactured products to the United States (1983 trade 
according to Brazilian export statistics). 
The most important articles affected by countervailing 
duty proceedings —according to their trade coverage (1983 
FOB export value, according to Brazilian export 
statistics)— are non-rubber footwear ($560 million), frozen 
92 
concentrated orange juice ($282 million) and a series of 
steel products ($324 million). Steel products subject to 
countervailing duty proceedings in 1984 represented, in 
1983, 69% of the total value of steel exports to the United 
States (80% in the case of manufactured steel products). 
Brazil was one of the first countries which signed the 
GATT subsidy code agreed upon in the Tokyo Round (Agreement 
on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and 
XXIII of GATT). Under Article 14:45 of Part III of the 
Agreement, Brazil committed itself to phase out (by June 
1983) its principal export subsidy: the export credit 
premium. The U.S. considers Brazil as a "Country under the 
Agreement",5/ and applies Subtitle A of Title VII of the 
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Agreements Act 
of 1979, to imports alleged to be subsidized by Brazil. 
Under Title VII, countervailing duties are imposed 
when the Department of Commerce determines that a country 
under the agreement 6/ provides subsidies with respect to a 
class or kind of merchandise imported into the United 
States, and the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) 
determines that an industry in the United States is 
materially injured or threatened with material injury, or 
that the establishment of an industry is materially 
retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise. 
Several U.S. agencies have responsibilities for 
dealing with countervailing duty questions. The U.S. 
Department of Commerce (International Trade Administration) 
is responsible for investigations about the granting of 
subsidies by exporting countries. The U.S. International 
Trade Commission is charged with the authority to determine 
whether subsidized imports cause or threaten to cause 
material injury to a domestic industry. The Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative provides policy guidance on 
subsidy issues, such as on the use of "suspension 
agreements" (see below). 
U.S. trade legislation on subsidies and 
countervailing duties is less tolerant than that of most 
other countries, such as the EEC, in that the imposition of 
countervailing duties is mandatory when subsidies and injury 
are shown (unless suspension agreements are reached) and is 
to the full level of net subsidies as computed by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce. 
Net subsidies, as calculated by the Department of 
Commerce, for selected articles imported into the United 
States from Brazil are presented in table V.5. This table 
shows that three elements of the Brazilian export promotion 
programs normally have been considered to constitute 
Brazil's most important export subsidies: the export credit 
premium; preferential working capital financing; and 
income tax exemption for export earnings. (For a 
description of these programs see Chapter III.) In recent 
investigations of several steel products, domestic subsidies 
have also been included in the calculation of the total net 
subsidy. The principal programs that provide incentives to 
the Brazilian steel industry and which the Department of 
Commerce considered to constitute countervailable subsidies 
are industrial product tax (IPI) rebates for capital 
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investment (Decree Law 1547 of April 1977), tax incentives 
on certain imported machinery for certain industrial 
projects approved by the Industrial Development Council 
(CDI), and accelerated depreciation for capital goods 
manufactured in Brazil in favour of expansion projects 
approved by CDI. In recent investigations on certain carbon 
steel products, a major concern has been the question of 
whether or not the participation of the Government of Brazil 
in equity capital corresponds to commercial criteria. (The 
Department of Commerce considers government participation in 
equity capital to constitute a subsidy when such 
participation is not based on commercial reasons, that is, 
when no profits are obtained.) 
Tables V.4 and V.5 give data and background 
information on countervailing duty petitions filed in the 
period 1981-1983. In all cases presented in the table 
(representing $410 million of U.S. imports in 1981) the 
Department of Commerce found subsidies ranging from 3.51% of 
the FOB invoice value in the case of frozen concentrated 
orange juice to between 15 and 20% for some steel products. 
In recent investigations, very high subsidies have 
been calculated. In the case of certain carbon steel 
products, the net subsidy was preliminarily estimated at 
27.42% of the FOB invoice value for all major exporters 
(January 1984), later revised to enterprise specific rates, 
as follows: CSN 62.18%; Cosipa 36.48% and Usiminas 17.49% 
(June 1984). 
ITC determinations in countervailing duty 
investigations on articles imported from Brazil and their 
trade coverage are summarized in table V.4. 
In most cases leading to affirmative determinations, 
the Government of Brazil reached suspension agreements with 
the U.S. Department of Commerce (table V.6). In these 
agreements, Brazil committed itself to offset by export 
taxes the ad valorem value of incentives considered to be 
subsidies by the U.S. Department of Commerce, and to adjust 
these export taxes for future changes in the underlying 
export promotion programs. In exchange, the U.S. 
Government did not issue countervailing duty orders. No 
suspension agreement was reached on certain carbon steel 
plates and sheets in spite of the fact that the Government 
of Brazil decided in March 1984 to impose an offsetting 
export tax of 27.42%, equal to the net subsidies according 
to the preliminary subsidy determination of the Department 
of Commerce. 
Normally, ITC suspends its investigation when 
suspension agreements are reached, but petitioners and/or 
governments are entitled to request the continuation of 
countervailing duty investigations. Such requests were 
filed in at least two cases by petitioners for pre-stressed 
concrete steel wire strand and stainless steel products, and 
by the Government of Brazil in the case of frozen 
concentrated orange juice. 
In two of these final investigations, ITC's 
determination was affirmative: stainless steel products and 
frozen concentrated orange juice. The corresponding 
suspension agreements remained in effect. In the case of 
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orange Juice only the threat of material injury was 
confirmed. With regard to the apparently low threshold in 
this case, it must be noted that ITC would have given 
special consideration to the agricultural nature of this 
industry. In the case of pre-stressed concrete steel wire 
strand, ITC reached a negative final determination. As a 
result, the suspension agreements did not remain in effect 
and the investigation was terminated. The Government of 
Brazil removed the corresponding export tax in April 1983. 
In 1983, ITC also conducted an investigation of the 
likely effects of the revocation of the countervailing duty 
order on imports of footwear from Brazil on the request of 
the Government of Brazil (by letter of October 26 1981). In 
this case, ITC reached a negative determination, mainly on 
the basis of the fact that the net potential subsidy, a3 
calculated by the Department of Commerce, was almost fully 
offset by an export tax. The remaining net subsidy was only 
0.48%, which is less than the 0.5% considered de minimis by 
the Department of Commerce. The fact that the Minister of 
Finance of Brazil gave assurances (by letter of April 22 
1983) that the offsetting export tax would remain in force 
in case of revocation of the outstanding countervailing duty 
order, and that it would be adjusted for any changes in the 
underlying subsidies, was taken into account in the U.S. 
decision. 
Countervailing duty proceedings constitute the most 
important obstacle to easy access of Brazilian articles, 
especially industrial products, into the U.S. market. It 
is not difficult for U.S. petitioners to demonstrate some 
evidence of subsidization provided to manufactures in 
Brazil; the threshold of proof in preliminary injury 
investigations is low. The filing of a petitioner for 
countervailing duties often leads to complicated and 
time-consuming investigations, even if the (final) 
determination of ITC is negative. Countervailing duty 
proceedings lead to uncertainty for importers and exporters, 
which is increased by the possibility of retroactive 
adjustments through the annual reviews of outstanding orders 
by the Department of Commerce. The effects of this 
uncertainty on Brazilian exports to the U.S. are difficult 
to quantify. 
In early 1984, the Government of Brazil tried 
—unsuccessfully at that time— to reach an agreement on an 
export control program for carbon steel products in return 
for a withdrawal of unfair trade petitions. In April 1984, 
the Government of Brazil initiated a three-year export 
control program for coils and hot and cold formed carbon 
steel plate and sheet, limiting exports to the United States 
in the first year (from May 1 1984 through April 30 1985) to 
430 thousand tons, a reduction of 52% with respect to the 
888 thousand tons exported to the United States in 1983 
(CACEX Communication 82, May 29 1984). 
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c) Antidumping actions 
In U.S. trade legislation, dumping i3 referred to as 
exports priced at "less than fair value". 
Subtitle B of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 
amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, provides that 
antidumping duties will be imposed when the Department of 
Commerce determines that a class or kind of foreign 
merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United 
States at less than fair value and the U.S. International 
Trade Commission determines that an industry in the United 
States is materially injured or threatened with material 
injury, or that the establishment of an industry is 
materially retarded, by reason of imports of that 
merchandise. 
The number of Brazilian products involved in 
antidumping cases was for a long time small. The reason for 
this may be that it is more difficult for U.S. petitioners 
to indicate evidence of dumping than of subsidization since 
the Brazilian export incentive program is well known. 
However, in 1982 the number of antidumping cases involving 
Brazilian products increased sharply (table V.7). A high 
proportion of these articles, especially steel products, 
were previously subject to countervailing duty 
investigations. The reason seems to be that petitioners, 
who were discontented with suspension agreements between the 
two governments, believed they could obtain more explicit 
protection under the antidumping law. 
In November 1983, antidumping duties were imposed on 
imports of carbon steel wire rod from Brazil. The level of 
these duties (63.5%) was prohibitive to further exports to 
the United States. Exports of carbon steel wire rod to the 
United States decreased from 109 thousand tons in 1982 to 
only 18 thousand tons in 1983. However, on the request of 
the Government of Brazil, the Department of Commerce 
conducted an accelerated revision of the dumping margins in 
order to consider the effects of the cruzeiro's devaluation. 
As a result, the antidumping duties were reduced to 7.4% for 
Belgo-Mineira and to 0% for Cosigua. 
In January 1984, the Department of Commerce made an 
affirmative preliminary determination on sales at LTFV of 
hot-rolled carbon steel plate and sheet (ranging from 65.58 
to 100.04%) and coils (from 50.55 to 52.57%). In April, 
dumping margins, ranging from 0 to 8.07%, were found on cold 
formed carbon steel plate and sheet. 
d) Escape clause 
The escape clause is designed to provide import relief 
for industries that suffer injury because of rapidly 
increasing imports, although neither subsidized nor dumped. 
GATT Article XIX permits temporary restrictions of 
disruptive imports on a non-discriminatory basis. When 
countries apply Article XIX restrictions on bound items, 
they must compensate the exporting country by an equivalent 
tariff concession or are otherwise subject to retaliation in 
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the form of cancelation of equivalent concessions by 
affected countries. 
In recent years, industrialized countries have tended 
not to use Article XIX but have preferred other protective 
devices generally not sanctioned by GATT, such as 
"Voluntary" Restraint Agreements (VRAs) and Orderly 
Marketing Agreements (0MAs).8/ 
Since 1974, import relief has been provided by Section 
201-203 of the Trade Act. According to the escape clause 
currently in force, ITC, if there is an affirmative injury 
determination, recommends import relief to the President. 
ITC can recommend a tariff increase, tariff quotas, 
quantitative restrictions, or a combination of these 
measures. If ITC believes that trade adjustment would 
provide adequate relief, it can recommend this solution. 
The President can reject or accept the ITC recommendations. 
He can also negotiate OMA's or VRA's with exporting 
countries. The President has to consider factors of 
national economic interest in his decision. For example, he 
can refuse to impose restrictive measures if this would have 
inflationary effects or if a real possibility of retaliation 
exists. 
If the President declines to take any action or takes 
action which is different from that recommended by ITC, 
Congress may, within 90 legislative days, pass a concurrent 
resolution, approved by a majority of each house, directing 
the President to proclaim the relief recommended by ITC. 
Relief is temporary and may be provided for up to five 
years, with the possibility of one extension of not more 
than three years. Tariffs may be increased to a level no 
more than 50% above the existing rate, and any quantitative 
restraint (quota) must permit imports of no less than those 
realized in the most recent period that can be considered 
representative for the importation of the restrained 
articles. 
As can be seen in table V.8, until 1982, Brazilian 
products were not frequently involved in escape clause 
investigations. The reason for this is the generally low 
import penetration rates of Brazilian products. Since it is 
easier to present evidence of subsidization of Brazilian 
products, U.S. industries prefer to initiate countervailing 
duty cases against Brazil. Countervailing duty orders are 
mandatory, if subsidization and injury are shown, whereas 
import relief under Section 201 is optional. The threshold 
for affirmative determinations regarding injury is also 
higher in escape clause cases. 
ITC has conducted several investigations on footwear, 
but no special measures were taken against imports from 
Brazil. In May 1984, ITC determined that increased imports 
of footwear were not a substantial cause of injury to the 
footwear industry in the United States. 
Recently, Brazil was involved in an escape clause case 
regarding specialty steels.9/ In spite of rapidly increasing 
exports to the United States, the import penetration of 
Brazilian stainless steel and alloy tool steel was less than 
1% of U.S. apparent consumption of the specialty steels 
subject to investigation. (At the product level the 
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penetration rate of imports from Brazil reached a maximum of 
3.4% for alloy tool steel in 1982, table V.5).10/ In other 
words, when import penetration from all sources is high, 
Brazil may be caught in import relief programs even if 
exports from Brazil to the United States are not great. 
In June 1984, ITC determined that increased imports of 
a broad range of steel products constitute a substantial 
cause of injury to the U.S. steel industry and recommended 
the imposition of quotas. As steel export control programs 
are already in effect with the major suppliers of the U.S. 
market (e.g., the EEC), the Brazilian Government fears that 
import reduction through quotas will principally affect 
Brazil and other smaller suppliers who also have fewer 
possibilities to take retaliatory trade measures. The 
establishment of import quotas on the basis of the volume of 
imports in a given period of reference tend to principally 
affect the most dynamic suppliers like Brazil. 
In September 1984, the U.S. administration decided to 
limit steel imports to 18.5% of apparent consumption 
(estimated to attain 88 million tons in 1984). USTR was 
requested to negotiate, within 90 days, "voluntary" export 
restraint arrangements with the main foreign suppliers. In 
December, the United States was demanding that Brazil limit 
its exports to 1% of U.S. apparent consumption while 
Brazilian negotiators were insisting on 1.5%.11/ 
e) Trade in textiles 
Trade in textiles was an early exception in the 
post-war process of liberalization of international trade. 
In 1955, Japan was pressed to impose a series of 
restrictions on the exports of certain cotton articles to 
the United States that culminated in the institution of a 
five-year export control program in 1957. These measures 
brought only temporary relief as new suppliers rapidly 
emerged. The United States then tried to avoid disruptive 
imports on the basis of multilateral action. These actions 
resulted in the creation in 1961 of the Short-Term 
Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles 
(STA), which covered the period from October 1 1961 to 
September 30 1962. The Long-Term Arrangement Regarding 
International Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA) originally 
covered a period of five years, starting October 1 1962. At 
first, trade in cotton textiles covered by the Arrangement 
was controlled only on a product-by-product basis, but the 
United States later negotiated bilateral agreements with 
many exporting countries. The LTA was renewed in 1967 and 
1970. In the early seventies, imports into the United 
States of textile products not covered by the LTA increased 
rapidly, principally man-made fibers from Japan and apparel 
from Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong. Under U.S. leadership, 
negotiations started in 1973 that culminated in the creation 
of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) in 1974. The first MFA 
covered the period January 1 1974 to December 31 1977, and 
included most textiles of cotton, wool and man-made fibers. 
It was renewed in 1977 and 1981. (Effective January 1 
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1 9 8 2 . ) 
Agreements on international trade in textiles are 
authorized internationally by GATT, currently through the 
MFA, and internally in the U.S. by Section 204 of the 
Agricultural Act of 1956, as amended. The Textiles Trade 
Policy Group (TTPG), under the chairmanship of the U.S. 
Trade Representative, makes broad policy decisions on U.S. 
textile and apparel trade, and the Committee for the 
Implementation of Textiles Agreements, under the 
chairmanship of the Department of Commerce, is responsible 
for the implementation of U.S. textile and apparel policy. 
The administration of trade agreements is the responsibility 
of the Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA) of the 
Department of Commerce. 
In late 1983, the U.S. Administration approved an 
overall program to control textile imports that also applies 
to articles not covered by bilateral agreements. These 
tighter import restrictions were issued, among other 
reasons, in return for a withdrawal of unfair trade 
petitions by U.S. textile manufacturers against imports of 
textiles from China.12/ 
Exports of certain cotton textiles from Brazil to the 
United States were restrained beginning with carded cotton 
sheeting in November 1963, followed by several other 
products in subsequent years. The first bilateral agreement 
between Brazil and the United States went into effect on 
November 1 1970, initially for a period of 5 years. It 
established an aggregate level of 75 million square yard 
equivalents for cotton textiles. It was amended in 1972 and 
replaced by a new agreement in 1974 under the Multifiber 
Arrangement (table V.9). 
Under the MFA, Brazil has signed three subsequent 
bilateral agreements with the U.S., effective April 1 1976, 
1979 and 1982 respectively. The first two agreements 
restrained trade in cotton textiles, on an aggregate level, 
on subgroup levels and on individual categories (table V.9). 
Categories for which no specific levels were established 
were subject to consultation if exports exceeded a certain 
volume (one million square yard equivalents for each 
non-apparel category and 700 000 square yard equivalents for 
each apparel category). In a separate agreement, Brazil 
committed itself to consult with the United States for 
possible limitations on man-made fiber textiles should 
imports into the United States during a 12-month period 
exceed by 10% or more the level of such imports during any 
of the 3 years preceding the agreement. Restraint levels 
and flexibility conditions are specified in table V.9. 
For a long time, imports of cotton textiles from 
Brazil into the United States were small in relation to 
global and subgroup restraint levels. Even for specific 
product categories, U.S. imports from Brazil were normally 
less than the levels permitted in the agreements (tables 
V.10 and V.ll). These figures seem to indicate that 
restrictions under the bilateral agreements had little 
negative effect on exports of textiles from Brazil to the 
United States. Internal factors in Brazil constituted more 
significant obstacles. 
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Under the current bilateral agreement, restraint 
levels became more significant. Since 1982, Brazil has 
completely filled the permitted imports for cotton yarns 
(product categories 300 and 301) and import restrictions are 
believed to be a major obstacle to increased exports of 
these articles to the United States.13/ 
f) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (unfair trade 
practices) 
Under Section 301 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1974, 
as amended, the President of the U.S. is "required to take 
all appropriate action, including retaliation, to obtain the 
removal of any act, policy or practice of a foreign 
government which violates an international agreement or is 
unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens 
or restricts U.S. commerce". 
Section 301 investigations are carried out by USTR 
with the advice of an interagency committee. The U.S. has 
tried to resolve actions affecting imports from Brazil in 
the framework of the formal dispute settlement procedures 
provided by GATT. 
Petitions under Section 301 that affect GATT member 
countries normally allege that foreign governments provide 
subsidies which are inconsistent with their obligations 
under the GATT subsidy code. 
With respect to Brazil, the GATT subsidy code exempts 
developing countries from the outright prohibition on 
granting export subsidies to manufactured products. 
However, with respect to primary products, the subsidy code 
establishes that GATT member governments must avoid granting 
export subsidies which would result in obtaining more than 
an equitable share of world exports in these products. 
Export subsidies on manufactured products granted by 
the Government of Brazil are thus not necessarily 
inconsistent with Brazil's obligations under the GATT 
subsidy code. No manufactured products imported from Brazil 
have been included in Section 301 investigations.14/ 
However, USTR has been conducting investigations on 
agricultural products —poultry and soybean derivatives— 
under the allegation that, through subsidies, Brazil has 
obtained a more than equitable share of world exports. 
These complaints were presented to GAIT for treatment under 
the dispute settlement procedures. 
g) Restrictions on imports of agricultural products 
and commodities 
Under Section 22 of the Agricultural Act of 1933, as 
amended, imports of certain agricultural commodities are 
restricted by quotas or fees to prevent interference with 
price support programs operated by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. Import restrictions are in force on cotton and 
certain cotton products, peanuts, certain dairy products and 
sugar. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1981 reinstituted 
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support programs for sugar cane and sugar beets for the 1982 
through 1985 crops.15/ Section 22 restrictions on sugar 
imports —consistent with these support programs— operate 
through a system of flexible fees and quotas. 
Import fees were increased several times beginning 
September 11 1981.16/ Import quotas were reinstituted 
effective May 11 1982.17/ Generally, the global import 
quotas are distributed among exporting countries on the 
basis of average exports to the United States in the period 
1975-1981, excluding the years of maximum and minimum 
shipments.18/ 
Table V.13 indicates that the protectionist sugar 
policy of the United States had a serious impact on exports 
of raw sugar from Brazil to that country in 1982. 
Under Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, the 
President of the United States is authorized to negotiate 
agreements with foreign governments limiting the exports to 
the United States of agricultural commodities and 
manufactured products as well as textiles. Except for 
textiles (Section e), no such agreements were negotiated 
with Brazil. 
h) Trade affected by U.S. import restrictions 
This section presents preliminary estimates of the 
value of Brazilian exports to the United States affected by 
the different kinds of import restrictions mentioned in the 
previous sections. The estimates also include trade in 
articles for which Brazil has been graduated from the 
benefits of duty-free treatment under the U.S. GSP program. 
(Graduation refers to exclusions on the basis of the 
discretionary authority of the President and not exclusions 
on the basis of competitive need limits. )19_/ The import 
restrictions were those prevailing in 1984. The 
corresponding trade figures refer to 1982 and 1983. The 
trade figures probably underestimate the impact of import 
restrictions on Brazilian exports to the United States, as 
they refer to effective trade realized in spite of the 
restrictions and not to trade that could have been realized 
in the absence of trade restrictions. In some cases, 
however, trade in the corresponding tariff lines of the 
Brazilian trade classification can be slightly larger than 
trade actually subject to restrictions. 
i) Tariff barriers 
As mentioned in Section a, no data are available on 
effective tariffs for imports from Brazil. High nominal 
tariffs are charged on frozen concentrated orange juice, 
sugar and tobacco. A possible increase of import duties for 
alcohol for fuel use is also a matter of great concern in 
Brazil. Exports from Brazil to the United States of these 
four products amounted to $690 million in 1981, $524 million 
in 1982 and $497 million in 1983. Trade in other items 
facing high nominal tariffs is not very significant. 
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ii) Non-tariff barriers 
Quantitative restrictions 
The volume of Brazilian exports to the U.S. is 
controlled through quotas for sugar (under Section 22 of the 
Agricultural Act of 1933, as amended), certain cotton 
textiles and apparel (under the bilateral agreement between 
the two countries in the framework of the MFA), and 
specialty steels (by the import relief program under Section 
201 of the Trade Act of 1974). 
Sugar quotas, reinstituted in May 1982, contributed 
significantly to the sharp decline of Brazilian sugar 
exports to the U.S. in 1982. Preliminary estimates 
indicate that the value of cotton textiles and apparel 
exports was less than 50 million dollars in 1982. The 
specialty steel import relief program has affected only a 
modest amount of trade. The establishment of quotas on the 
basis of average trade volumes in recent years, however, 
will most severely impede the most dynamic exporters to the 
United States, especially Brazil. 
The 1981-1983 value of exports currently subject to 
quantitative import restrictions in the United States was as 
follows (in millions of dollars, FOB): 
1981 1982 1983 
Sugar 
Cotton textiles and apparel */ 
Specialty steels 
331.1 14.7 89.6 
60.0 50.0 97.6 
2.4 2.7 6.3 
*/ Included man-made fibers subject to consultation if 
exports exceed a certain volume. 
In May 1984, the Government of Brazil started to 
control the volume of coils and carbon steel plate and sheet 
exported to the United States. The volume and value of 
corresponding exports in the period 1981-1983 were as 
follows: 
1981 1982 1983 
Value ($ millions) 93.7 81.0 237.6 
Volume (thousand tons) 280 281 888 
The volume of exports in the first year (May 1 1984 
through April 30 1985) will be controlled at 430 thousand 
tons, less than half the volume of exports to the United 
States in 1983. 
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Countervailing and antidumping duties 
Countervailing and antidumping investigations 
affecting imports from Brazil have increased rapidly since 
1981. The effects on exports from Brazil were in many cases 
mitigated by the establishment of suspension agreements 
between the two governments. As a result, a high proportion 
of exports of manufactures to the U.S. is currently subject 
to offsetting export taxes in Brazil. (This includes 
non-rubber footwear; the corresponding countervailing duty 
order was revoked in 1983 but the export tax remained in 
force.) Several countervailing duty cases involving steel 
products, which led to suspension agreements, later returned 
as antidumping cases. 
The export of products which in 1983 were subject to 
export taxes because of countervailing duty proceedings (for 
some of them countervailing duty orders were also in force) 
amounted in 1982 and 1983 to 911 and 1 238 million dollars 
respectively (for details see table V.6). The number of 
countervailing and antidumping actions against Brazilian 
products and its trade value is much higher in the United 
States than in any^ other country. According to estimates of 
the Ministry of Finance of Brazil, the (1983) trade coverage 
of countervailing duty (included those suspended by export 
taxes) and antidumping actions against Brazil in different 
countries in mid-1984 was as follows: 
Millions of US dollars % of exports 
Importing 
country Trade Anti- Anti- Indus-
actions subsi- dumping All trialized 
dies prod. 
United States 1 255. 5 1 255 .5 200. .2 25. 2 35.6 
E.E.C. 1 234. 4 1 220 .5 13. .9 21. 7 -
Basic products */ 996. 5 996 .5 - 17. 5 -
Industr. prod. 237. 9 224 .0 13, .9 4. 2 12.0 
Canada 18. 4 - 18. .4 9. 5 5.9 
Australia 6. 4 - 6. .4 4. 7 5.4 
Chile 5. 8 5 .8 - 3. 0 3.5 
*/ Soybean, all other articles subject to unfair trade 
actions in the countries included in this table are 
industrial products. 
Summary 
Total 1982 and 1983 trade subject to import restrictions in 
1984, avoiding double-counting for articles subject to 
different kinds of restrictions, can be summarized as 
follows (the data are based on 1982 and 1983 trade). (For 
details see Table V.14): 
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Trade coverage of U.S. import restrictions 
affecting Brazilian exports (in 1984) 
Total Subject to restrictions 
(U.S.$ 
millions) (U.S.$ % of total 
millions) exports 
1982- exports 
Total 3 980.3 1 108.8 27.9 
Primary products 1 187.9 167.5 14.1 
Industrial products 2 792.4 941.3 33.7 
Semi-industrialized 244.6 27.4 11.2 
Manufactures 2 54-7.8 913.9 35.9 
1983- exports 
Total 4 989.7 1 575.3 31.6 
Primary products 996.1 208.7 21.0 
Industrial products 3 993.6 1 366.6 34.2 
Semi-industrialized 402.6 78.2 19.4 
Manufactures 3 591.0 1 288.4 35.9 
Notes 
1/ OAS, Inventario de Investigaciones Comerciales de 
Estados Unidos y Otras Medidas con Posibles Efectos 
Restrictivos para paises latinoamericanos y del Caribe, 
Washington (Sept. 1983), p. 52, (OEA/Ser.H/XIII, 
CIES/CEC0N/459). 
2/ The effect of duties on U.S. imports of frozen 
concentrated orange juice from Brazil is mitigated by the 
fact that a significant proportion of U.S. imports takes 
place under the drawback system which grants a 99% 
restitution of import duties. 
3/ On petition of the U.S. tobacco industry, the 
tobacco in question was reclassified from TSUS item 170.80 
into TSUS item 170.35, resulting in an 83% increase in 
import duties, from 17.5 to 32 cents per pound. In 1980, 
the U.S. imported 8.7 million dollars of tobacco from 
Brazil classified under TSUS item 170.80. The ad valorem 
equivalent of the specific import duty was 11.2%. 
4/ Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the President of the 
United States on the Trade Agreements Program, 1981-82. The 
report states that: "Never before has an Administration 
undertaken investigations of this magnitude into charges of 
unfair trading practices in a single industrial sector" 
(p. 114). 
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5/ The U.S. considers as "Countries under the 
Agreement" those countries which have assumed the 
obligations (or substantially equivalent obligations) of the 
MTN agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures. 
6/ Countries not under the Agreement are not entitled 
to an injury investigation on dutiable imports. Once the 
determination is made by the Department of Commerce that 
subsidies are granted, this is the only legal requirement 
for the imposition of countervailing duties. 
7/ Antidumping investigations on steel products 
imported from several countries increased sharply in recent 
years, especially after the suspension of the Trigger Price 
Mechanism on January 11 1982 (see section b). 
8/ The U.S. textile industry was an early petitioner 
for import relief because of competition from increasing 
imports from Japan. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
provided tariff relief to industries injured by increasing 
imports that resulted from U.S. tariff concessions. (In 
the Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1955 between the U.S. and 
Japan; following Japan's acceptance into GATT, the U.S. 
provided tariff concessions on certain textile products.) 
The U.S. textile industry preferred quotas to tariff relief 
available under the escape clause. "However, the imposition 
of import quotas would not have been consistent with the 
United States commercial policy and its commitment to trade 
expansion under GATT. The situation was particularly 
sensitive since the United States had been the major 
supporter of GATT and, in particular, the outspoken opponent 
of quantitive restrictions used for protective purposes. It 
had also been one of Japan's supporters in the latter's 
efforts to join GATT. The problem was temporarily resolved 
by the so-called "Japanese voluntary export controls". 
(USITC: The History and Current Status of the 
Multifiber Agreement, p. 2.) 
9/ Under article XIX of GATT. 
10/ The import relief program for specialty steels 
provides import quotas for a four-year period. As is the 
case with the EEC and Korea, Brazil has not agreed with the 
restraint levels requested by the United States. The United 
States proposed a quota of 2 500 short tons. On the basis 
of its exports in 1981 and 1982, Brazil requested a quota of 
6 000 short tons. The United States put Brazil, the EEC and 
Korea under a joint quota of 3 943 short tons from October 
20 1983 through January 20 1984; 5 042 short tons from 
January 20 through April 19 1984; and 4 882 short tons from 
April 20 1984 through July 19 1984. In 1984, the basket 
arrangement was replaced by quarterly import quotas. Brazil 
has reserved its rights to trade retaliation. 
11/ Business Week (December 24 1984), p. 19. 
12/ The new rules establish procedures for monitoring 
non-quota imports of textiles and for issuing "calls" for 
negotiating of restraint agreements. A "call" will be 
issued when imports of a particular product grow by more 
than 30% in a single year, or when total imports of the 
product exceed 20% of U.S. production. In addition, a 
"call" will go out when imports of a product from one 
country equal one percent of U.S. production. (CEC0N Trade 
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ews. Vol. VIII, No. 12 (December 1983), p. 3.) 
13/ Many Brazilian exporters of cotton yarn are on the 
CACEX waiting list for additional quotas, which become 
available when other exporters are unable to fill their 
quotas. (See Gazeta Mercantil, Feb. 10 1984.) 
14/ In February 1982, USTR initiated investigations 
under Section 301, instituted on the basis of petitions 
alleging that the Governments of Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
France, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom had subsidized 
the production of stainless and alloy tool steel (specialty 
steel) in a manner inconsistent with their obligations under 
the Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of 
Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of GATT (Subsidies Code). USTR 
decided not to initiate investigations concerning the 
petitioner's allegations with respect to Brazil. 
15/ There were no support programs for the 1980 and 
1981 crops. 
16/ Effective December 24 1981, import fees were 
increased to 2.1418 and 3.1104 cents per pound for raw and 
refined sugar respectively and customs duties for raw sugar 
with 96 degree polarity were raised from 0.625 to 2.8125 
cents per pound. 
17/ For the period May 11 1982 through June 30 1982, 
the U.S. established a global quota of 199 581 short tons. 
The quota for the third quarter of 1982 was 381 000 short 
tons. Since October 1 1982, quotas were established for 12 
month-periods (October-September). The overall sugar quota 
for 1983-84 is 2 952 million short tons, up from 2.8 million 
for 1982-1983. 
18/ If exporting countries foresee that they are 
unable to fulfill their quotas due to crop shortfalls or 
other reasons, these shortfalls can be redistributed among 
sugar-producing countries. 
19/ Excluded are quotas in the framework of 
international commodity agreements, articles retained in the 
U.S. customs service for specific reasons (e.g., because of 
improper sanitary or technical conditions) and 
investigations by the ITC of unfair import practices, under 
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (such as copyright and 
trade mark infringements). Excluded, also, are import 
restrictions for health reasons, e.g., the United States 
banks' imports of fresh meat from South America; beginning 
September 1 1984, the United States will ban imports of 
fresh fruit --papayas and possibly mangoes-- for human 
consumption, treated with ethylene dibromide, following a 
decision by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
Brazil has recently inaugurated an installation for 
fumigation of stored fruit at the Viracopos airport in Sa%~o 
Paulo, according to the technical standards required by the 
United States for fresh fruit imports into that country. In 
1983, Brazilian exports to the United States of papayas and 
mangoes amounted to 81 and 61 thousand dollars respectively. 
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Table IV.11 
WJEBAGE UHITES STATES IMPOST DUTIES CHA8GED OH MiflHS E80H BRAZIL 
<1980 saaple of GAIT) 
U.S. iaports U.S. iiport duties, ad valorea equivalents (Z) 
froi Brazil in 1980 
Nuiber of Siiple arithaetic average Trade weighted average 
tariff lines (U.S. ( Percentage 
aillions) breakdown Pre-HIN Post-HTN 1980 Pre-NTN Post-MH 1980 
total 549 3 642.4 100.0 3.1 2.4 3.0 4.9 4.6 4.8 
HEN 254 3 187.9 87.5 6.7 5.2 6.5 5.6 5.2 5.4 
Dutiable 147 1 360.4 37.2 11.7 8.9 11.3 13.1 12.3 12.8 
Duty-free 107 1 827.5 50.3 
GSP duty-free 295 454.4 12.5 7.8 4.5 7.2 5.7 3.6 5.3 
NEN-dutiable: 
Iariffs of up to 1SZ 108 820.3 60.7 8.0 6.2 7.7 7.2 6.1 6.8 
Tariffs of 15X or aore 39 531.1 39.3 21.9 16.4 21.3 22.1 16.4 21.3 
Tariffs of 25! or aore 7 66.4 4.9 32.9 24.6 32.5 51.5 51.3 51.4 
Iariffs of 35Z or aore 2 65.2 4.8 44.3 38.8 44.3 51.9 51.8 51.9 
United States concessions at KIN: a/ 
HEN-dutiable 147 1 351.4 100.0 11.7 8.9 11.3 13.1 12.3 5.4 
Included iteas 96 431.4 31.9 12.3 8.1 11.9 7.7 5.2 6.9 
Excluded iteas 51 920.0 68.1 10.5 10.5 10.2 15.6 15.6 15.5 
GSP-duty free 295 454.4 100.0 7.8 4.5 7.2 5.7 3.6 5.3 
Included iteas 259 371.0 81.4 7.9 4.2 7.2 6.3 3.7 5.8 
Excluded iteas 36 84.5 18.6 7.0 7.0 7.0 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by GAIT, 
j/ On iteas which were dutiable in 1980. 
107 
Table IV.11 
UNITED STATES; COUNTERVAILOffi.DUn.Pg^EEDINGS_ftFgECTIKG. IMPORTS FWH BMIl. 
Article TSUS Observations 
1974 Hon-rubber footwear 700.05-700.45 CUD-order: two alternatives according to proportion of total 
700.56; sales of each particular fira accounted for by export sales 
700.72-700.83 if <401 : 11.21 (1-24-79); 10.62 ( 3-31-79); 10.11 (6-30-79); 
700.95 9.5! (9-30-79); 1.0Z (12-7-79) 
if >402 : 4.3Z (1-24-79); 4.11 (3-31-79); 3.91 (6-30-79); 
3.71 (9-30-79); 1.0Z (12-7-79) 
CVD-order revoked in 1983, but offsetting export tax in 
Beazil will reiain in force 
1975 Leather handbags 706.0700 
1A£ AOAA 
Waiver in 1976; CVD-order revoked in 1980 
1975 Castor oil and 
/VOmOWV 
178.20 10.21 (1-24-79); 9.6Z (3-31-79); 9.12 (¿30-79) 
castor oil products 490.26 8.52 (9-30-79); 1.0Z (12-7-79) 
Currently: 2.53 
1976 Scissors and shears 650.90;92 14.51 (1-24-79); I3.8Z (3-31-79); 13.21 (6-30-79) 
12.5Z (9-30-79); 2.5Z (12-7-79) 
Currently: 3.88Z 
1976 Cotton yarn 300.60 1983 administative review: 10.97Z 
through 302.98 
1976 Leather wearing apparel 791.7620 IIC: negative injury determination in 1979 
for aen and boys 
1977 Certain textile articles Various -generally (evoked in 1980 
all apparel iteas 
specified in bilateral 
textile agreeaents 
1979 Pig iron 607.15 17.9Z (1-24-79); 17.0Z (3-31-79); 16.2Z (6-30-79) 
15.3Z (9-30-79); 2.5Z (12-7-79) 
Currently: various rates (froa between 2.85Z and 
15.42Z; weighted average:6.07Z) 
1979 Ares and parts Various Investigation suspended in 1980 
1979 Ferrochroaiua 606.24;30;37;44 Investigation suspended in 1980 
1981 Carbon steel plate Self-initiated by the U.S. Departaent of Coaaerce 
1982 Certain carbon steel products 
- hot-rolled carbon 607.6615;9400 ITC: affirmative preliminary determination (February 1982) 
steel plate 608.0710,'IICO Suspension agreement (September 1982) 
- hot-rolled carbon 607.6610;6700;8320 IIC: negative preliminary determination 
steel sheet and strip 607.8342;9400 
- cold-rolled carbon 607.8320;8344 ITC: negative preliminary determination 
steel sheet and strip 608.1940;2140;2340 
- structural shapes ¿09.60 ITC: negative preliminary determination 
- hot-rolled carbon steel bar 606.8310;8330:8350 ITC: negative preliminary determination 
- cold-foraed carbon steel bar 606.8805;8809;8815 ITC: negative preliminary determination 
1982 Carbon steel wire rod 607.17 ITC: affirmative preliminary determination 
Suspension agreement (September 1982) 
1982 PC steel wire strand 642.11 ITC: affirmative preliainary determination (April 1982) 
Suspension agreement (October 1982) 
ITC: negative final determination (March 1983) 
Suspension agreement remained without effect 
1982 Uelded carbon steel 610.32 ITC: affirmative preliminary determination 
pipe and tube fsiall diameter only) Suspension agreement (December 1982) 
1982 Certain stainless ITC: affirmative preliminary determinations in all three 
steel products cases. 
- hot-rolled bar 606.9005 Suspension agreement (February 1983) 
- cold-formed bar 606.9010 ITC: affirmative final determination 
- wire rod 607.2600;4300 
1982 Frozen concentrated ITC: affirmative preliminary determination (December 1982) 
Orange Juice (FCOJ) 163.35 Suspension agreement (March 1983) 
ITC: affirmative final determination 
1982 Tool steel 606.9300;9400;9505 ITC: affirmative preliminary determination (January 1982) 
606.9510;9525;9535 Suspension agreement (April 1983) 
606.9540 
607.2800;3405;3420 
607.4600; 5405; 5420 
1982 Commuter airplanes 694.1410 IK: negative preliminary determination (October 1982) 
1983 Iron bars 606.67;69;83;tf ITC: negative preliainary determination (December 1983) 
657.09;10J25 
1984 Certain carbon steel products various ITC: affirmative final determination (May 1984) 
1984 Uelded carbon steel pipe 
and tube (large diaieter) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of: 
US International Irade emission, 
OAS,Inventario de Investigaciones Coierciales de Estados Unidos y Otras Hedidas con Posibles Efectos Restrictivos 
para Paises Latinoamericanos y del Caribe. 
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Table IV.11 
UNITED STATES: SUBSIDIES CALCULATED BY THE DEPARTHENT OF COMERCE ON SELECTED ARTICLES IMPORTED FROM BRAZIL 






can be adjusted to 
later changes in un- preaiui 
derlying programs) 
Export subsidies Doiestic subsidies 
o t h e r 
Incoie tax Industrial Accelerated export and Total 
Export Preferential exeiption IPI rebates Developient depreciation doiestic subsidy 
credit writing capital tor export tor capital Council (CD1) for capital subsidies 
financing earnings investment Prograi goods lanufac-
tured in Brazil 
Non-rubber 7-31Dec79 P a/ n/a 4.00 0.43 
footwear 1980 P n/a 2.32 0.82 
(potential) P n/a 7.32 0.82 
Castor oil 1979 P n/a 3.55 0.16 
products 1979 P n/a 2.36 0.17 
Pig iron P 
E 15.20 c/ 6.50 c/ 
(Revision) E n/a 
Certain scissors 03.01.79- P n/a 
and shears 02.29.80 E n/a 2.03 0.76 
Cotton yarn 10.01.79- f n/a 
12.31.80 E n/a 3.28 0.27 
Carbon steel plate 1981 P 5.40 1.71 1.47 
Carbon steel 1981 
F 
P 10.63 1.31 0.34 1.77 
wire rod E 
Certain stainless 1981 P 
steel products E 10.65 1.85 0.55 0.80 
PC steel 1981 P 12.50 1.06 0.52 1.83 
wire strand E 11.00 1.13 0.55 0.91 
Orange Juice around P 
(FC0J) «arch 81-Feb.82 E 1.64 1.13 
0.34 b/ 4.77 
0.34 b/ 3.48 
0.34 b/ 8.48 
2.71 
2.53 
















a/ P=Preli»inary investigation, E=Einal investigation, n/a Not applicable as incentive was not granted at the tiae of the 
investigation. 
b/ Tax reduction on equipment used in export production; Decree Law No. 1248 of Decelber 2 1975 ( 0.03) + Preferential export finan-
cing under CIC-CREGE 14-11 (0.30)+incentives for trading cotpanies under Resolution 643 (0.01). 
c/ Weighted average of 16 exporting fins. 
4/ Export financing against foreign exchange contracts (ACC). 
£/ BNDE loan adjusted at only 20Z of the 0RTN variation. This prograi, instituted in 1975 is no longer in force. Subsidy refers 
to outstanding balance on such a loan received by one lajor producer. 
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Table IV.11 
UNITED STATES: IIC COUNTERVAILING DUTY WVESTIGATIOHS OK IMPORTS FROM BRAZIL IN 1981-1983 
U.S. imports from 
Product Petition filed on Brazil in 1981 Other countries involved in 
(U.S. $ millions) in investigations 
a) Affirmative injury determinations 
Hot-rolled carbon steel plate 
Carbon steel wire rod 
Small-diameter pipes and tubes 
Stainless steel products 
Frozen concentrated orange juice 
Tool steel 
Total 
January 11 1982 112.9 
February 8 1982 10.6 
Hay 7 1982 37.0 
June 16 1982 8.1 
July 14 1982 168.~9 
July 30 1982 4.3 
341.8 
7 EEC countries, Romania 
Belgium, France, Venezuela 
France, Italy, Korea, Uest Germany 
Uest Geriany 
b) Negative injury determinations 
Hot-rolled carbon steel sheet and strip January 11 1982 1.3 several EEC countries 
Cold-formed carbon steel sheet and strip ,, 3.7 ,, 
Carbon steel structural shapes ,, 4.8 ,, 
Hot-rolled carbon steel bar ,, 2.2 ,, 
Cold-formed carbon steel bar ,, 0.4 ,, 
Prestr. concrete steel Hire strand March 4 1982 3.3 
Commuter aircraft . August 13 1982 54.1 
Subtotal 69.7 
Non-rubber footwear ¿/ On request of Brazil 327.3 (Spain and India) 
Total 397.0 
Total iiports subject to investigations 738.8 
Source: ECLAC on the basis of ITC publications. 
3/ negative determination, but offsetting export tax retains in effect. 
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Table IV.11 
IMITED STATES: ITC INVESTIGATIONS ON DIAZ IL IAN AITICLES IN 1981-1383 AND COSIESPONDING US W O R T S IN 1979-1982 
Iaport penetration rate 
Value (thousands ot US dollars) Quantity Brazilian products j/ 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1979 1980 1981 1982 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Unfair trade investi9ations 
Non-rubber fooUear 239 596 327 251 349.710 
Certain steel products 
- Hot-rolled carbon 
steel plate 61 754 101 796 112 855 
- Hot-rolled carbon 
steel sheet and strip 7 313 1 818 1 3112/ 
- Cold-foraed carbon 
steel sheet and strip 2 481 506 3 695 y 
- Carbon steel struc-
tural shapes 4 861 7 4 my 
- Hot-rolled carbon 
steel bar 6 900 3 983 2 151 2/ 
- Cold-foraed carbon 
steel bar 311 310 414 y 
Carbon steel plate 
Carbon steel tiire rod 10 - 10 553 
PC steel uire strand 3 072 1 899 3 335 
Stall diaaeter 
pipes and tubes 13 000 17 000 37 000 
Stainless steel prod. 3 061 3 157 8 052 8 447 
- Hot-rolled bar 779 782 1 088 1 327 
- Cold-foraed bar 2 282 2 353 4 546 5 220 
- Hire rod - 22 2 418 1 900 
Tool steel 20 571 4 285 5 824 
EC0J 103 630 64 753 168 870 
FCOJ-crop year (111 010) (66 791X162 084)1282 439) 
Coaauter airplanes 5 298 21 653 34 016 20 756 
Certain carbon steel prod 2 246 8 837 32 049 
Escape Clause 
Stainless steel and 
alloy tool steel 3 081 3 746 12 336 14 287 
- Stainless steel bar 3 061 3 135 5 634 6 547 
- Stainl. steel uire rod 22 2 418 1 900 
- Alloy tool steel 20 571 4 285 5 824 
Carbon and certain alloy 
steel products 125 731 154 917 226 867 222 330. 
1/ 32 000 31 338 43 028 41 114 4.2 5.7 5.1 
W 206 323 309 2.6 4.2 4.2 
y 28 7 4 2/ 0.2 
t! 8 765 1 491 9 289 2/ 
y 20 0.3 • • 
y 24 14 7 2/ 0.4 0.3 0.2 
y 656 669 749 V • • 0.1 0.1 
i! 33 0 32 579 - - 0.6 
y 12 704 7 809 13 680 
c/ 40 49 74 1.1 1.2 1.6 
1/ 2 030 1 716 4 263 5 218 0.8 0.7 1.9 2.9 
541 450 536 949 0.9 0.8 1.0 2.3 
1 489 1 253 2 378 3 129 1.1 0.9 2.0 2.2 
- 13 1 349 1 140 - 0.03 2.7 2.8 
£/ 14 340 1 751 - 0.3 1.9 
e/ 152.3 97.7 203.1 14.1 7.2 16.6 
e/ (163.9) (100.1) (197.9) (352.2) (15.4) (7.8X16.71(27.9) 
1/ 5 20 37 
& 8 22 108 0.5 
c/ 2 044 2 076 6 014 8 074 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 
2 030 1 703 2 914 4 078 1.1 1.0 1.9 3.1 
13 1 349 1 140 0.02 2.4 2.6 
14 340 1 751 2 803 0.01 0.3 1.8 3.4 
i./ 437 459 549 602 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.8 
Source: ECLAC on the basis of ITC publications. 
V In voluae teres in relation to US apparent consuiption. 
J/ January-Noveaber. 
3/ 1983 ieports: value: • 333.1 aillion; voluae: 1 258 thousand.short tons; iaport penetration rate: 1.51. 
j/ 1 000 pairs, 
b/ 1 000 short tons. 
£/ Short tons, 
d/ 1 000 pounds. 




BRAZIL: PRODUCTS SUBJECT ID EXPORT TAXES TO OFFSET INCENTIVES CONSIDERED AS SUBSIDIES 
Br THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMERCE 
(On export to the United States through 04.30.85) 
Export tax rate Corresponding Exports to the U.S. 
Central Bank (U.S.I lillions FOB) 
Description Initial Revised Resolution 
1' (date reso- 1981 1982 1983 
lution) 
Non-rubber footwear 15.00 19.00 750 (07.23.82) 385.4 372.5 560.3 
Castor oil and castor oil prod. 15.00 11.00 699 (06.25.81) 34.1 13.4 23.0 
Pig iron 15.00 11.00 699 (06.25.81) 31.1 14.5 21.8 
Certain scissors and shears 15.00 18.19 863 (11.09.83) 2.0 2.1 1.1 
Cotton yarn 15.00 11.00 699 (06.25.81) 5.5 9.7 8.8 
Leather wearing apparel 15.91 11.91 692 (04.30.81) 2.1 2.5 3.4 
for ten and boys 
Certain textile products 15.63 11.63 692 (04.30.81) 21.9 7.7 27.6 
Leather handbags for ladies 15.00 11.00 708 (11.13.81) 6.6 3.8 5.1 
Carbon steel plate 12.16 765 (09.23.82) 86.4 42.4 42.8 
12.53 798 (02.10.83) 
Carbon steel wire rod 14.90 768 (10.13.82) 18.7 25.2 4.2 
15.50 798 (02.10.83) 
PC wire strand ¡3.89 773 (11.26.82) 4.1 2.1 3.2 
14.41 798 (02.10.83) 
0.0 812 (03.30.83) 
Stall diameter welded carbon 13.30 798 (02.10.83) 80.0 34.4 41.5 
steel pipes and tubes 
Frozen concentr. Orange juice b/ 3.51 838 (06.09.83) 268.4 328.2 281.9 
Certain stainless steel products 13.42 812 (03.30.83) 2.4 2.7 6.3 
16.26 878 (12.20.83) 
Tool steel 15.31 819 (04.27.83) 9.0 10.8 11.7 
18.77 847 (07.20.83) 
19.83 878 (12.20.83) 
Carbon steel plates and sheet, coils c/ 27.42 897 (03.13.84) 7.2 38.7 194.8 
Total trade 964.9 910.7 1237.5 
Source: ECLAC. 
y On the reinstitution of the export credit preaiui; Central Bank resolution 692 (04.30.81). 
b/ Exports of FCOJ becaie subject to a 20X export tax after the laxidevaluation of the cruzeiro in 
February, 1983, This rate was reduced to 16.492 on June 9 1983, the total tax rate for exports 
to the U.S. thus retaining 202. On July 9 1983, the global rate was reduced to 12. 
c/ There is no suspension agreement in force. 
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Table IV.11 
UNITED STATES: ANTIDUMPING ACTIONS AGAINST IMPORTS EROH BRAZIL 
Antidmping investigations on articles iiported froi Brazil 
Tear Product TSUS 
1972 Fig iron 606.13J15 
1973 Vinyl fill 771.4312 
1977 Nethol alcohol 497.96¡99;499.97 
1982 Certain carbon 607.6615J9400 
steel products 608.0701;1100 
1982 Velded carbon steel 610.3208¡3209;3231¡3232 
pipe and tube 610.3241;3244;3247 
1982 Helaiine 425.1020 
1982 Carbon steel «ire rod 607.17 
1983 Carbsn steel piste 607.6610;6615;9400 
and sheets 608.0710;1100 
1983 Carbon steel sheets 607.6700;8342;9400 
Antidumping duties in effect, July 1984 
Product Exporter Kate of duty Date Exports to the United States in 1983 
(Z) ($ thousands) 
Printed vinyl fill 52.00 August 1973 _ 
Carbon steel wire rod All firis 63.50 Noveiber 1983 4 202 
Cosigua 0.00 April 1984 1 822 
Belgo-Hineira 7.40 April 1984 1 235 
Carbon steel plate Cosipa 100.04 January 1984 20 636 
Usiiinas 65.58 January 1984 19 421 
Coils CSN 52.57 January 1984 1 983 
Cosipa 89.04 January 1984 -
Usiiinas 50.55 January 1984 -
Hot-rolled carbon Cosipa 8.07 April 1984 20 539 
Steel plate and sheet Usiiinas 1.44 April 1984 10 513 
Source: OAS, Inventaría de Investigaciones Comerciales de Estados Unidos y Otras Hedidas con Posibles 
Efectos Bestrictivos para los Países Latinoamericanos y del Caribe. 
(Washington, Sept. 1983, 52p. (0EA/Ser.H/XIII,CIES/CEC0N/459) 
ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the press and by CACEX. 
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Table IV.11 
UNITED STATES: ESCAPE CLAUSE INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING PRODUCTS FROh BRAZIL 
Year Product TSUS IlC-determination; 
Decision by the President 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962: 
1970 Non-rubber footwear 700.5l;52;53;60 Adjustment assistance 
Trade Act of 1974 (Section 201): 
1975 Steel, stainless and alloy tool 607.01;04 Adjustient assistance 
608.18;52;76;78;85 
609.06;08 
1975 Footwear 700.05 through 85 Adjustment assistance 
1975 Honey 155.70 No action 
1976 Footwear 700.05 through 85 Adjustient assistance 
(excl. 700.51;52;53;60) 
1977 Colour television receivers 685.20 
1977 Ferrochromium, low-carbon 607.30 No action 
1977 Ferrochroiiua, high-carbon 607.31 No action 
1977 Zinc, unalloyed, unwrought 626.02 No action 
1978 Ferrochroiiui, high-carbon 607.31 Tariff increase 
(3 years' period) 
1979 Leather wearing apparel 791.7620;40;60 No action 
1979 Hotor vehicle chassis 692.02;03;10;11;20;21 No action 
1982 Steel, stainless and tool 606.90 through 95 Tariff increase 
607.26 through 90 and iiport quotas 
608.26 through 64 
609.45 
1983 Non-rubber footwear ITC: negative injury determination; 
no action reconended 
1984 Certain steel products ITC: affirmative injury deteriinHion 
Source: 0AS, Inventario de Investigaciones Comerciales de los Estados Unidos y Otras Hedidas Vigentes con 
Posibles Efectos para los Países Latinoamericanos y del Caribe. 
(0EA/Ser.H/XIII,CIES/CEC0N/459, Washington, 1 September 1983). 
ECLAC on the basis of ITC docuients. 
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Table IV.11 
UNITED STATES: RESTRICTIONS ON IHPORIS OF TEXTILES FROH BRAZIL (SPECIFIC LIMITS) 
Levels of 
restrictions 
Type of (aillions of Reference Growth Swing 1/ Carry- Carry-
restrictions Products affected square yard period over forward 
equivalents) 2/ 3/ 
Restrictions as originally notified under Article 2:1 
Articles 3 and 6 I Tarn of cotton (Cat. 1-4) 34.7 j/ 1 Oct. 70-
(LTA) II Fabrics of cotton (Cat. 5-27) 43.4 j/ 9 Sep. 77 
III Apparel, aade-ups and aisc. 
textiles (Cat. 28-64) 6.9 j/ 
Total 85.0}/ 
Restrictions in period January 1974-flarcb 1979 
Article 4 HFA I Tarn of cotton (Cat. 1-4) 40.0 
II Fabrics of cotton (Cat. 5-27 ) 49.0 
III Apparel, lade-ups and aisc. 
textiles (Cat. 28-64 ) 25.0 
Total 114.0 
1 Apr. 76-
31 Bar. 79 
lesstrictions in period April 1979-Harch 1982 
Article 4 UFA 
(extension of 
Agreeaent) 
I Tarn of cotton (Cat. 300-301) 45.8 b/ 1 Apr. 79-
31 Kar. 82 
II Fabrics of cotton (Cat. 310-320 ) 36.1 b/ 
isz 
(1QZ in group) 
15Z 
(10X in group) 
11Z 6Z 
III Apparel, lade-ups and aisc. 
cotton textiles (Cat 330-369 ) 28.6 b/ 
Total 110.5 b/ 
Source: GAIT, Textiles Surveillance Body, Report of the Textiles Surveillance Body to the Textiles Coaaittee for the Hajor Review 
Addendua, Evolution of Restrictions Since the Entry into Force of the Arrangeient 
Regarding International Trade in Textiles (COH.TEX/SBrtlO/Add.4, Geneva, 14 October 1980). 
W Suing: the use of a proportion of an unfilled liiit for a category to increase the restraint liait of another category up to a 
certain percentage (usually 71). 
2/ Carryover: use in the present bilateral agreeaent of an unused proportion of an iaport liait for a category froa the correspond-
ing category of the previous year up to certain percentage specified in the agreeaent. 
y Carryforward: use of a category in the present bilateral agreeaent year of a proportion of a next year's liait for a correspond-
ing category up to certain percentage increase specified in the agreeaent. 
3/ level for twelve-aontb period ending in 1974. 
5/ 3rd agreeaent year. 
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Table V.10 
UNITED STATES: BILATERAL AGREEMENT UNDER THE MFA, IMPORTS FROM BRAZIL SUBJECT TO SPECIFIC RESTRAINTS AND QUOTAS FILLED 
Iiports 
Product category Type of restraint a/ Final adjusted US imports charged against Percentage 
restraint level from Brazil restraint level filled 
1978/79 1982 1978 1979 1982 1978 1979 1982 1978 1979 1978 1979 1982 
1 OOP square yards 
300,301 Yarns D 35 000 35 279 100.8 
313 Sheeting SL SL 17 517 18 743 24 500 22 213 1 560 9 613 13 427 133 76.7 0.7 39.2 
315 Printcloth SL D 14 769 15 803 12 000 619 224 1 580 279 460 1.9 2.9 13.2 
316 Shirting SL H - 1 000 1 000 0 - 3 0 - 0.0 0.3 
318 Yarn-dyed fabrics NCL D 1 000 1 000 1 500 276 276 394 420 541 42.0 54.0 26.3 
319 Duck SL S 3 664 3 920 7 000 1 180 808 3 363 722 975 19.7 24.8 48.0 
331 Gloves MCL M 1 200 700 1 0 0 1 0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
1 000 dozens 
333,334,335 Coats NCL DSN 53 53 116 5 2 3 6 1 10.8 1.7 2.3 
338/339 Knit shirts MCL DSN 348 340(SL) 361 250 203 117 256 173 73.7 50.7 32.4 
340 Shirts, not knit SL M 199 132 29 2 1 , , 1 0.7 0.1 0.2 
341 Blouses, not knit HCL H 48 48 48 1 s . 1 , , , , 0.2 0.5 2.1 
345 Sweaters SL If 46 50 19 6 8 ,, 7 6 15.2 12.7 0.0 
347,348 Trousers SL D 242 259 258 129 75 79 106 59 43.7 22.8 30.6 
349 Brassieres, etc. NCL M 146 146 146 1 0 1 1 0 0.8 0.0 0.7 
Source: 1978-1978: United States International Trade Commission, The Nultifiber Arrangement, 1973 to 1980. Washington, Harch 1981, 
2 v. il. (USITC publication 1131). 
1982: ITC (Coipiled fro* Perforaance Reports and Textile Quotas Reports of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of 
Textile and Apparel). 
a/ SL=specific limit, |4CL-iiniiui consultation level, S=specific, Designated and M=minimum. 
Table IV.11 
UNITED STATES: RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF TEXTILES ORIGINATING IN BRAZIL 
(BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH REFERENCE PERIOD 4/1/82-3/31/85) 
A) Specific liiits (Annex B) 
Category Description 
Aggregate 
Group I Cotton yarn and fabrics 
Sheeting 




Group II Apparel, lade-ups etc. of cotton 
4/1/82- 4/1/83- 4/1/84-
3/3/83 3/31/84 3/31/85 
SYE 171.1 183.1 195.9 
SYE 133.6 142.9 152.9 
SYD 24.5 26.2 28.1 
SYD 9.1 9.7 10.4 
SYD 7.0 7.5 8.0 
SYE 37.5 40.1 43.0 
B) Designated consultation levels (Annex C) 
Quantity 
Category Description (Billion SYE) 
300/301 Yarn, carded and coibed 33.0 
314 Poplin and broadcloth 1.5 
315 Printcloth 12.0 
318 Yarn-dyed fabrics, n.e.s. 1.5 
320 Woven fabrics, other 4.0 
334 Other coats, HB 2.0 
335 Coats, MGI 2.0 
337 Playsuits 2.3 
339 Knit shirts, blouses, MSI 1.9 
347 Trousers, MB 2.5 
348 Trousers, HGI 2.1 
350 Dressing gowns 2.0 
359 Other cotton apparel 1.0 
363 Terry towels 5.0 
369 pt. Other cotton lanufactures 2.5 
369 pt. Floor coverings 3.4 
613 Fabric, non-cellulosic, n.k. 5.0 
614 Fabric, other, n.k. 3.0 
Source: 6ATT, Textiles Surveillance Body, Arrangement Regarding International Irade 
in Textiles. Notification under Article 4:4. Bilateral Agreeient be-
tween the United States and Brasil. (COM.IEX/SB/777, 3 August 1982.) 
Note: HFA articles for which no specific liiits or designated consultation levels 
are established are subject to category consultation levels for possible 
restrictions as follows: 
Cotton categories: 1 lillion SYE for each non-apparel category and 
700 000 SYE for each apparel category. 
Man-iade fibers are subject to the consultation lechanisi when iiports are 
causing »arket disruption, unless the i(ported volute is less than 1 000 000 
SYE for non-apparel categories and 700 000 for apparel categories. 
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Table IV.11 
COTTON TEXTILES: US IMPORTS ERQM BRAZIL BY HFA CATEGORIES 
(In thousands of square yard equivalents) 
Subgroups 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Total 66 239.6 36 526.2 57 461.8 16 726.2 13 569.2 59 660.5 69 361.9 
I Yarn of cotton 48 804.9 13 044.5 7 835.8 126.0 13 395.0 35 279.4 
300 Carded yarn 48 701.2 13 044.5 7 835.8 126.0 13 077.2 34 113.8 
301 Coibed yarn 103.7 317.8 1165.6 
II Fabrics of cotton 8 607.8 13 514.2 36 171.0 6 244.0 5 257.2 36 789.3 19 878.2 
310 Cingha» 2.2 114.5 
312 Corduroy 0.2 
313 Sheeting 3 098.2 8 274.6 22 213.4 1 560.5 1 580.7 20 894.7 9 613.0 
314 Poplin and broadcloth 213.5 321.0 779.3 515.9 245.9 979.1 959.9 
315 Printcloth 52.8 471.0 618.6 224.1 417.0 4 372.7 1 580.1 
316 Shirting 226.9 24.4 74.2 3.5 
317 Iuill and sateen 2 061.6 2 132.0 5 705.8 1 877.0 1 283.1 5 065.6 2 488.8 
318 Yarn-dyed fabric n.e.s. 102.2 215.0 276.3 538.5 4%.9 595.5 393.6 
319 Duck 216.5 999.6 1 180.2 807.7 904.5 3 402.3 3 363.2 
320 Woven fabrics n.e.s. 2 636.1 1 098.8 5 397.4 720.3 304.7 1 405.2 1 361.4 
Ill Apparel, «ade-ups 
•isc. of cotton 8 826.9 9 967.5 13 455.0 10 356.2 8 312.0 9 476.2 14 204.3 
330 Handkerchiefs 0.0 
331 Gloves 2.5 
332 Hosiery 0.7 0.6 
333 Suit-type cloths 15.2 3.6 6.3 2.9 7.8 
334 Other coats 14.4 74.1 70.3 74.0 44.8 8.0 28.5 
335 Coats 14.6 125.6 125.3 28.8 6.4 49.6 66.2 
336 Dresses 18.2 9.6 3.8 9.7 10.1 13.7 11.5 
337 Playsuits 276.9 980.1 1 137.2 1 494.2 1 241.8 1 020.2 525.2 
338 Knit shirts 101.6 159.4 205.0 234.9 111.1 100.4 184.1 
339 Knit shirts and blouses 1 225.4 601.8 1 595.3 1 226.2 1 075.8 562.4 656.7 
340 Shirts, not knit 43.9 63.4 47.4 23.1 2.0 4.2 1.8 
341 Blouses, not knit 33.5 29.7 10.3 4.5 0.6 11.0 8.3 
342 Skirts 21.3 13.2 4.8 13.3 18.6 2.8 2.7 
345 Sweaters 0.3 64.4 239.8 286.6 4.3 0.1 0.5 
347 Trousers 1 462.4 1 436.1 1 576.5 527.3 259.4 73.0 368.7 
348 Trousers 39.7 132.0 714.0 807.7 795.8 822.4 1 043.7 
349 Brassieres 11.6 4.7 5.8 2.8 0.8 
350 Dressing gowns 962.7 1 643.3 1 442.4 588.3 559.8 912.7 1 401.5 
351 Nightwear 87.8 0.5 4.1 29.1 
352 Underwear 34.2 54.5 28.7 0.5 29.4 5.0 
359 Other apparel 247.4 153.6 690.7 40.7 25.8 87.3 175.5 
361 Sheets 0.6 
362 Bedspreads and quilts 0.4 
363 Terry .and other pile towels 792.2 1 450.2 1 929.0 1 470.5 1 119.9 2 450.5 1 490.8 




BRAZIL, 1980-1983, EXPORTS OF SUGAR 
(Tons) 




Exports to the United States 
Raw sugar 
Refined sugar 
Exports to other countries 
Rau sugar 
Refined sugar 
1 960 452 1 785 208 1 ¿19 841 1 720 833 
611 884 915 634 1 089 840 782 642 
797 170 
4 300 
1 163 282 
607 584 




824 874 1 333 698 1 434 027 
915 634 1 087 789 775 829 
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PROBLEMS IN BRAZIL-U.S. TRADE 
RELATIONS: LOOKING AHEAD 
Two conflicting conclusions can be drawn from the analysis 
of the previous chapters: Brazil-U.S. trade relations are 
tense because of a combination of philosophical and 
practical differences; yet, at the same time, the efforts 
to resolve trade differences are being carried out in a more 
cordial atmosphere than at any time during the past decade. 
This chapter will discuss in turn the reasons for the 
tension and the details of the conflict/cooperation, and 
conclude with recommendations. 
a) Tension in Brazil-U.S. trade relations 
Philosophic differences between the two countries on 
appropriate instruments to promote industry and exports are 
great. Important techniques used to promote Brazilian 
industry and exports are a variety of subsidies, many 
specifically on exports,1/ others on production rather than 
exports but which may affect exports.' U.S. firms have 
complained about domestic content provisions, export 
performance requirements, and in certain key sectors —such 
as small computers-- market reservations for Brazilian 
firms. 
Brazil grants protection to domestic producers on 
infant-industry grounds, in the conviction that its large 
domestic market provides potential economies of scale. 
Export subsidies are defended on the ground of the 
need to compensate for internal and external discouragements 
to exports, such as the overvaluation of the exchange rate, 
the high cost of domestic inputs due to protection of infant 
industries and import controls for balance-of-payments 
reasons, as well as tariff escalation and trade restrictions 
in importing countries. 
The GATT international trade rules recognize the need 
for developing countries to adopt trade policies different 
from the industrialized countries, but do not prohibit 
industrialized countries from reacting to specific actions 
of developing countries. 
The United States opposes the validity of these 
export-promotion measures to the degree they are practiced 
by a relatively more advanced developing country like 
Brazil. The issue of principle for the United States is 
minimum government interference with the market place. The 
practical issue is that private U.S. producers feel they 
are asked to compete with governments, particularly in the 
U.S. home market, when Brazil subsidizes exports to the 
United States. The United States did agree in the 
subsidies/countervailing duties code to give developing 
countries some freedom to use export subsidies for 
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manufactured goods, but not complete freedom; and, in any 
event, the United States did not agree to refrain from 
countervailing against subsidies. 
Another difference in philosophy exists on the issue 
of reciprocity. Brazil, as a developing country, received 
the benefits of the United States trade concessions on a 
non-reciprocal base. The United States argues that while 
Brazil may not have to give equivalent concessions for 
benefits received, Brazil does owe something more than a 
token gesture in return. 
Still, another difference in philosophy arises on the 
question of graduation of Brazil from U.S. tariff 
preferences. The argument here is the same: Brazil 
considers itself to be a developing country; the United 
States considers Brazil to be a relatively advanced country 
economically, one which requires fewer special privileges 
than less advanced countries. 
The differences arise regularly, particularly in 
public statements designed for home-country audiences, but 
they cannot be resolved on the level of principle. One 
reason for the cordiality of the current bilateral trade 
discussions is that each country recognizes this. Problems 
are being addressed on a practical level.2/ 
The times have conspired to make the trade problems 
more difficult than they would be if the solutions required 
only the setting aside of principle. The severe recession 
of 1981-82, accompanied by the high level of unemployment, 
intensified protectionist sentiment in the United States. 
So has the burgeoning U.S. trade deficit. Practices by 
trading partners which might be tolerated in the United 
States in more prosperous times became fair game during the 
recession for those who wish to keep out imports. Brazil 
has its own contextual problems. Its balance-of-payments 
crisis, and the need to generate a large trade surplus to 
help service its external debt, coincides with the increase 
in U.S. protectionism. Until recently, Brazil was loath to 
devalue its exchange rate sufficiently to stimulate exports 
for fear of worsening an already intolerably high rate of 
inflation and complicating the servicing of its external 
debt, and this made subsidization inevitable if the desired 
merchandise trade surplus was to be achieved. 
Brazil, based on its industrial strategy and 
accompanied by the need to generate a large trade surplus, 
restrains imports of U.S. and other foreign products and at 
the same time maintains export subsidies. U.S. producers 
and labour, who have their own problems, place pressure on 
their government to keep out subsidized imports from Brazil. 
These practical positions are then justified on the basis of 
trade philosophies that are antithetical to each other. 
Tension exists in trade relations but this tension has been 
kept mostly in check by the efforts of the two countries to 
resolve particular trade issues as they arise. They have 
had some successes and some failures in resolving specific 
trade issues. 
122 
b) Trade conflict 
While Brazil has enjoyed a growing surplus in its trade with 
the United States in recent years, Brazil is not, on the 
whole, a major factor in the U.S. market. It is for some 
products, however. U.S. imports from Brazil in 1982 were 
less than 2% of total U.S. imports and a majority of these 
imports --as evidenced by the fact that they are not 
dutiable on entry into the United States— are not 
competitive with U.S. production.3/ Despite this, 
restrictive U.S. action against Brazil has been 
substantial. In 1982 and 1983, as noted in Chapter V, 25% 
of Brazilian exports to the United States were subject to 
U.S. countervailing duty procedures, although in the 
majority of cases the action was suspended. The figure on 
countervailing duty examinations rises to 40% for Brazilian 
exports of manufactured goods to the United States. In 
addition, the United States has raised its duties on alcohol 
and tobacco, restricted imports of sugar, and imposed quotas 
on imports of specialty steel, all of which affect Brazil; 
and the United States has challenged alleged Brazilian 
subsidies on soya products and frozen poultry exported into 
third markets. Many examinations were opened on charges of 
Brazilian dumping into the United States and antidumping 
duties have been imposed. 
No other country has had to overcome this high 
proportion of protective action taken against its exports to 
the United States, even though many countries export more 
goods --and more manufactured goods— to the United States. 
This must have something to do with the techniques used by 
Brazil in its export drive. These have tended to conflict 
with U.S. trade philosophy as embedded in laws and 
regulations, whereas practices of other developing country 
exporters --such as South Korea and Taiwan-- have been less 
conflictive with U.S. philosophy in their export drives. 
U.S. restrictions against imports from Brazil are set 
forth in detail in Chapter V. It is useful to summarize 
U.S. restrictions by type and severity since this gives a 
good picture of the way the United States approaches trade 
relations with Brazil. Brazil's trade policy is set forth 
in Chapter III and a comparable summary will be provided 
here. U.S. restrictions will be covered first and in 
greater detail because the import practices are more 
complex. 
c) U.S. treatment of imports from Brazil 
i) Tariffs. In 1982, U.S. imports from Brazil were 
$4.2 billion. Of this, $1.4 billion or 34.1% entered free 
of duty on a most-favoured-nation (MFN) basis. An 
additional $563.9 million or 13.5% was imported duty free 
under the U.S. general system of preferences (GSP). 
Consequently, a total of $2.0 billion or 47.6% of U.S. 
imports from Brazil in 1982 entered free of tariff charges 
Of the dutiable imports, the average (mean) duty (in 1981) 
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was 8.2%. This will decline to an estimated 7.5% in 1987, 
when all the tariff reductions agreed to in the multilateral 
trade negotiations (MTN) have been phased in. 
It is noted in Chapter V that in 1982 out of 669 
dutiable tariff items imported from Brazil and not granted 
duty-free treatment under GSP, U.S. duties exceeded 15% on 
127 items, 25% on 51 items, and 35% on 18 items. In other 
words, the duty on imports has a fairly large standard 
deviation; the simple mean does not bring out the many high 
duties. Despite this variability of duty rates, the 
conclusion reached in Chapter V —that the most serious 
impediments against U.S. imports from Brazil are non-tariff 
in nature-- is undoubtedly valid. Changes in the 
relationship between the dollar and the cruzeiro tend to 
dwarf the impact of the effect of most U.S. tariffs against 
Brazilian goods and potentially the cruzeiro could be 
sufficiently depreciated to eliminate almost completely the 
effect of the U.S. tariff on most items. That the exchange 
rate has not been used fully to this end in any systematic 
way is evident from the many U.S.-Brazil disputes on 
subsidies and countervailing duties. Brazil started to use 
its exchange rate more effectively to promote exports in 
1983. 
ii) Countervailing duties. The philosophic and 
practical differences between the two countries are most 
intense in the use of export subsidies by Brazil and the 
requests by U.S. competitors for imposing countervailing 
duties against these. The number of countervailing cases 
brought against U.S. imports from Brazil has exploded in 
the past two years (see table V.2). There were about 15 
outstanding cases in November 1983, and they are still 
growing, although there were suspension agreements in effect 
on most of these. A suspension agreement permits Brazil to 
take action itself to nullify the effects of the export 
subsidy on the U.S. market, usually by collecting the 
equivalent in Brazil of what the countervailing duty would \ 
be. What this means, in economic terms, is that Brazil may 
have a different exchange rate, product by product, based on 
the combination of the prevailing exchange rate for exports 
generally, the subsidy provided to encourage exports of 
particular products, and the nullification of the effect of 
the subsidy by an export tax for products on which there is 
a suspension agreement. This system involves internal 
Brazilian bargaining between the government and particular 
industries, and then further negotiation between U.S. and 
Brazilian officials, but only after U.S. officials have 
done some bargaining (or information gathering) of their own 
with the U.S. industry. It clearly is a procedure made to 
order to engender uncertainty in trade for specific 
products. The many sets of necessary negotiations also 
assure the lack of transparency in decision making. 
Each side accepts in principle that there must be a 
better way to order trade between the two countries. This 
was reflected in a memorandum of understanding between the 
two countries agreed to on December 2 1982, but still not 
signed a year later. The memorandum of understanding has 
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not been made public. Its essential feature is a Brazilian 
undertaking to phase out export subsidies in return for more 
certain treatment by the United States on imports benefiting 
from Brazilian subsidies. There is some business and 
government dissatisfaction in the United States about the 
proliferation of suspension agreements, particularly for 
steel imports,5/ and in Brazil that it is being asked to 
undertake a major trade reform at the most inopportune time. 
The subsidy/countervailing duty issue is the most 
intractable one in Brazil-U.S. trade relations. (The 
elimination of this problem would not resolve all trade 
conflicts, however.) The issue has been kept under control, 
albeit in a manner not completely satisfactory to either 
side, through the technique of suspension agreements. What 
the United States is requesting of Brazil is not easy to 
accomplish. Elimination of export subsidies will require 
either a more rapid depreciation of the cruzeiro to 
generalize the export incentive, but this has the side 
effect of complicating the effort to reduce inflation; or 
an alteration of the tax system so that export incentives 
are not countervailable, which could antagonize the United 
States if the technique were too blatant. 
What has kept the issue manageable on both sides is 
the evident effort to avoid a political explosion over trade 
issues at a time when each country faces trade and 
balance-of-payments problems. 
The foregoing discussion deals with trade in 
manufactures. There is both tension and a potential for 
cooperation in agricultural trade. The United States has 
asserted that Brazil is subsidizing exports of agricultural 
products --soybean oil, soybean meal, and poultry— into 
third-country markets and thereby capturing more than 
Brazil's traditional share. The U.S. assertion —both as 
to subsidies and share-- is disputed by Brazil. The two 
countries do have some common cause in opposing excessive 
agricultural subsidies of the European Economic Community in 
third country markets. 
iii) Antidumping duties. As with countervailing duty 
cases, the number of actions being brought against Brazil by 
U.S. petitioners has increased during the last two years,6/ 
and antidumping duties have been imposed on important 
categories of steel products which are prohibitive to 
further exports to the United States. This probably 
reflects the intensity of the Brazilian export drive, the 
concern of U.S. competitors because of the depressed 
economic conditions in the United States for much of this 
period, and the fact that antidumping cases can be brought 
after subsidy petitions are handled by other than a 
countervailing duty in the United States. 
iv) General System of Preferences. The nature of the 
GSP system in the United States and the specific treatment 
of Brazil under GSP is provided in Chapter IV. As noted in 
that chapter, Brazil in recent years has been the fifth 
largest supplier of goods to the United States under GSP 
--the average annual rate of increase in GSP imports from 
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Brazil in current dollars has been 15% from 1976, when the 
program started, through 1982. Despite its ranking as the 
number five GSP beneficiary, Brazil captures only a small 
share of total U.S. GSP imports from all sources— 6.1% in 
1981. 
There is no meeting of the minds between U.S. and 
Brazilian authorities on the GSP issue. Indeed, there is a 
vast philosophic and potentially practical gulf. As a 
developing country, and as a country extremely hard hit by 
oil price increases, high international interest rates, and 
the general economic slowdown in the industrial countries in 
recent years, Brazil would like even more generous treatment 
from the United States under GSP. Brazil's potential is 
being lost under various existing provisions of the U.S. 
GSP legislation. In 1982, out of a potential $828.8 million 
of duty-free imports under GSP, only $563.9 actually entered 
duty free. Of the remainder, $168.8 million were excluded 
on competitive need grounds, $20.4 million on the basis of 
graduation, and $75.7 million for administrative reasons. 
The competitive need exclusions were even greater in 1983 
—seven items were excluded with a U.S. import value of 
$256 million (see table IV.10). 
Brazil is being treated by the United States as a 
developing country, but as an advanced developing country. 
Thus far, the graduation exclusions have been modest. The 
competitive need exclusions have been more substantial. 
Under the legislation enacted by the U.S. to replace the 
current GSP legislation when it terminates in January of 
1985, advanced developing countries will be treated less 
generously than less advanced developing countries. What is 
intended under the new law is to provide a transition period 
for advanced developing countries but then to systematically 
differentiate between them and less advanced countries in 
the U.S. GSP system. 
The philosophic difference can be phrased simply. 
Brazil, as a developing country, seeks more generous GSP 
treatment from the United States; the United States 
considers Brazil to be an advanced developing country and 
therefore contemplates giving Brazil even less generous 
treatment than it now receives. 
v) Other U.S. import restrictions. These include 
restrictions on trade in textiles and apparel, escape clause 
actions on specialty steels, and quotas for sugar. There 
are also actions brought under Section 301 of the Trade Act 
of 1974 (unfair trade practices). These are covered in 
Chapter V and need no elaboration here. 
The intensity of these measures varies widely. Sugar 
quotas, reinstituted in May 1982, contributed significantly 
to the sharp decline of Brazilian sugar exports to the 
United States in 1982. Restraints under the MFA used to 
have no significant impact on Brazil's exports of textiles 
and apparel to the United States. However, since 1982, 
Brazil has reached the maximum permitted volume of exports 
of cotton yarn, the most important MFA category covered by 
the bilateral agreement on textile trade. The specialty 
steel import relief program affects only a modest amount of 
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trade, according to 1981 and 1982 trade statistics. The 
establishment of quotas on the basis of average trade 
volumes in recent years, however, more severely affects the 
most dynamic exporters to the United States, especially 
Brazil. 
d) Treatment of imports from the United States 
Just as an understanding of the economic situation in 
the United States is necessary to explain the proliferation 
of actions seeking to restrict imports from Brazil, so must 
one understand the economic situation in Brazil to 
understand its commercial policy. Brazil's commercial 
policy cannot be understood without also relating this to 
the country's financial external debt restructuring, its 
search for new financing, and the program with the 
International Monetary Fund. Brazil set out to reduce the 
current account deficit in its balance of payments along the 
following path: $14.8 billion in 1982; $6.2 billion in 
1983; and $5.3 billion for 1984. The 1982 deficit was 4.5% 
of gross domestic product, and this is projected to fall to 
around 1.7% in 1984. The key aspect of this reduction is 
the achievement of an increasingly large trade surplus based 
on a combination of increased exports ($20.2 billion in 
1982, $21.9 billion in 1983 and a forecast of $24.6 billion 
in 1984) and diminishing or stagnant imports ($19.4 billion 
in 1982, $15.4 billion in 1983, and $15.5 billion forecast 
in 1984). A large proportion of the import decline in 1983 
was for oil and its derivatives, but declines in non-oil 
imports were also involved. 
The combination of stagnant or declining real GDP and 
an objective of a growing trade surplus to be achieved in 
part by stagnant or declining imports makes normal access to 
the Brazilian market impossible. This is understood by U.S. 
officials and is one of the reasons that official complaints 
against Brazil's import practices tend to be muted. 
However, Brazil's financial crisis has not completely 
silenced the critics of Brazil's import policies. There is 
considerable feeling in both private and official circles in 
the United States that Brazil is coupling its external 
financial stabilization program with much old-fashioned 
protectionism. 
The United States has complained about the lack of 
access to Brazil for small airplanes at the same time that 
Brazil was successfully exporting its own small airplanes to 
the United States and other markets. A commission made up 
of the most senior officers of large private U.S. companies 
recently recommended to the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 
that Brazil should be pressed to relax its Import 
restrictions to the maximum extent consistent with its 
current economic situation. The tone of this recommendation 
is that Brazil should cease to hide behind developing 
country status in ordering its commercial policy but rather 
should begin to conform more closely to practices of the 
industrial countries with which it is increasingly 
competing. 
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The official U.S. position combines complaints 
against Brazil's trade practices with those concerning 
investment related to trade. There are U.S. complaints 
against Brazil's informatics policy under which investment 
in the small computer industry is being limited to Brazilian 
firms. Similar complaints have been lodged by the 
pharmaceutical industry. Official complaints have been made 
against Brazil's domestic content and export performance 
requirements in agreements with multinational corporations. 
U.S. officials have expressed concern over what they 
believe is Brazil's practice of targeting certain industries 
for exports and then providing the official financial 
assistance needed to make this targeting effective. One can 
summarize the U.S. complaints as being based on the belief 
that Brazil's industrial structure should permit it to 
increasingly take on trade obligations and practices more 
like those of developed rather than less developed 
countries. This attitude is evident already, but will not 
reach its full flowering until Brazil emerges from its 
present economic crisis. 
A reasonably safe prediction, therefore, is that U.S. 
complaints about Brazilian commercial policy —and 
industrial and investment policies as they affect trade— 
will grow in intensity over time. 
e) Looking ahead 
Several significant conclusions about U.S.-Brazil trade 
relations emerge from this study. At present, the U.S. 
market is important to Brazil, although at 23% of total 
Brazilian exports (the 1983 percentage) it is less 
overwhelming compared with the dependence of other Latin 
American countries. Mexico, for example, normally sends 
between 60 and 70% of its exports, by value, to the United 
States. The United States supplied 16% of Brazil's imports 
in 1983 --32% of Brazil's non-oil imports— which again is 
significant but not startling. Less than 2% of U.S. 
imports now come from Brazil and in 1983 only 1.3% of U.S. 
exports went to Brazil. The composition of the bilateral 
trade is given in Chapter IV. 
One must conclude that while the present trade 
relationship is important --more so for Brazil than for the 
United States— it is the promise of a much greater future 
interchange that most interests traders in each country. 
One is also struck by the pervasiveness of 
restrictions placed in the way of trade by each of the 
countries. Despite the low import penetration of Brazil in 
the U.S. market, Brazil has become a favorite target for 
U.S. competitors seeking countervailing duties. For trade 
in the other direction, there is a wide belief in the United 
States that Brazil restricts imports not only to achieve 
equilibrium in its balance of payments, but also on 
protectionist grounds. The bilateral trade balance changed 
after 1980 from a surplus in favor of the United States to 
one in favor of Brazil. If trade in services is included, 
the surplus is still in favor of the United States. 
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Bilateral trade conflicts are substantial at present, 
but muted. Most subsidy complaints raised in the United 
States are dealt with by mutual agreement, on a case-by-case 
basis, rather than by the imposition of a countervailing 
duty. This is because of U.S. recognition of Brazil's 
difficult economic situation and the acceptance that Brazil 
must reduce its current account deficit —that Brazil must 
run a trade surplus because its deficit in services is 
large-- if it is to limit future borrowings and meet 
interest payments on a current basis on outstanding external 
debt. Similarly, Brazil's import restrictions are accepted 
as necessary in the current economic context. However, the 
potential is great for a transformation from muted conflict 
to open trade warfare once Brazil emerges from the current 
crisis. The two countries should prepare now to institute 
policies that will prevent this from happening. 
Avoidance of trade conflict will not be easy to 
achieve because of the philosophic and practical differences 
that guide the commercial policies of the two countries. 
The Brazilian system is replete with export subsidies and 
this is justified on the dual ground of necessity and of 
right as a developing country. The one trade practice that 
is anathema to U.S. officials and the U.S. Congress is the 
use of fiscal incentives to penetrate the U.S. market; 
this is seen as forcing private U.S. producers to compete 
with foreign governments. The long history of efforts to 
introduce an injury test in U.S. subsidy/countervailing 
duty legislation is testimony to the intensity of U.S. 
antagonism to subsidized imports. The injury test, when 
finally accepted, took place in the context of the 
subsidy/countervailing duty code in GATT, in which there was 
a quid pro quo; and even then, the injury provision was 
granted only to other signatories of the code. 
Brazil uses domestic content and export performance 
requirements as part of its trade and industrial policies, 
and presumably these measures, coupled with infant industry 
protection, is what has made possible Brazil's trade and 
industrial expansion of the past two decades. U.S. 
officials can be expected to oppose each of these techniques 
--domestic content requirements, export performance 
conditions, and protracted infant industry protection by 
Brazil-- on grounds of principle. 
The philosophic and practical differences also show up 
on the issue of reciprocity. Brazil justifies its lesser 
degree of reciprocity on its status as a developing country. 
The United States is becoming increasingly vexed by the lack 
of reciprocity from Brazil —not necessarily complete 
reciprocity, since the countries are unequal economically, 
but much more reciprocity than Brazil has granted thus far— 
which is seen as a relatively advanced country, with a 
sophisticated industrial base. This same philosophic 
difference explains Brazilian opposition to graduation from 
GSP and U.S. preparations to graduate Brazil and other 
similarly advanced developing countries. 
There is no need to further belabor these philosophic 
differences. One must accept and understand them and then 
seek to fashion cooperative trade relations in spite of 
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them. Neither country is likely to convince the other that 
its view of international trade practices is the correct 
one. 
f) What can be done? 
The most comprehensive answer is the most self-
evident, for each country to correct the conditions —other 
than those inherent in its philosophic view of the 
international trading system— that have made the current 
situation such a conflictive one. 
For the United States, this requires economic growth 
sustained over a period of years, which would at least 
partially remove one of the conditions on which 
protectionism thrives; and a lowering of interest rates, 
which would ameliorate one of the main aggravations of 
Brazil's current account outflow. With an external debt 
estimated by the Brazilian authorities at $94 billion in 
1983 and projected to grow to more than $100 billion in 
1984, each percentage point of interest rate reduction is as 
significant to Brazil's current account correction as any 
conceivable one-year increase in exports to the United 
States generated by increased U.S. growth. Indeed, a one 
percentage point decrease in interest costs sustained for a 
full year would be the equivalent of about one-sixth of 
Brazil's merchandise exports to the United States in 1983.7/ 
Brazil's trade surplus targets —which motivate many of the 
import restrictions and the continuation of export 
subsidies— could be reduced if interest rates in 
international money-market centers declined. It is hard to 
exaggerate the potential importance to Brazil, and the 
opportunities opened for Brazil to practice a less 
restrictive commercial policy, of declines in interest costs 
on external debt. A more active policy of positive U.S. 
adjustments to trade to reflect changing comparative 
advantages also constitutes an important instrument to 
reduce trade conflicts. 
For Brazil, the requirement is to complete 
successfully its stabilization program since only then can 
significant import liberalization take place. 
Beyond these admonitions on overall economic policy, 
there are specific trade actions that each country could 
take that might alleviate the pressures for conflict that 
exist in the bilateral trade relationship. 
For the United States, these actions include the 
following: 
1. There is a high correlation between U.S. 
protectionism as it affects specific imports from Brazil and 
the competitiveness of the Brazilian product. This is 
precisely what one would expect. It is of little use to 
argue with the U.S. competitor that Brazil's overall import 
penetration in the United States is low because it often is 
not in the specific case; or if it i3, the potential for 
increased penetration exists. However, the U.S. Government 
is able to take a larger view than product competitors of 
trade relations with Brazil and should resist case-by-case 
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protectionism impeding imports of precisely those products 
which Brazil is able to export. 
2. Graduation from special or preferential treatment 
should be a logical consequence of economic development and 
not constitute precipitative demands, certainly not in the 
light of Brazil's balance-of-payments and debt service 
problems. The issue is one of timing; the course of study 
to prepare a country for graduation does not have a 
specified period. The issue, therefore, is the transition 
time the United States gives to Brazil before it is 
considered graduated. The transition time should be 
reasonably lengthy --five years at least after the new U.S. 
GSP legislation comes into effect in January 1985, and 
probably more. There are several reasons for this 
recommendation. The most important is that in terms of 
preferential imports from Brazil, the issue is a trivial one 
for the United States. GSP imports from Brazil in 1982 were 
two-tenths of 1% of total U.S. imports. When imports of a 
particular product exceed competitive need limits, they lose 
preferential treatment even without graduation. The second 
reason is that while the issue is minor for the United 
States, it is significant for Brazil. In 1982, U.S. 
imports under GSP were 13.5% of total imports from Brazil 
and 20.5% of dutiable imports. It makes little sense for 
the United States to behave mechanically on the basis of 
some principle honored mostly in the breach to take an 
action that would have little benefit for the United States 
and could inflict serious damage on Brazil. 
3. Finally, in its trade actions, the United States 
must take into account the transfer problem which its own 
domestic economic policy had a role in creating by forcing 
up interest rates. Brazil can service its debt —at least 
the interest portion— only if its current account deficit 
is significantly diminished. The principal of the external 
debt cannot be reduced (except as inflation does so in a 
real sense) unless Brazil actually runs a current account 
surplus; and this will be difficult to achieve because of 
the interest payments on existing debt. U.S. protectionism 
must affect Brazil's ability to meet its interest 
obligations. It must affect the ability of Brazil itself to 
liberalize its import regime. These systemic issues cannot 
be ignored as the U.S. Government frames its trade policy 
vis-a-vis Brazil. 
For Brazil, these actions include the following: 
1. Brazil has a right to subsidize exports, but 
importing countries also have the right to countervail if a 
domestic industry is injured. There are other techniques 
which can encourage exports and which are more acceptable in 
international trade practice. The memorandum of 
understanding agreed to (but not signed) with the United 
States in December 1982 under which Brazil undertook to 
gradually terminate its export-subsidy regime tacitly 
recognizes that this is what Brazil plans to do. The 
maxidevaluation of the cruzeiro in February 1983, followed 
by minidevaluations in line with domestic inflation, have 
helped to restore Brazilian competitiveness. This exchange 
rate policy explains much of the Brazilian export success in 
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1983; and success in the future will be dependent on 
aggressive continuation of that policy. The use of the 
exchange rate to stimulate Brazilian exports is far less 
conflictive than selective export subsidization in trade 
relations with the United States (and, for that matter, with 
other industrial countries). Brazil can also encourage its 
industrialization by more taxes and other fiscal incentives 
at earlier stages in the production process —which is what 
most countries already do-- rather than to rely too heavily 
on subsidies at the final export stage. 
2. Once Brazil emerges from its current stabilization 
program it will find itself under severe pressure to ease 
(ease, not eliminate) its import restrictions. The 
understanding now exhibited by the U.S. Government over 
Brazil's trade policy will dissipate once it is felt that a 
balance-of-payments crisis no longer exists. Brazil can 
prepare for that time by easing some import restrictions now 
and looking to its tariff and exchange rate as the main 
future instruments for controlling imports. 
3. The proliferation of trade complaints against 
Brazil by U.S. competitors is a manifestation that despite 
its modest penetration of the U.S. market —modest by 
comparison with many advanced developing countries in Asia, 
against which there tend to be fewer complaints— Brazil is 
not seen in a favorable light as a trading country in the 
United States. Competitors complain about Brazil's 
subsidies and occasional dumping; and investors about 
domestic content requirements and Brazil's market 
reservations. What this implies is that Brazil could use 
allies in the United States to counteract the conflict that 
is likely to erupt after Brazil emerges from its current 
economic crisis. Modifying content requirements; easing 
some market reservations which now exist; loosening 
non-tariff import restriction; making common cause with 
U.S. importers of Brazilian products; and aggressively 
explaining Brazil's development, trade, and investment 
policies to influential groups in the United States would 
all serve to mitigate future bilateral trade conflicts.8/ 
Conclusion 
This study was undertaken because of the great importance of 
the economic relationship between Brazil and the United 
States. The study describes current trade policies in each 
country and their trade with each other, but the intent was 
to use the present as a springboard for looking ahead. 
The present is not necessarily a good indicator of the 
future. The United States has only recently emerged from 
its worst recession since the great depression of the 1930s, 
and is in the midst of an important internal debate about 
the future of its basic industries (such as steel and 
automobiles) and how it should encourage the high-technology 
industries of the future. Protectionist pressure has 
thrived in this atmosphere. This can be seen clearly in the 
steel industry, in which protection against Brazil has been 
intense. 
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Brazil also went through its worst economic crisis in 
eight decades and the stabilization effort involves an 
export drive and a limitation of imports. These actions 
must be aggravations to the United States, Brazil's most 
important trading partner, especially at a time of economic 
difficulty for the United States. 
Each side recognizes the other's current economic 
problems. This is reflected in the many suspension 
agreements in subsidy/countervailing duty cases in which 
each side has been willing to take action to prevent an open 
conflict. This understanding is apt to evaporate — o n both 
sides— when the economic situation in each country returns 
to what might be considered "normal". The actions suggested 
in this study are designed to prevent or mitigate future 
conflict and thereby make a contribution to the improvement 




1/ The nature of the Brazilian subsidy system is described 
in Chapter III. 
2/ Bilateral discussions take place on a semi-annual basis 
in the trade subgroup of the United States-Brazil 
consultative mechanism. 
3/ The data are given in Chapter IV. 
4/ Increased U.S. protectionism against Brazilian exports 
has been the main driving force for the introduction of a 
new trade bill, presented to the Brazilian Congress by Mr. 
Pratini de Moraes, member of the House of Representatives 
for the governing PDS party. The trade bill has been 
approved unanimously by the commissions for industry and 
commerce, constitution and justice, and foreign affairs, in 
which participate representatives of several political 
parties. It grants the Executive broad retaliatory powers 
(in the fields of trade in goods and service and finance) 
against countries that hamper or impede Brazilian exports. 
The bill updates former trade laws (some provisions were 
incorporated into Law 3244 of 1957 and Decree Law 1427 of 
1975, both prior to the MTN codes) and is similar to Section 
301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974. 
5/In 1982, of $234 million of U.S. steel imports from 
Brazil, $94 million, or 40%, were subject to countervailing 
duty suspension agreements. 
6/ The full list of antidumping actions, as of August 
1984, is presented in Chapter V (table V.7). 
7/ Brazil's total foreign debt amounted to $93.9 billion 
in December 1983, of which $10.3 billion was non-registered 
(short term) debt. The composition of medium- and long-term 
debt according to interest rate categories was as follows: 
US $ billion % Share 
Total 81.3 100.0 
Variable rate 65.1 80.0 
Prime 6.7 8.3 
Libor 57.6 70.8 
Other 0.7 0.9 
Fixed term 16.3 20.0 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Brazil Economic Program, 
Internal and External Adjustment (table 37, p.55), 
Volume 3, Brasilia (May 1984). 
Each percentage variation of the interest rate 
(normally variations in the New York prime rate are followed 
by similar variations in the Libor rate) sustained for a 
full year, thus imply a $650 million variation in interest 
payments on Brazil's medium- and long-term debt. 
8/ For instance, the Brazilian Iron and Steel 
Institute (IBS) has recently hired the services of a major 
U.S. lobbying firm in order to improve the image of the 




- Ambassador Brock annnounces annual GSP changes. Effective 
March 31, Brazil will be removed from GSP duty-free 
treatment on seven articles for either competitive need 
reasons or graduation. 
April. 1981. 
- Brazil reinstitutes the export credit premium. A 
timetable is designed for its gradual elimination until June 
1983, roughly equal to Brazil's original commitment in GATT. 
The United States continues to consider Brazil as an 
agreement country in relation to countervailing duty 
provisions. Offsetting taxes are charged on exports to the 
United States of non-rubber footwear, castor oil and castor 
oil products, pig iron, certain scissors and shears, leather 
wearing apparel for men and boys, certain textile products, 
leather handbags for ladies, and cotton yarn. 
October, 1981. 
- The Government of Brazil requests ITC to conduct an 
investigation on the likely effects of the revocation of the 
outstanding countervailing duty order on non-rubber 
footwear. 
November. 1981. 
- The Department of Commerce self-initiates antidumping and 
countervailing duty investigations covering carbon steel 
products imported from seven EEC countries. South Africa, 
Romania, Spain and Brazil (carbon steel plate), in response 
to significant imports of these products at prices below 
those established by the Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM). 
December, 1981. 
- The Tool and Stainless Steel Industry Committee and the 
United States Steelworkers of America file a petition with 
USTR pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
alleging that the Governments of Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
France, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom grant subsidies 
on exports of certain stainless steel products, which are 
inconsistent with the GATT Subsidy Code. USTR decides not 
to initiate an investigation on alleged subsidies provided 
by Brazil. 
January, 1982. 
- Seven U.S. steel prducers file 59 countervailing duty and 
33 antidumping petitions with respect to certain steel 
products imported from Brazil, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Romania, the United Kingdom and West 
Germany. The Department of Commerce terminates the 
investigations on carbon steel products, initiated in 
November 1981. The TPM is suspended. 
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February, 1982. 
- ITC makes an affirmative preliminary determination 
concerning hot-rolled carbon steel plate imported from 
Brazil. The preliminary determination is negative with 
respect to a series of other carbon steel products. 
- U.S. steel producers file a countervailing duty petition 
alleging injury by allegedly subsidized import of carbon 
steel wire rod from Brazil, Belgium and France and by 
imports, allegedly sold at less than fair value from 
Venezuela. 
March, 1982. 
- U.S. steel producers file a countervailing duty petition 
with respect to pre-stressed concrete steel wire strand from 
Brazil. 
- Ambassador Brock announces annual GSP changes. Effective 
March 31, Brazil will be excluded from duty free treatment 
on ten articles, representing $565.5 million of U.S. 
imports in 1981. Brazil will be removed on eight items 
because U.S. imports exceeded the competitive need limits 
in 1981 ($537.7 million) and on two articles because of 
graduation ($27.8 million). 
- Firms joining Brazil's BEFIEX program after March 31 will 
no longer receive the export credit premium during the whole 
period of their long-term export commitments. This measure 
follows a claim of the U.S. Government that Brazil had 
signed contracts granting the export credit premium through 
1991. 
- ITC makes an affirmative preliminary investigation with 
respect to carbon steel wire rod imported from Brazil. 
April, 1982. 
- A new bilateral textile agreement between Brazil and the 
United States goes into effect, in the framework of the MFA. 
May, 1982. 
- United States Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel) files a 
countervailing duty petition with respect to welded carbon 
steel pipes and tubes imported from Brazil. 
- The United States reinstitutes sugar quotas under Section 
22 of the Agricultural Act of 1933. Brazilian raw sugar 
exports to the United States will fall from 960 thousand 
tons in 1981 to only 286 thousand tons in 1982. 
June, 1982. 
- ITC issues an affirmative preliminary determination 
regarding welded carbon steel pipes and tubes imported from 
Brazil. 
- U.S. steel producers file a countervailing duty petition 
with respect to stainless steel bar and rod imported from 
Brazil. 
- The Department of Commerce takes an affirmative 
preliminary determination with respect to carbon steel 
plates imported from Brazil. 
July, 1982. 
- Florida Citrus Mutual files a countervailing duty petition 
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with respect to frozen concentrated orange juice imported 
from Brazil. 
- U.S. steel producers file a countervailing duty petition 
alleging injury from subsidized imports of tool steel bar 
and rod from Brazil. 
- The President of the United States directs the Office of 
the USTR to conduct an expeditious examination of Brazilian 
poultry export subsidies, under Section 301 of the Trade Act 
of 1974. 
- The export tax on non-rubber footwear shipped to the 
United States is increased from 11 to 19% to offset changes 
in subsidies granted by working capital financing. 
August, 1982. 
- ITC issues an affirmative preliminary investigation on 
certain stainless steel products imported from Brazil. 
- The Department of Commerce makes an affirmative 
preliminary determination with respect to subsidies paid by 
Brazil on exports of pre-stressed concrete steel wire 
strand. 
- The United States holds informal consultations with Brazil 
concerning Brazilian export subsidies on poultry. 
- Central Bank Resolution 765 charges a 12.16% offsetting 
export tax on exports of carbon steel plate exported to the 
United States, in the framework of a suspension agreement. 
September. 1982. 
- ITC issues a negative (preliminary) injury determination 
on certain commuter aircraft imported from Brazil. The 
investigation is terminated. ITC makes an affirmative 
preliminary determination on certain stainless steel 
products imported from Brazil and West Germany. 
- U.S. steel industries file an antidumping petition with 
respect to carbon steel wire rod imported from Brazil and 
Trinidad and Tobago. 
October, 1982. 
- A suspension agreement is reached on pre-stressed concrete 
steel wire strand. Central Bank Resolution 798 imposes an 
offsetting export tax of 14.41%. 
- A suspension agreement imposes a 15.50% offsetting tax on 
exports of carbon steel wire rod to the United States. 
- The U.S. Treasury Department provides a bridge loan of 
$1.4 billion to contribute to the financing of Brazil's 
balance-of-payments deficit. 
November, 1982. 
- Brazil and the United States agree to the maintenance of 
the export credit premium^through April 1985 (at a rate of 
11% of the adjusted FOB value). 
- At the GATT Ministerial meeting, Brazil votes in favour of 
a resolution that requests GATT member countries to conduct 
an investigation --to the extent possible-- of the services 
sector of their economies. 
- USTR completes its Section 301 investigation on specialty 
steels and recommends --among other measures-- an ITC 
investigation under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. 
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- ITC issues an affirmative preliminary determination in the 
antidumping investigation of carbon steel wire strand 
imported from Brazil. 
December, 1982. 
- Brazil and the United States agree to a memorandum of 
understanding. The main feature is a Brazilian 
understanding to phase out export subsidies in return for 
more certain treatment by the United States on subsidized 
imports. 
- ITC institutes a Section 201 investigation on specialty 
steel. 
January, 1983. 
- An antidumping petition is filed on behalf of Bethlehem 
Steel Corp. concerning flat-rolled carbon steel products 
imported from Brazil. 
February, 1983. 
- A suspension agreement is reached on frozen concentrated 
orange juice. The Government of Brazil imposes an 
offsetting tax of 2.77% on exports to the United States. 
- The cruzeiro is devalued by 23%. 
- The dollar equivalents of preferential working capital 
financing are reduced in line with the maxidevaluation of 
the cruzeiro. 
- Exports of many primary products become subject to export 
taxes to compensate for the maxidevaluation. 
- The offsetting export taxes on carbon steel plate, carbon 
steel wire rod and pre-stressed concrete steel wire strand 
are increased (Central Bank Resolution 798). 
March, 1983. 
- The Government of Brazil requests the continuation of the 
countervailing duty investigation on frozen concentrated 
orange juice. 
- ITC issues a negative final injury determination on 
pre-stressed concrete steel wire strand from Brazil. The 
suspension agreement signed in October 1982, will not remain 
in force. Brazil removes the offsetting export tax. 
- Ambassador Brock announces annual GSP changes. Effective 
March 31, Brazil will be removed from GSP eligibility on 12 
items as follows: (U.S. imports in 1982) 
Competitive need reasons 7 articles ($255.8m) 
Graduation 5 articles ($60.9m) 
- A suspension agreement is signed on certain stainl ess 
steel products. An offsetting export tax of 13.42% will be 
levied (Central Bank Resolution 798). 
April, 1983. 
- A suspension agreement is reached on tool steel. A 15.31% 
export tax will become effective (Central Bank Resolution 
819) . 
May, 1983. 
- ITC determines that the United States footwear industry 
would not be injured by the revocation of outstanding 
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countervailing duty orders on non-rubber footwear imported 
from Brazil, India and Spain. 
- ITC determines that increased imports of specialty steels 
are a substantial cause of injury to the domestic industry. 
ITC recommends a three-year import relief program beginning 
retroactive to January 1 1983. 
- The United States and Brazil signed memoranda of 
understanding which allow U.S. firms to contribute to the 
development of major energy projects. In the past, U.S. 
companies have been excluded from significant participation 
in the energy development program of Brazil. The memoranda 
of understanding expressed the intent of the Brazilian and 
U.S. Governments to assist their private sectors in 
reaching commercial agreements. (OTAP, 35th Report, 
p. 323.) 
June, 1983. 
- The export tax under the suspension agreement on frozen 
concentrated orange juice is increased to 3.51% to offset 
changes in subsidies in working capital financing. 
- Central Bank Resolution 832 increases annual interest 
rates charged on preferential working capital financing 
(former Resolution 374) from 40 to 60%. 
July, 1983. 
- ITC issues a final determination that a US industry is 
threatened with material injury by reason of subsidized 
imports of frozen concentrated orange juice from Brazil. 
The suspension agreement signed in February 1983, therefore, 
remains in effect. 
- The offsetting export tax on tool steel is increased to 
18.77% 
- The United States formally communicates the specialty 
steel import relief program to GATT under Article XIX. 
Brazil reserves its rights under Article XIX. 
August, 1983. 
- The U.S. Customs Service changes the tariff 
classification of certain tobacco, resulting in an increase 
of 83% of the import duty (from 17.5 to 32 cents per pound). 
September, 1983. 
- The Office of the USTR does not accept a petition from 
domestic footwear industries for an investigation of unfair 
trade practices by the Governments of Brazil, France, the 
United Kingdom, Taiwan, Korea and Japan. 
- The U.S. Department of Commerce (ITA) issues an 
affirmative preliminary determination on sales at less than 
fair value (LTFV) of hot-rolled carbon steel plate (57.82%) 
and hot-rolled carbon steel sheet (39.28%) imported from 
Brazil. 
- Brazil and the United States initiate discussions on a 
possible OMA under the U.S. specialty steel relief program. 
No OMA was concluded. The 35th OTAP report explains that "A 
major point of contention in the negotiations centered on 
proposed specific quota allocations for Brazil. The United 
States wanted a significant reduction from 1982 quota 
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levels, while Brazil argued for a quota representing the 
average of 1981 and 1982 shipments" (p. 329). 
November. 1983. 
- U.S. Steel Corporation files a countervailing duty 
petition against imports of carbon steel plate imported from 
Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. An additional dumping 
complaint is filed against Brazil. 
f The American Iron and Steel Institute requests Congress to 
enact legislation that limits steel imports to 15% of U.S. 
domestic consumption. 
- The export tax on certain scissors and shears is increased 
to 18.19% (Central Bank Resolution 863). 
January, 1984. 
- Central Bank Resolutions 882 and 883 increase interest 
rates on working capital financing (former Resolution 674) 
to 3% annually plus 100% of the variation of the monetary 
correction factor (ORTN). The amounts available for 
individual sectors are reduced, in some cases to zero. 
- Antidumping duties become effective on carbon steel plate 
(ranging from 65.58 to 100.04%) and coils (ranging from 
50.55 to 89.04%) imported from Brazil. 
February. 1984. 
- Brazil seeks —unsuccessfully— an export restraint 
agreement on steel plate in return for a withdrawal of 
unfair trade petitions. 
March. 1984. 
- The Government of Brazil levies a 27.42% tax on exports of 
certain carbon steel products to the United States in the 
expectation that the United States will eliminate a cash 
deposit. There is no formal suspension agreement. The 
United States does not agree to eliminate the cash deposit. 
- The U.S. Department of Commerce announces its intention 
to terminate the suspension agreements on carbon steel wire 
rod and carbon steel plate, alleging that the Government of 
Brazil had failed to comply with the terms of the agreement 
because of the late payment of the export taxes. 
April, 1984. 
- Outstanding antidumping duties on carbon steel wire rod 
are reduced to account for the effects on the cruzeiro's 
devaluation, as a result of an accelerated investigation 
requested by the Government of Brazil. 
- The Department of Commerce revises the net subsidy 
calculations on certain carbon steel plate, preliminarily 
established at 27.42% of the FOB invoice value to enterprise 
specific rates, ranging from 17.49 to 62.18%. 
May, 1984. 
- The Government of Brazil announces a three-year program to 
control the volume of exports of carbon steel coils and hot 
and cold formed carbon steel plate and sheet to the United 
States. In the first year of the program (from May 1 1984 
through April 30 1985) exports will be limited to 430 
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thousand tons, 52% less than the 1983 exports. (CACEX 
Communication 82 of May 29 1984.) 
June, 1984. 
- ITC determines that imports are not a substantial cause of 
injury to the domestic footwear industry, turning down a 
^ petition for import relief under Section 201 of the Trade 
Act of 1974. 
July, 1984. 
- ITC determines that imports are a substantial cause of 
injury to the U.S. steel industry and an import relief 
program under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 is thus 
justified. 
August, 1984. 
- Central Bank Resolution 950 obliges banks to finance 
working capital for export production completely out of 
their own resources and establishes that interest rates must 
be equal to the normal rates of each bank, less a percentage 
borne by FINEX (10% for operations for which certificates 
are issued after August 1). 
September. 1984. 
- The President of the United States decides to restrain 
imports of steel products to 18.5% of U.S. apparent 
consumption. USTR is requested to negotiate, within 90 
days, "voluntary" export restraint agreements with the main 
foreign suppliers. 
- The Minister of Finance of Brazil decides to reduce the 
export credit premium as follows: 9% in November 1984; 7% 
in December 1984; 5% in January 1985; 4% in February 1985; 
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